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ABSTRACT 
Client management forms part of a company's internal control environment. If 
management's hpnesty and competency are questionable, the audit evidence derived 
from its control system may also be questionable. The first study in this thesis 
consists of a survey that was administered to identify which factors auditors associate 
with the honesty and competency of client management. Factors associated with the 
honesty of client management are more likely to be associated with fraud risk, 
whereas factors associated with the competency of client management are more 
likely to be associated with error risk. In most cases, the auditors correctly identified 
the factors as being related to honesty vs competency. However, some of the fraud 
risk factors were classified as error risk factors. This will have impact on the scope of 
work of an audit. The second study is a behavioural experiment to examine the 
impact of client management behaviour on auditor's judgment. This is a 2 (initial 
honesty) x 2 (initial competency) x 2 (consistency of honesty) x 2 (consistency of 
competency) between-subjects design experiment. The survey in the first study 
serves as a means to determine what behaviours can best represent the 
operationalisations of honesty and competency in the experiment. The theories on 
impression formation particularly the category-diagnosticity theory underlie the 
manipulations of variables in the experiment. Both honesty and competency are 
tested simultaneously in the experiment. Previous studies have only examined 
honesty and competency in separate experiments. The findings for the experiment 
are not consistent for all audit assertions, and thus, there is not sufficient evidence to 
support the propositions in the category-diagnosticity theory. Thus, when both 
honesty and competency are being evaluated at the same time by auditors, their 
evaluation of one could have an impact on the other. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Honesty and competency of management have been the highlights in the collapses of 
companies. The Australian Royal Commission, in its report on the collapse of HIH 
Insurance, states that the lack of integrity that existed in the company, combined with 
the lack of attention to detail and accountability, were the factors leading to poorly 
conceived business decisions that were poorly executed (Owen 2003). HIH Insurance 
is one example where management lacked integrity and competency; this is also not 
uncommon with other corporate collapses such as Enron, Worldcom and Onetel. 
Management dishonesty and incompetency are the main factors of material 
misstatements in financial reports. Dishonest management may be tempted to 
perpetrate fraud when there is an incentive, opportunity and pressure to do so. For 
example, a company trying to attract investors in an initial public offer, or a company 
that is in the process of applying for loan, may be tempted to window-dress their 
financial reports in order to show good performance (Burns and Kedia 2006; 
Dechow et al. 1996; Efendi et al. 2007; Lie 2005). The competency of management 
also affects the quality of financial reports. If management is not competent, they 
may make bad decisions over accounting matters, which may result in materially 
misstated financial reports. In addition, managers who are not competent may make 
bad decisions with the poor results of those bad decisions being reflected in the 
financial report. This may put pressure on management to bias the accounts to cover 
up the effects of their bad business decisions. Therefore, audit client management 
characteristics are a factor that affects auditors' assessments of error risk (Goodwin 
1999; Helliar et al. 1996; Monroe et al. 1993; Peecher 1996). As a consequence, 
auditing standards emphasise the need for auditors to assess the honesty1 and 
competency of audit clients (ASA 2402 and ASA 3153). However, little is known 
about how management integrity and competency affect auditor judgments. Studies 
examining client integrity find that auditors' judgments of client integrity are 
important in auditors' decision-making, for example, in acceptance of client 
decisions (Ayers and Kaplan 1998; Ayers and Kaplan 2003), however, very few 
studies examine the impact of management integrity and management competency 
on audit risk judgments (Beaulieu 2001; Kizirian et al. 2005). 
1.2 Research Aims 
This thesis has two aims. The first aim is to identify factors that affect auditors' 
perceptions of the honesty and competency of client management and find out how 
these factors affect their assessments of the risk of fraud and error. The first study in 
this thesis addresses this aim. A survey study is undertaken where auditors are 
1 In the context of auditing standards this is also referred to as integrity. 
2 ASA 240 The Auditor's Responsibility Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Report. 
3 ASA 315 Identifying and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement through Understanding the 
Entity and Its Environment 
presented with descriptions of client management behaviour. The auditors categorise 
the descriptions of audit client management behaviours into honesty or competency 
behaviours or neither. For each behaviour description, participants also assess the 
level of risk of fraud and error arising from the behaviour. Therefore, the first study 
provides information about how different client management behaviours affect 
auditors' perceptions of client management's honesty and competency and their 
effect on assessments of fraud risk and error risk. 
The psychology literature reports that people exhibit positivity and negativity biases 
when forming impressions about the honesty and competency of people. Prior 
research finds that negative behaviours are more diagnostic than positive behaviour 
in people's judgement of honesty and positive behaviours are more diagnostic than 
negative behaviour in their judgment of competency (Klein 1991; Peeters and 
Czapinski 1990; Singh and Teoh 2000; Skowronski 2002; Skowronski and Carlston 
1987; Vonk 1993). (Anderson and Marchant 1989) also find that auditors display the 
same biases as other people in that they are negatively biased in perceiving honesty 
and positively biased in perceiving competency. However, Anderson and Marchant 
(1989) do not examine whether such biases affect audit related judgments by 
auditors. Perceptions of the honesty and competency of client management should 
affect auditors' judgments and decision-making, particularly with respect to 
assessments of the risk of fraud and error in the financial report. Fraud and error 
assessments may be affected by the positivity and negativity biases reported in 
Anderson and Marchant (1989). Therefore, the second aim of this thesis is to 
examine the effect of biases in auditors' perceptions of honesty and competency of 
client management as reflected in their judgments when making risk assessments 
related to audit assertions. To achieve this, a behavioural experiment is conducted. 
In the experiment, auditors read a case study on a hypothetical client, which includes 
information about the client's financial controller's behaviour that can be used to 
infer the honesty and competency of the financial controller. The findings from the 
first study are used to operationalise the honesty and competency variables in the 
behavioural experiment. After reading the information, the auditors make a set of 
assessments on whether several audit assertions are true or not true using a seven-
point Likert scale. Next, more information about the financial controller's behaviour 
is provided. The additional information is either consistent or inconsistent with the 
initial information, i.e., if the initial information about the financial controller 
describes him as honest and competent, the second set of information describes him 
as honest or not honest and competent or not competent. After reading the additional 
information, the auditors make a second set of assessments on whether audit 
assertions are true or not true. Both sets of assessments and the revisions to the first 
assessments are used to examine the effect of the financial controller's honesty and 
competency on the auditors' judgements and to determine whether auditors exhibit a 
positivity bias for information relating to competency and a negativity bias for 
information relating to honesty, as reflected in the risk assessments. 
1.3 Contributions 
This thesis makes several significant contributions to our understanding of auditors' 
perceptions of the audit client management behaviours. The need to separately 
identify honesty and competency is magnified with the enforcement of an auditing 
standard that specifically requires auditors to consider fraud in the audit of financial 
statements (ASA 240). Its implementation in recent years warrants further research 
into the issue on whether auditors appropriately identify and distinguish honesty 
factors (which affect fraud risk) from competency factors (which affect error risk). 
The survey study is the first research that examines auditors' perceptions of client 
management behaviours that relate to honesty and competency of client management 
that directly relate to the work of an auditor. This method is similar to the method 
used by Anderson and Marchant (1989). However, they do not extend the effect of 
honesty and competency and the biases associated with perceptions of honesty and 
competency to auditor judgments such as fraud and error risk assessments. 
1.3.1 Practical Contribution 
The auditing literature reports that among the most important factors relating to 
management characteristics are error risk and fraud risk factors (Apostolou et al. 
2001a; Heiman-Hoffinan et al. 1996; Smith et al. 2005; Weisenborn and Norris 
1997). However, not much is known on how auditors perceive such characteristics as 
displayed by the behaviours of the client management. The present study on auditors' 
perceptions of the behaviours of client management provides evidence on the impact 
of auditors' perceptions of client management behaviours signalling honesty and 
competency on auditors' judgments. The results may assist researchers in developing 
decision-making aids that take into consideration auditors' perceptions of 
management behaviour and enhance the accuracy of auditors' decisions without 
imposing additional cognitive costs. Further, it has been suggested that decomposing 
fraud risk assessments may require less cognitive effort in assessing fraud risk and 
may allow auditors to better process fraud risk factors (Wilks and Zimbelman 2004). 
Similarly, separately identifying the risk due to dishonesty from the risk due to 
incompetency may require less cognitive effort and lead to more accurate audit 
judgments. 
Even though auditors are sensitive to the integrity and competency of management 
(Abdel-khalik et al. 1983; Beaulieu 2001; Brown 1983; Hirst 1994; Joyce and Biddle 
1981b; Peecher 1996; Schneider 1984, 1985), prior research does not show how 
perceptive auditors are in recognising client behaviours that may be indicative of 
dishonesty and incompetency and how this impacts on risk assessments. Wrongly 
perceived behaviours may result in auditors planning to use inappropriate audit 
procedures. ASA 240 requires auditors to plan to conduct different audit procedures 
to detect material misstatements from fraud. Fraud detection procedures are supposed 
to be "forensic" in nature. Thus, a fraud risk factor related to the dishonesty of 
management that is wrongly classified as a competency factor and, therefore, an 
error risk factor, may lead to an ineffective audit. This thesis investigates whether 
auditors properly interpret the behaviours of client management as being related to 
honesty (related to fraud risk) and competency (related to error risk) and the effects 
of these behaviours on risk assessments. 
1.3.2 Theoretical Contribution 
Biases can distort auditors' judgments. Previous studies find that auditors are subject 
to biases such as a recency bias (Ahlawat 1999; Bamber et al. 1997; Brown 2009; 
Guiral and Esteo 2006) and a confirmation bias (Ashton and Ashton 1990; Kida 
1984). Further, cue-diagnosticity theory (Skowronski and Carlston 1987) proposes 
that people are negatively biased in perceiving honesty and positively biased in 
perceiving competency. Auditors are professionals, who are required to exhibit 
professional scepticism when conducting an audit. As a result, they may be more 
objective in their perceptions of honesty and competency of their client management, 
and the negativity and positivity biases reported in the psychology literature may not 
extend to audit judgments and decision-making. Therefore, this thesis extends cue-
diagnosticity theory by providing evidence on whether auditors act in the same 
manner as ordinary people in perceiving behaviours that signal honesty and 
competency and whether this impacts on their audit related judgments. This also 
enriches the literature on human behavioural studies. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter Two discusses the literature on audit risk 
in relation to the honesty and competency of audit client management. Chapter Three 
describes the survey study. Chapter Four discusses the belief revision model and cue-
diagnosticity theory (Skowronski and Carlston 1987) and the hypotheses to be tested 
in the behavioural experiment. The belief revision model predicts that negative 
information has a greater effect than positive information on belief revision, while 
cue-diagnosticity theory predicts a negativity bias in perceptions of honesty and a 
positivity bias in perceptions of competency. Chapter Five describes the development 
of the case study used in the behavioural experiment. Chapter Six reports the results 
of the experiment that examine the propositions of belief revision model and cue-
diagnosticity theory. The results presented in that chapter provide evidence on the 
existence or absence of biases in auditor's perceptions of honesty and competency 
behaviour of client management. Chapter Seven provides a summary and 
conclusions from the research findings. Some practical implications are also 
discussed. Finally, the chapter discusses the limitations and opportunities for future 
research from this research. 
Related supplementary information is presented in the Appendices. Appendix 1 
contains a list of probable honesty and competency behaviours, which are compiled 
from various sources, for example, actual cases, the auditing standards and previous 
research work. Appendix 2 contains the related documents and the questionnaire 
used in the survey study. The research instrument used in the behavioural experiment 
is presented in Appendix 3. 
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON AUDITORS' 
PERCEPTIONS OF CLIENT BEHAVIOUR 
2.1 Introduction 
Important factors in an entity's control environment are management's integrity and 
ethical values and their competency (COSO 1992). This chapter discusses the 
literature surrounding auditor's assessments of fraud risk and inherent risk. It relates 
the honesty of audit client management with fraud risk and their competency with 
error risk, which form the basis of my survey. 
The next section discusses honesty and fraud risk assessment followed by a 
discussion of competency and error risk assessment in Section 2.2. A conclusion is 
drawn in Section 2.3. 
2.2 Honesty and Fraud Risk Assessment 
Behavioural dimensions of an individual, such as honesty, form the characteristics or 
attitudes of that individual. Management's incentives and abilities to manipulate 
account balances are manifestations of their attitudes and moral reasoning. Given an 
opportunity to commit fraud, a dishonest manager may take advantage of a situation 
providing an opportunity for fraud, but an honest manager would not. 
Auditing standards are unambiguous in stating that fraud risk is one of the risks that 
require consideration by auditors (AuASB 2009b). ASA 240 (AuASB 2006) defines 
fraud as involving the use of deception to obtain an unjust or illegal advantage. Thus, 
an act that is legal but unjust, for example, not giving full disclosure of a takeover 
with the intention of concealing significant information from the shareholders that 
may jeopardise their interests, is considered a fraudulent act. ASA 240 (AuASB 
2006) requires auditors to identify fraud risk factors that may indicate that fraud 
exists in a client entity. Auditors should react to fraud risk factors by assessing the 
levels of risk accordingly and planning and conducting audit procedures to ensure 
that material misstatements due to fraud can be identified. 
Fraud involves deception. In a fraudulent action, there is an element of intentional 
false representation, which is acted upon the victim to the victim's damage (Albrecht 
et al. 2006). Traditional fraud theory states that there are three conditions that must 
exist if fraud is to occur (Cressey 1953), which are now popularly known as the 
Fraud Triangle (Albrecht et al. 2006). The first condition is pressure (or motivation) 
to commit fraud, where a fraud perpetrator may have pressure to commit fraud. For 
example, a manager has pressure to show good performance if his bonus is tied to the 
firm's performance. Such behaviour has been observed by a few studies. Dechow et 
al. (1996) find that management is motivated to manipulate earnings when a firm is 
trying to attract external financing at a low cost as stock options are also associated 
with incentives to misreport earnings (Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi et al. 2007; Lie 
2005). Similarly, misstatements are more likely to occur in firms that are constrained 
by debt covenants, or firms raising new debt or equity capital (Efendi et al. 2007) and 
firms may be motivated to window-dress their accounts in such circumstances to 
portray good performance. 
The second condition is the existence of an opportunity to commit fraud, for 
example, a poor corporate governance structure. Corporate governance has been 
recognised as one of the controls to address the risk of management override, where 
a higher incidence of fraud is partly due to greater opportunities associated with a 
poor governance structure (Hogan et al. 2008). Studies on corporate governance find 
an association between corporate governance practices and occurrences of fraudulent 
acts in firms. Prior research finds that firms with manipulated earnings are those that 
have less independent boards (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; Farber 2005; Lo et 
al. 2010; McMullen and Raghunandan 1996; Osma 2008). This is consistent with the 
findings that independent corporate boards provide effective monitoring of earnings 
management (Jaggi et al. 2009). In addition, firms that manipulate earnings tend to 
have the same person as chairman and CEO (Dechow et al. 1996), and where the 
CEO is the founder or chairman (Dechow et al. 1996; Farber 2005). Dominant 
management is one of the primary factors that increase the opportunity for fraud 
(Loebbecke et al. 1989). Audit committee characteristics also have an impact on the 
likelihood of financial statements being restated where higher occurrences of 
fraudulent acts are associated with firms: not having an audit committee (Dechow et 
al. 1996); fewer audit committee meetings (Farber 2005); having fewer financial 
experts on the audit committee (Abbott et al. 2004; Farber 2005); and where the audit 
committee is less independent and less active (Abbott et al. 2004). 
The third condition is rationalisation by the perpetrator committing the fraud. Fraud 
will not be committed if the perpetrator is unable to justify his fraudulent act. 
Management may rationalise that any behaviour that creates advantage for the firm 
in a competitive environment is tolerable and encouraged even though the act may 
create a disadvantage for the competition. Some of the common rationalisations for 
smaller business concerns are: owners to bend the rules a little in order to be 
successful; or they are unfairly disadvantaged due to their size and thus, 
compromising ethical standards is considered acceptable behaviour; or an unethical 
decision is taken as a short-term solution to develop the business (Jackson et al. 2010). 
However, Sitorus and Scott (2008) find that rationalisation does not have a direct influence 
on "fraud commission". Nevertheless, incidents of fraud appear to be higher when employee 
perceptions of organizational justice are poor (Rae and Subramaniam 2008) and thus, such 
an employee may justify their fraudulent actions 
Management may resort to lying to rationalise their actions.4 Lying may be 
accelerated where the environment created by the top executives is conducive to 
dishonesty. While management might think that it is necessary for them to be 
selective in telling the truth, which could be due to possible disadvantages or damage 
the truth could bring to the firm, this may lead to more lies to cover up the initial 
4 It is common in the business environment to lie and hope to get away with it (Williams 2009) even 
though it is thought to be bad in the business environment. 
lie(s). The extent to which management lies depends on the type of individuals they 
are. They could be classified as ethical individuals who are fully honest or economic 
individuals who are willing to lie to maximise wealth (Koford and Penno 1992). An 
ethical manager will not lie, whereas an economic individual tells lies necessary to 
maximise their wealth when they experience no disutility from lying (Gneezy 2005). 
A manager falls in a category somewhere along this continuum. 
There are individuals who weigh the gains and losses from behaving unethically. 
(Williams et al. 2009) find that unselfishness diminishes as potential gain increases. 
This is consistent with the linkage between ethical ideology and decision-making 
(Callanan et al. 2010). Callanan et al. (2010) find that there is a greater likelihood 
that an unethical option will be chosen when participants perceive higher personal 
benefit. Similarly, there is a greater likelihood that participants scoring low on 
idealism will choose an unethical option when there is a lower perceived chance of 
getting caught. Further, more ethical options are chosen when the perceived 
opportunity to commit the unethical act is low and when the perceived chance of 
getting caught is high. Their study illustrates the connection between honesty and 
portrayal of behaviour. Thus, it is possible to auditors to foresee potential fraud by 
observing the behaviour of client management. Auditors observing management's 
low idealism should be cautious as they may be more likely to make unethical 
business decisions than management with high idealism. 
However, such rationalisation can be attributed to the level of ethics promoted by the 
firm's environment. The tone at the top should be one that creates a general feeling 
of honesty and integrity that pervades throughout the organisation. The integrity of 
top management is one of the most important factors to consider when assessing the 
risk of material misstatement in financial statements. The strength of the internal 
control system and the economic condition of the client entity are the other major 
determinants of incidents of material misstatements in the accounting process 
(Warren 1979). Management who lack integrity have a tendency to override or 
circumvent controls (Dirsmith and Haskins 1991; Messier and Austen 2000b; Shailer 
et al. 1998). Unethical management is actually sending a message to employees that 
fraudulent or unethical conduct may be considered acceptable by the firm (Kenyon 
2009). Thus, if there exists in the firm, pressure and opportunity to commit fraud, an 
honest manager (or employee) will choose not to rationalise any unethical or 
fraudulent behaviour. Rationalisation to commit fraud seems to be the most 
important element in the fraud triangle that determines whether a manager or 
employee will commit fraud. Dishonesty makes it easier to rationalise, requiring less 
perceived opportunity or pressure for fraud to be committed. Thus, central to the 
issue of fraud occurrence is honesty. 
Very few fraud cases are discovered by auditors. Joseph T. Wells, the Chairman of 
the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), stated in an interview that 
audits have detected very few fraud cases (fewer than 5% of the fraud in an ACFE's 
study ) because the clues to fraud are largely behavioural and not necessarily 
financial in nature (Nilsen 2010). Therefore, auditors should pay attention to both 
financial and behavioural cues when assessing fraud risk. 
In their effort to promote ethical behaviour in firms, governments emphasise the 
importance of ethical conduct by management. The United Kingdom (UK) 
Government appointed the Cadbury Committee, which proposed the Code of Best 
practice (known as the Cadbury Code) in 1992. Since then, there have been many up-
dates of the code and the most recent is the UK Corporate Governance Code, which 
was issued in June 2010. The US Government enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, which imposed a dramatic change on the corporate governance practices of 
firms. This led to the development of codes of ethics for financial officers and also 
employees (Canary and Jennings 2008). Among the requirements is management's 
honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of conflicts of interests. 
The Act also requires firms to disclose their code of practice in their annual report. In 
Australia, the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council 
issued the Principles of Good Corporate Governance Practice and Best Practice 
Recommendations in 2003, which was revised in 2007, as guidelines for firms to 
promote ethical conduct among their managers and employees. 
5 Findings were reported in the 2010 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, which 
can be accessed at acfe.com/rttn. 
The eight principles laid down by the council are: (1) Lay solid foundations for management and 
oversight; (2) Structure the board to add value; (3) Promote ethical and responsible decision-making; 
(4) Safeguard integrity in financial reporting; (5) Make timely and balanced disclosure; (6) Respect 
the rights of shareholders; (7) Recognise and manage risk; and (8) Remunerate fairly and responsibly 
(ASXCGC 2007). 
Despite these efforts by governments, fraud is still on the rise. The Association of 
Certified Fraud (ACFE) reported that losses due to fraud, in terms of the US Gross 
Domestic Product, rose from $600 billion in 2002 to $994 billion in 2008 (ACFE, 
Report to the Nation, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008). One may deduce that it is perhaps the 
greed and dishonesty of those who hold power in the firms that drive these fraudulent 
acts. 
Studies on audit risk assessment, particularly in relation to fraud risk, show that 
auditors acknowledge the importance of management integrity in their assessments 
of audit risk, where it is found that the integrity of the audit client's management 
influences auditors' risk assessments (Allen et al. 2006; Apostolou et al. 2001b; 
Ayers and Kaplan 2003; Beaulieu 2001; Iyer and Reckers 2007; Joyce and Biddle 
1981a, b; Kizirian et al. 2005). In particular, the integrity of client management 
impacts on auditors' decisions on the acceptance of client (Ethridge et al. 2007; 
Peecher 1996), materiality estimates (Arnold et al. 2001; Bernardi and Arnold 1994; 
Friedberg et al. 1989), fraud detection (Bernardi 1994), likelihood of assessments of 
account overstatement and required write-downs (Goodwin 1999), and the discovery 
of misstatements (Kizirian et al. 2005). Auditors also adjust their risk assessments in 
relation to their client's reputation and, accordingly, amend their audit procedures 
(Ayers and Kaplan 2003; Beaulieu 2001; Johnstone 2000). 
Several studies rank the importance of the fraud risk factors in order to investigate 
which factors are weighted as the most important ones (Apostolou et al. 2001b; 
Heiman-Hofrnan et al. 1996; Smith et al. 2005; Weisenborn and Norris 1997). These 
studies find that management characteristics are the most important fraud risk factors 
and management's failure to display appropriate attitude about internal control is one 
of the most important individual factors. 
Studies investigate ways to effectively detect fraud. (Zimbelman 1997) finds that 
when risks are "decomposed" during the risk assessment as opposed to a universal 
assessment of the risk of material misstatements from both error and fraud, auditors' 
sensitivity to fraud risk factors that may be indicative of a material misstatement 
increase.7 Separate assessments and separate documentation of fraud risk increase 
auditors' attention to fraud risk cues. Therefore, fraud risk assessments are enhanced 
by considering fraud risk separately from misstatements due to error even though 
fraud risk factors may be difficult to interpret, measure and weigh (Allen et al. 2006). 
Studies also integrate fraud risk factors into fraud prediction models. Apostolou, 
Hassell and Webber (2001) develop a decision model to rank fraud risk factors. Bell 
and Carcello (2000) develop a logistic regression model that includes fraud risk 
factors as independent variables. They use 382 actual fraud and non-fraud cases to 
identify the risk factors they include as variables and their "best" model includes: 
weak internal control environment; management lies to auditors or are overly 
evasive; and an interaction between weak internal control environment and 
aggressive management attitude toward financial reporting. Both studies find that 
management characteristics are one of the most important factors. 
7 This is also a requirement under SAS 99 Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit 
AICPA. 2002. "Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit." In SAS 99. 
In developing a computational model to make more accurate audit risk assessments, 
Peters et al. (1989) develop a conceptual model of inherent risk evaluation. This 
model is reproduced in Figure 2.1. In this model, management's incentives and 
abilities to manipulate account balances are depicted as crucial in assessing inherent 
risk. 
Risk assessments should be an ongoing process as required by ASA 500 whereby 
understanding the client firm and its environment, including its internal control, is a 
continuous, dynamic process of gathering, updating and analysing information 
throughout the audit. Therefore, auditor's assessments of the integrity of 
management should be updated throughout the audit (Kizirian et al. 2005). 
Figure 2.1 
Conceptual Model of Inherent Risk Evaluation 
(Source: Peters, Lewis and Dhar, 1989) 
All of these studies find that management characteristics, which include the honesty 
of client management, affect auditors' assessments of risks, particularly their 
assessment of fraud risk. However, these studies do not actually illustrate the types of 
behaviours that could be categorised as behaviour that is honest or not honest. It may 
be concluded at this juncture, that the findings are quite general, whereas ASA 240 
(AuASB 2006) cautions auditors that fraud risk factors can be specific to each client 
and, therefore, cannot be generalised to all clients. It is crucial that auditors are aware 
of such behaviours at an early stage of the audit so that they can foresee the potential 
occurrence of a fraudulent act. Auditors have to exercise their professional judgment, 
as required by ASA 240, in determining the fraud risk factors that are specific to 
each client. Therefore, this study investigates whether auditors are able to distinguish 
between honest and not honest behaviours of the audit client's management and 
identify the impact of such behaviour on auditors' risk assessments. 
2.3 Competency and Audit Risk Assessment 
Competency is the quality that a person possesses of being suitably qualified 
physically and intellectually. A competent manager should perform effectively and 
efficiently and thus, the level of risk due to error (or inherent risk) may be set at a 
low level. Management makes up the control environment of an organisation and 
thus, the assessment of control risk must always include consideration of the control 
environment. The assessment of both inherent and control risk requires a high degree 
of audit professional judgment. If management is indifferent to the importance of 
controls then, no matter how effective the system might appear to be, control risk 
must be assessed higher than another system where the control environment is 
strong. 
Audit risk can be defined as auditor's willingness to accept that the financial 
statements may contain material misstatements after the audit is completed and 
auditor issues a clean audit report. The audit risk model is usually expressed as 
follows: 
AR = IR x CR x DR 
where; 
AR = audit risk or the risk that the auditor issues a clean audit opinion when the 
financial statements contain material misstatements. 
IR = inherent risk or the likelihood that there are material misstatements in a 
financial report before considering the effectiveness of the internal control structure. 
CR = Control risk is the likelihood that misstatements exceeding a tolerable amount 
will not be prevented or detected by the client's internal control structure. 
DR = detection risk or the risk that the auditor will not detect a material 
misstatement. 
Both inherent risk and control risk are affected by the client's environment, which 
include factors relating to the client's management. Thus, incompetent management 
contributes to inherent risk. 
In the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2004 requires auditors to perform a 
joint audit of the financial statements and the environment elements that include 
consideration of the quality and competency of the board of directors (Langmead and 
Michenzi 2010). This is consistent with ASA 315 (AuASB 2009b), which requires 
auditors to consider management's commitment to competence because employing 
incompetent people increases the possibility of misstatements in the financial 
statements due to errors. Client management and employees are among the 
components that make up the control environment of the client and the efficiency and 
effectiveness of internal control systems are also affected by the characteristics of 
employees or management because one of the five components of internal control is 
the control environment. Corporate management has the responsibility of ensuring 
that the internal control system operates effectively and efficiently. If an auditor has 
concerns about the competency of the client's management, this should affect 
auditors' assessments of inherent risk and control risk. 
Several studies find that characteristics of client management are factors linked to the 
presence of errors (Brumfield et al. 1983; Houghton and Fogarty 1991; Hylas and 
Ashton 1982; Kinney 1989). Management characteristics are perceived as the most 
important factors that influence inherent risk assessments at the financial statement 
level (Hellier et al. 1996; Monroe et al. 1993). Competency of client management is 
one of the factors that auditors consider when planning the audit (Abdel-khalik et al. 
1983; Brown 1983; Goodwin 1999; Hirst 1994; Joyce and Biddle 1981a; Peecher 
1996; Schneider 1984, 1985). Management is a source of information and, therefore, 
information obtained from more competent sources are considered as more 
diagnostic and affect the work of auditors more than information obtained from less 
competent sources (Goodwin 1999; Hirst 1994). 
Schneider (1984 and 1985), Margheim (1986) and Suwaidin and Qasim (2010) find 
that the competency and work performance of internal auditors are perceived as 
almost equally important in an auditor's decision on whether to rely on the work of 
internal auditors. The auditing literature also reports that, not only are auditors 
8 The other four components are entity's risk assessment process; information system; control 
activities; and monitoring of controls (ASA 315). 
sensitive to the competency of a source of audit evidence, they are also sensitive to 
the competency of their team members (Bamber 1983). 
Characteristics pertaining to top management and the board of directors, are among 
the important inherent risk factors (Colbert 1987). Gibbins and Wolf (1982), using a 
questionnaire, identify items thought to be predictors of whether significant problems 
would be encountered for a hypothetical audit. Auditors choose from these items and 
are allowed to add their own items. They identify two classifications, client factors 
and audit firm factors, where the competency of client's top management is one of 
the significant client factors. Research also shows that higher risks are linked with 
high turnover in key personnel (Brumfield et al. 1983) as high turnover means that 
inexperienced employees are performing the task. Thus, it is appropriate to assess 
higher inherent risk when management turnover is high. 
The competency of the client's staff responsible for or involved in the accounting 
process must also be considered when conducting an audit (ASA 240, ASA 315, 
ASA 500). Consistent with this requirement, Colbert (1988) finds that the quality of 
personnel in inventory calculation is the most important factor in influencing 
auditors' assessments of inherent risk as auditors consider it more important than 
factors such as controller turnover, financing pressure, and the complexity of 
inventory overhead. Another example is where accounting and financial staff do not 
have sufficient depth and experience to evaluate whether the application of complex 
accounting standards is appropriate, such as accounting standards for derivatives and 
hedges, and tax effect accounting. This leads to reliance on the external auditor to 
make the interpretations, which, in turn, may violate the auditor's independence 
(Langmead and Michenzi 2010). Houghton and Fogarty (1991) find that inherent risk 
factors such as non-systematic transactions have a higher likelihood of error. Some 
non-systematic transactions are normal recurring transactions and others are unusual 
transactions, which are not routine transactions that occur frequently and are not 
processed using routine processing procedures. These are normally accomplished by 
recording a journal entry. Unusual transactions are expected to have a high 
probability of error because routine processing procedures do not exist for such 
transactions. 
In addition, management-related elements affect auditors' assessments of inherent 
risk, such as the quality of personnel in the accounting system (Colbert 1987, 1988; 
Messier and Austen 2000b); and past performance of management (Peters et al. 
1989). Management having knowledge about their industry is also a condition for 
competency. In auditing the client's internal control environment, auditors must 
consider whether the client's management possess such knowledge. Studies find that 
management knowledge about changes in the industry and management's incentives 
influence auditor's assessments of inherent risk (Peters et al. 1989). 
Therefore, in assessing inherent risk and control risk, the attitude or behaviour of 
client management should be among the issues considered by auditors. Related 
studies find that the competency of an audit client's management has an impact on 
audit work, where auditors consider it to be an important element from the internal 
control environment and it is considered by auditors when making audit risk 
assessments. However, these studies do not show how specific behaviours affect 
auditor's risk assessments. Therefore, this study investigates whether auditors are 
able to distinguish between competent and not competent behaviours of the audit 
client's management and identify the impact of such behaviours on their fraud and 
error risk assessments. 
2.4 Conclusion 
When assessing the risk of fraud and error in the client's financial statements, 
auditors need to consider the integrity and ethical values of client management and 
management's commitment to competence. Prior research finds that auditors 
consider the behaviour of client management when assessing audit risk. However, 
research investigating whether auditors distinguish between behaviours indicative of 
honest vs. not honest behaviour and those that indicate competent vs. not competent 
behaviour has not been conducted. The first study in this thesis investigates which 
client management behaviours auditors perceive as being indicative of honesty and 
competency and auditors' perceptions about whether these behaviours contribute to 
low or high risk of fraud or error in the financial statements. 
CHAPTER THREE 
STUDY 1: A SURVEY TO IDENTIFY CLIENT 
MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOURS INDICATIVE OF 
HONESTY AND COMPETENCY AND THEIR IMPACT 
ON FRAUD AND ERROR RISK 
3.1 Introduction 
Auditing standards require auditors to consider the competency and integrity 
(honesty) of audit client personnel. However, little is known about what auditors 
consider to be honesty and competency cues. Therefore, this study uses a survey to 
identify cues that are considered by auditors to signal the honesty and competency of 
client management. A survey is suitable to identify which behaviours auditors 
consider as honest (or not honest) and competent (or not competent) behaviours. 
The results of the survey show that auditors classify client behaviour into honesty 
and competency behaviours and these perceptions are, in general, appropriately 
reflected in their assessments of risks. However, the results also indicate that, in 
some circumstances, auditors identify honesty factors as competency factors. In other 
words, some items that are indicative of fraud risk are considered as indicative of 
error risk. From a practical point of view, such perceptions may lead to incorrect 
assessments of fraud risk and error risk. In circumstances where auditors consider 
fraud risk to be high, they need to plan to use auditing procedures that are forensic in 
nature to discover the fraud. However, in circumstances where they consider error 
risk to be high, they are required to plan the use of auditing procedures with the 
objective to discover those errors. Forensic procedures are often quite different than 
procedures to detect errors. Therefore, incorrect perceptions of management's 
behaviour may have serious implications for the effectiveness of an audit. 
This chapter is organised as follows: the following section explains the survey 
instrument and its administration, Section 3.3 discusses the results from the survey, 
Section 3.4 explains the limitations of this study. The conclusions from this survey 
are presented in Section 3.5. 
3.2 The Survey 
The objective of the survey is to identify factors that affect auditors' perceptions of 
the honesty or competency of client management. The survey contains 48 items, 
which are based on Appendix 3 of ASA 240, actual and fictitious fraud cases from 
the academic literature (Ballou and Mueller 2005; Boockholdt 2000; Keim and Grant 
2003; Ragothaman et al. 2003; Strand et al. 2002; Zekany et al. 2004), and the 
AICPA's (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) website on Ethics and 
Business Fraud (http://fVs.aicpa.org/Resources/ Antifraud+Forensic+Accounting/). 
The actual fraud cases from the literature are Comptronix Inc (Boockholdt 2000); 
and Worldcom (Zekany et al. 2004). Comptronix Inc was founded in 1984 and was a 
high-technology company. Three of its founders became senior officers of the 
company. The company provided contract manufacturing services to equipment 
manufacturers in the electronics industry as their primary product was circuit boards 
for personal computers and medical equipment. Comptronix employed about 1,800 
people in three operating locations. It went public in 1989, listing its stock with 
NASDAQ. It grew rapidly and consistently received "buy" recommendations from 
brokerage firms until fraud was suspected in 1992 when its board of directors 
disclosed that its earnings for 1989-1991 had been overstated and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission's (SEC) investigation determined that Comptronix's chief 
executive officer (CEO), chief operating officer (COO), and controller/treasurer 
colluded to overstate assets and profits by recording fictitious transactions. The three 
executives overrode existing internal controls so that others at Comptronix would not 
discover the scheme. 
WorldCom was the largest accounting fraud in American history. It was a large 
telecommunication company that achieved its position as a significant player in the 
telecommunications industry through 65 acquisitions. Between 1991 and 1997, 
WorldCom spent almost $60 billion in the acquisition of many of these companies 
and accumulated $41 billion in debt. In preparing their financial statements, 
WorldCom used a liberal interpretation of accounting rules. In July 2002, WorldCom 
filed for bankruptcy protection after several disclosures regarding accounting 
irregularities. Among them was the admission of improperly accounting for 
operating expenses as capital expenditure in violation of generally accepted 
accounting practices (GAAP). WorldCom admitted to a $9 billion earnings 
adjustment for the period from 1999 through the first quarter of 2002. 
In addition to actual fraud cases, fictitious cases are also considered so as to identify 
items that may be indicative of fraudulent acts and incompetence of staff and 
management of the audit client. Even though these are fictitious cases, the events in 
the cases are based on actual events in real organisations. All the articles from which 
the items are extracted are published in the Issues in Accounting Education Journal 
(Ballou and Mueller 2005; Keim and Grant 2003; Ragothaman et al. 2003; Strand et 
al. 2002). I consider it appropriate to adapt the circumstances from these cases 
because they are developed for the purpose of developing skills to identify fraud. In 
addition, some items are extracted from Monroe et al. (1993), who investigate 
auditors' perceptions of the importance of inherent risk factors in assessing inherent 
risk for accounts receivable and inventory. Their questionnaire lists 42 inherent risk 
factors and six control risk factors and the auditor participants are required to identify 
whether each factor is an inherent risk factor. They indicate whether the factor 
affects their assessment of inherent risk at the financial statement or account balance 
level. 
Some of the items included in the survey are extracted from Appendix 3 of ASA 240, 
which contains examples of circumstances that indicate potential fraud. The 
circumstances include discrepancies in the accounting records, conflicting or missing 
evidence, and problematic or unusual relationships between the auditor and 
management. However, not all of these are included in the survey. Only those items 
associated with the behaviour of management are included. 
The AICPA's series on Ethics and Business Fraud is another resource from which 
the items are extracted. These are suitable as they are used as case studies for training 
auditors. 
From a review of these sources, a list of 76 items was generated. These items and 
their sources are shown in Appendix 1. A draft of the questionnaire consisting of the 
76 items was given to six colleagues at the School of Accounting and Business 
Information Systems at the Australian National University to complete and for 
comment. Based on their responses and the feedback received, adjustments were 
made to the questionnaire. Some of the items were found to be similar, e.g., 
"...adjustments showing reduction in operating expenses and increase in inventory 
on monthly basis but no documentations exist to support these adjustments " (Item 2) 
is similar to " There are frequent changes to the accounting estimates which are not 
accompanied by changes in circumstances" (Item 61). As a result, item 2 is included 
in the final list but not item 61. In addition, the scores given were considered and 
items allocated the highest were considered to be unambiguous in representing the 
honesty and competency of client and thus, are included in the final list of 48 items 
in the questionnaire. 
The final instrument is presented in Appendix 2. The survey instrument has three 
sections: (1) instructions; (2) a list of 48 items that the participants classify as 
indicative of honesty or competency and assess the level of risk associated with each 
item; and (3) questions capturing demographic information. Participants were 
informed of the objective, purpose of the survey and that the survey should not take 
more than thirty minutes to complete. They were then informed on how to answer the 
questions in the survey in Part 1 of the questionnaire. 
An example of the questions that respondents have to answer is shown in Exhibit 3.1. 
For each of the items presented, the participants are asked to specify whether the 
item indicates honesty (H) or competency (C) of the auditee. A neither column (N) is 
also provided to avoid forcing respondents to classify any of the items into the two 
categories, when they perceive it as neither honest nor competent behaviour. They 
indicate their response by circling H, or C, or N and, they indicate whether they 
believe the item contributes to low or high risk of fraud or error in the financial 
statements by circling a number on a seven-point Likert scale. A "1" indicates the 
lowest risk while "7" indicates the highest risk of fraud or error. 
Exhibit 3.1 
Classification of Circumstances and Assessments of Risks 
(a) Does the circumstance indicate honesty or competency of the auditee? 
(Circle either H or C or N) 
Honesty Competency Neither 
H C N 
(b) Does the circumstance contribute to low or high risk of fraud or error in the 
financial statements? (Circle the appropriate number). 
Low Risk High Risk 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When participants circle "H" to indicate the circumstance is an Honesty item in (a), 
the risk assessed in (b) is assumed to be a fraud risk factor due to the (dis)honesty of 
the client's management, and when they answer Competency in (a), the risk assessed 
in (b) is assumed to be an error risk factor due to the (in)competency of the client's 
management. If the answer is Neither, the risk is categorised as an error risk factor. 
Finally, the participants provide demographic information in Part 2. 
3.3 Results 
One hundred and five questionnaires were completed by auditors attending an audit 
training course in Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney. In addition, 135 
questionnaires were mailed to auditors having experience of five years or more. 
Their mailing addresses were obtained from the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission's (ASIC) list of registered company auditors. Thirty-three 
responses were received from the mailed questionnaires giving a response rate of 
24.4% for this group of auditors. In total, 138 usable responses were received. 
Table 3.1 shows the demographic data of the participants. The respondents' audit 
experience ranges from 1 to 46 years, with a mean of 5.87 years. One respondent did 
not state his length of experience. The majority (61.6%) of the respondents are staff 
auditors in audit firms: 14.5% are senior auditors; 15.9% are audit managers; 2.2% 
are audit partners and 2.9% are internal auditors. The "other" category consists of 
sole practitioners and accountants, who have some experience in audit. The majority 
of the participants (77.3%) work for a Big-4 firm. 
Table 3.1 
Demographic Information of the Participants 
Auditors % 
n 138 100 
Gender: M 79 55.1 
F 62 44.9 
Experience (years): 
Minimum 1 
Maximum 46 
Mean 5.87 
(sd = 0.748) 
Current Post: 
Audit staff 85 61.6 
Senior auditor 20 14.5 
Audit manager 22 15.9 
Audit partner 3 2.2 
Internal auditor 4 2.9 
Other 4 2.9 
Firm Type: 
Big-4 106 77.3 
Medium 13 9.4 
Small 14 10.3 
Other 4 2.9 
The percentage for each item classified as H, C, and N is calculated. An item is 
classified as indicative of honesty when the percentage is the highest for H; it is 
classified as indicative of competency when the percentage is the highest for C; and 
as neither honesty nor competency when the percentage is the highest for N. Chi-
square values (x2) are calculated for each of the items. Chi-square tests are used to 
analyse whether distributions of the categorical variables, namely H, C, and N, differ 
from one another. A significant x2 value means that the difference between these 
categories are real and not due to sampling error. 
The following sections discuss the results of auditors' perceptions on the honesty and 
competency of the client management and their risk assessments. 
3.3.1 Honest (or Not Honest) Behaviour of Client Management 
Out of the 48 items, 15 are perceived as indicating honest (or not honest) behaviour. 
Table 3.2 shows the items perceived as indicating "Honesty". All but two of the 
items are significant at the p < 0.001 level. The last column of Table 3.2 shows the 
average assessment of each item's contribution to risk. A high risk value means the 
item indicates behaviour that is not honest and a low risk value means the item 
indicates honest behaviour. Items are arranged from the highest contribution to risk 
to the lowest contribution. The first 13 items have average assessments of 4.00 or 
higher. 
Table 3.2 
Items Perceived as Honest (or Not Honest) Behaviour and Their Contribution to 
Risk 
Item Item Frequency, % l l value Assessment of 
No. Contribution 
to Risk 
H C N Mean (SD) 
28. The financial director gives an instruction to 
delete valid accounts payable two months before 
the year end and reinstate them around middle of 
the financial year. 
64.96 5.84 29.20 72.89** 6.09 (0.087) 
11. A significant amount of physical inventory is 46.62 19.55 33.83 14.63** 5.94 (0.087) 
missing. 
5. The CEO terminated the vice president and a 
director who questioned the CEO's action to 
capitalise start-up costs with the intention to 
maintain or increase the stock price and 
earnings. 
59.56 8.09 32.35 54.10** 5.66(0.102) 
39. Management approves non-related expenses 
(e.g., personal travelling expenses) as a company 
expenses. 
61.31 12.41 26.28 52.22** 5.38 (0.094) 
4. Individuals related to the directors sell their 
shares in a subsidiary before the subsidiary was 
sold. 
64.96 2.92 32.12 79.20** 5.36(0.127) 
There have been adjustments showing a 
reduction in operating expenses and an increase 
in inventory on a monthly basis but no 
documentation exists to support these. 
41.30 25.36 33.33 0.07 5.36 (0.094) 
23. The sales manager sometimes made adjustments 
to the amounts of credit sales in writing on some 
of the carbon copies of sales vouchers. 
54.07 14.07 31.85 32.53** 5.13 (0.095) 
V1 There have been regular instructions from the chief accountant to transfer inventory to the 
equipment account. 
42.96 22.22 34.81 54.41** 5.08 (0.113) 
18. Invoices payable to a particular supplier have 
not been processed in the usual manner. 
46.62 24.81 28.57 10.84* 4.96 (0.110) 
16. The purchasing manager changed suppliers to 
the one who appeared to be a good friend of his. 
65.94 3.62 30.43 80.91** 4.73(0.102) 
6. The directors engage companies that they (and 
their families) own to do work for the company, 
for example, interior decoration service. 
48.15 5.19 46.67 48.18** 4.65(0.117) 
35. A director gives an expensive gift to a third 
party in the process of negotiating a contract. 
54.41 5.15 40.44 52.60** 4.58 (0.125) 
7. A director is being investigated by the 
Australian Tax Office for allegedly reporting 
significantly less personal income. 
65.69 2.92 31.39 81.21** 4.25 (0.158) 
19. The CFO confided to you that he entered the 
country as an illegal immigrant and asked you to 
keep this in confidence. 
62.04 1.46 36.50 76.04** 3.77 (0.170) 
38. The financial controller tells the auditor his 
concern about a weakness in the control system. 
66.42 23.36 10.22 71.05** 3.72(0.138) 
•significant at p < 0.01 **significant at p < 0.001 
Items 11, 23, and 38 come from ASA 240. Items 11, and 23 are correctly perceived 
as acts that are not honest (p < 0.001 for both) and contribute to a high risk of fraud. 
The missing inventory in Item 11 (A significant amount of physical inventory is 
missing) is perceived as a result of dishonesty, as intended by ASA 240 and its 
contribution to fraud risk is high (mean = 5.94). The auditors correctly perceive Item 
23 (The sales manager sometimes made adjustments to the amounts of credit sales in 
writing on some of the carbon copies of sales vouchers) as a fraud indicator as per 
ASA 240 and its contribution to fraud risk is high (mean = 5.13). The auditors relate 
these acts to dishonesty of client management and appropriately assess their effect on 
fraud risk as high. Missing inventory is associated with theft and making adjustments 
may indicate an act that is not honest. Hence, they are appropriately perceived as 
fraud risk indicators. Item 38 (The financial controller tells the auditor his concern 
about a weakness in the control system) is seen as an honest act by the financial 
controller because the contribution to fraud risk is moderate (mean * 3.72). This 
moderate (instead of low) level of contribution to risk could be due to the fact that 
the participants take into consideration the weakness that exists in the control system. 
Items 28, 5, 4, 2, 3, and 7 are also significant (p < 0.001). These items come from an 
actual fraud case, Comptronix Inc in the US (Boockholdt 2000) and the participants 
appropriately perceive these as behaviours that are not honest. Item 28 (The financial 
director gives an instruction to delete valid accounts payable two months before the 
year end and reinstate them around middle of the financial year), Item 5 {The CEO 
terminated the vice president and a director who questioned the CEO's action to 
capitalise start-up costs with the intention to maintain or increase the stock price and 
earnings), and Item 3 (There have been regular instructions from the chief 
accountant to transfer inventory to the equipment account) involve manipulation of 
the accounts that have been instructed by higher level of management within a firm. 
It is obvious that these circumstances would lead to material misstatements in the 
financial statements and the acts represent unethical conduct by management. Their 
contributions to fraud risk are assessed as high (means = 6.09, 5.66, and 5.08 
respectively). 
The contribution to fraud risk is quite high (mean = 5.36) for Item 4 {Individuals 
related to the directors sell their shares in a subsidiary before the subsidiary was 
sold) indicating that auditors perceive that such behaviour is not honest. 
Participants assess a moderate contribution to fraud risk (mean = 4.25) for Item 7 (A 
director is being investigated by the Australian Tax Office for allegedly reporting 
significantly less personal income). The act of reporting less income is perceived as 
less dishonest than the act of using confidential information for personal gain such as 
insider trading because the latter is illegal and therefore, it is appropriately thought to 
contribute to higher risk. 
Item 2 (There have been adjustments showing a reduction in operating expenses and 
an increase in inventory on a monthly basis but no documentation exists to support 
these) is perceived as indicating dishonesty and the contribution to risk is assessed as 
high (mean = 5.36). This is an obvious case of manipulation of accounting records. 
The fact that there is no documentation to support the adjustments should trigger 
probing questions by the auditors. However, the result is not significant. Therefore, it 
is not conclusive that auditors perceive this as indicating a fraudulent act. 
Item 18 (Invoices payable to a certain supplier have not been processed in the usual 
manner) comes from a fictitious fraud case of a city council. It is noted that 46.6% of 
the participants perceive it as a dishonest act and this is significant at p < 0.01. 
Participants assess its contribution to fraud risk as moderately high (mean ft 4.96). 
Such an act may also indicate a weakness in internal controls. 
Other items the auditors perceive as not honest behaviour are Item 16 (The 
purchasing manager changed suppliers to the one who appeared to be a good friend 
of his), Item 6 (The directors engage companies that they (and their families) own to 
do work for the company, for example, interior decoration service), and Item 35 (A 
director gives an expensive gift to a third party in the process of negotiating a 
contract). The p-values for these items are significant at the 0.001 level. These items 
come from fictitious cases and a high percentage of participants (65.94%, 48.15%, 
and 54.41% respectively) perceive them as indicating dishonesty. Their average 
assessments of the contribution to the risk of fraud for these items are moderately 
high (mean = 4.73, 4.65, and 4.58 respectively). Favouritism acts such as these may 
be considered to have an impact on audit risk, however, the risk is not as high as 
those behaviours that have a direct impact on the financial reports. 
The results clearly show that high contributions to risk are assessed for items that 
have a direct impact on the financial report. These are Items 28, 11, 5, 39, 4, 2, 23, 
and 3 and the means for these items are high, i.e., higher than 5.00. Those items with 
means lower than 5.00 are those that do not have an obvious direct impact on the 
accounts, i.e., Items 18, 16, 6, 35, 7, 19, and 38. Auditors seem to believe that 
managers who act dishonestly in their private lives would not necessarily act 
dishonestly at work, for example, reporting less income tax to the tax authority (Item 
7), and the CFO confided that he entered the country as an illegal immigrant (Item 
19) are assessed as contributing to medium risk. However, the average assessments 
of contribution to risk for most of these items are higher than 4.00. 
In summary, auditors seem to be able to appropriately identify fraud risk factors for 
those items that have been discussed in the preceding paragraphs. It is worth noting 
that some of these are not mentioned in the auditing standards, in particular ASA 
240, which is the crucial standard that provides guidelines for auditors to consider 
fraud risk in their audit of financial statements. 
3.3.2 Competent (or Not Competent) Behaviour of Client Management 
Table 3.3 contains the 23 items that the auditors perceive as indicating 
"Competency". Contribution to risk is assessed as high for items that affect the 
financial reports. Auditors perceive the first 17 items as contributing to high risk, i.e., 
the means are higher than 4.00. All have significant p-values at the 0.001 level 
except for Item 26 (Customers complain about overdue notices. They say they have 
paid and have receipts to prove it. The staff accountant is unable to locate records of 
the related accounts receivable), Item 40 (The accounts manager returns vouchers 
for payment, without proper authorisation to the purchasing department) and Item 8 
(The purchasing manager added suppliers to the vendors' list without proper 
verification), as their p-values are not significant. 
For the items that do not have direct effects on the financial reports, the auditors 
perceive these as signalling moderate and lower risks (mean < 4.00). These are the 
last six items in Table 3.3. The p-values are significant at the p < 0.001 level, except 
for Item 45 {The CFO has a reputation of impeccable integrity and has won a CFO 
Excellence Award), which is significant at the p < 0.01 level. 
The auditors appropriately perceive previous experience (Item 45) or lack of 
experience (Item 41) as a competency factor. This supports the findings by Monroe 
et al. (1993), who find that the experience of client personnel is classified as an 
inherent risk factor at the account balance level. In other words, competency is 
considered as an important factor in ensuring that financial statements are free from 
material misstatements due to errors. 
Table 3.3 
Items Perceived as Competent (or Not Competent) Behaviours and Their Contribution to Risk 
Item 
No. Item 
Frequency, % 
H C N 
X2 value Assessment of 
Contribution 
to Risk 
Mean (SD) 
26 Customers complain about overdue notices. 
They say they have paid and have receipts to 
prove it. The staff accountant is unable to locate 
records of the related accounts receivable. 
28.15 42.22 29.63 4.84 5.69 (0.099) 
25 The Financial Controller does not comply with 
GAAP on some material matters 
11.85 60.74 27.41 50.53** 5.65(0.114) 
37 Expired inventory are still included in the 
valuation of inventory at full cost. 
17.78 55.56 26.67 31.60** 5.51 (0.108) 
29 The accounts manager processes vouchers for 
payments without checking for authorisation. 
10.22 62.77 27.01 59.23** 5.14(0.107) 
31 The credit manager is unable to explain 
discrepancies between accounts receivable 
balances and debtors' confirmations. 
16.30 56.30 27.41 34.53** 5.12(0.099) 
36 Accounts payable and accounts receivable are 
not reconciled. 
6.62 66.91 27.21 78.28** 5.09(0.113) 
42 Sales orders received are recognised as sales 
immediately. 
16.91 50.74 32.35 23.40** 5.01 (0.140) 
22 The senior accountant has been unable to 
provide a list of all fixed assets, asset 
identification numbers, cost, date of purchase, 
and current location of each item on the list. 
The excuse given is she has always been busy. 
17.04 50.37 32.59 22.53** 5.00(0.108) 
41 The CFO is inexperienced and lacks knowledge 
of the industry. 
3.62 71.74 24.64 100.74** 4.96(0.127) 
12 Management has not rectified weaknesses in 
internal control that have been reported in the 
previous audit. 
10.95 54.74 34.31 39.47** 4.90(0.111) 
13 The credit manager has not been observing the 
policy to authorise the adjustments of 
customers' credit limits. 
12.59 57.04 30.37 40.53** 4.89 (0.099) 
40 The accounts manager returns vouchers for 
payment, without proper authorisation to the 
purchasing department. 
32.12 42.34 25.55 5.88 4.85 (0.104) 
9 The manager is unable to explain discrepancies 
arising from the reconciliation of shipping and 
billing documents. 
14.71 61.76 23.53 51.06** 4.80 (0.096) 
8 The purchasing manager added suppliers to the 
vendors' list without proper verification. 
35.07 36.57 28.36 1.54 4.77 (0.112) 
44 The accounts manager recorded the purchase of 
a fixed asset as an expense. 
11.03 64.71 24.26 63.81** 4.77(0.123) 
1 The accounts manager is unable to answer your 
questions as to why there has been a dramatic 
increase in miscellaneous income over the past 
year. 
18.12 58.70 23.19 40.48** 4.58(0.120) 
Table 3.3 (continued) 
Item 
Frequency, % 
N C N 
Assessment of 
Contribution 
to Risk 
yr value 
48 Half of the directors have been absent 
from board meetings, and, when they are 
there, they do not contribute significantly 
in the discussions. 
5.07 53.62 41.30 52.74** 4.57(0.123) 
15 Management is very slow in providing the 
information that you request. 
8.09 54.41 37.50 44.84** 3.46 (0.104) 
43 The chief accountant reduced the 
provision for doubtful debts because the 
company received, just before the year-
end, a settlement from a substantial 
customer, whose account had been 
overdue for months. 
7.97 57.97 34.06 51.78** 2.99 (0.129) 
27 The accounts manager is always ready 
with satisfactory answers when asked 
about fluctuations in revenue. 
7.35 80.88 11.76 138.77** 2.55 (0.104) 
45 The CFO has a reputation of impeccable 
integrity and has won a CFO Excellence 
Award. 
35.61 44.70 19.70 12.68* 1.87(0.099) 
20 The CFO has more than 10 years of 
experience in the industry. 
2.17 81.88 15.94 150.30** 1.87(0.088) 
14 Directors are committed to attend the 
board of directors meetings and you 
observe that decision-making in these 
meetings is always thorough. 
8.89 67.41 23.70 74.98** 1.83 (0.091) 
*significant at p<0.01 **significant at p<0.001 
Item 14 (.Directors are committed to attend the board of directors meetings and you 
observe that decision-making in these meetings is always thorough) is assessed as 
contributing to low error risk (mean = 1.83). This may be an indication that directors' 
attendance at board meetings is an important aspect of competency. This item is the 
opposite to what occurred in the HIH Insurance case (Owen 2003), where the 
directors did not show their commitment by attending board meetings, where on a 
particular occasion, a very important decision on a material takeover of another 
company was made. Commitment from directors should ensure that directors know 
what is going on in the company and are able to prevent material misstatements due 
to error. Thus, their non-attendance, which is an indication of their non-commitment 
in Item 48 (Half of the directors have been absent from board meetings, and, when 
they are there, they do not contribute significantly in the discussion) is appropriately 
assessed as contributing to moderately high error risk (mean = 4.57). 
Both Item 25 {The Financial Controller does not comply with GAAP on some 
material matters) and Item 41 {The CFO is inexperienced and lacks knowledge of the 
industry) contribute to high error risk. Their means are 5.65 and 4.96 respectively 
and are significant (p < 0.001), indicating that both are considered as behaviours of 
management who are not competent. Insufficient experience and knowledge may not 
necessarily lead to material misstatement. However, non-compliance with GAAP 
would almost certainly result in material misstatements and that could be the reason 
for the assessment of higher contribution to risk for Item 25 compared to Item 41. 
Normally, auditors would advise management to amend the financial report for such 
non-compliance. If management disagrees, auditors should be suspicious because 
management may be trying to conceal certain facts. This is illustrated in a fictitious 
case, Waste Disposal Incorporated in the US (Ragothaman et al. 2003). Waste 
Disposal was described as a major player in the domestic and international trash 
collection industry in the US. Its rapid expansion resulted in substantial profits and 
its stock price skyrocketed, putting pressure on the company to attain increasing 
profits. Further, certain actions by management raised questions, for example, 
offsetting prior period estimates and expense adjustments against the gain from the 
sale of a subsidiary is not in compliance with GAAP. Additionally, the controller was 
trying to conceal some expenditure and did not disclose them in the footnotes to the 
financial statements. Thus, non-compliance with GAAP could be indicative of acts 
that are not honest acts. 
The non-rectification of weaknesses reported in the previous audit in Item 12 is seen 
as behaviour that is not competent rather than behaviour that is not honest 
{Management has not rectified weaknesses in internal control that have been 
reported in the previous audit) even though it is one of the fraud cues listed in ASA 
240. However, a majority of the auditors in this survey (54.74%) perceived this as 
behaviour that is not competent rather than behaviour that is not honest and the 
contribution to error risk is moderately high (mean 4.90). The audit approach 
would therefore focus on uncovering errors, but not fraud. This should raise concern 
in the audit profession. Nonetheless, its opposite, Item 38 in Table 3.2 (The financial 
controller expressed concern on a weakness in the control system) is correctly 
classified as honest behaviour. 
Other items that are listed as fraud cues in ASA 240 are Items 31, 13, 9, and 15. All 
of these items result in moderately high assessments of contribution to error risk 
(means = 5.12, 4.89, 4.80 respectively) except for Item 15 where the mean error risk 
assessment is low (mean = 3.46). Therefore, the audit approach will focus on 
uncovering errors instead of fraud. 
Manager's inability to explain discrepancies in Item 31 (The credit manager is 
unable to explain discrepancies between accounts receivable balances and debtors' 
confirmations) and Item 9 (The manager is unable to explain discrepancies arising 
from the reconciliation of shipping and billing documents) should be treated 
cautiously by the auditors. A manager usually has some amount of experience before 
they are appointed as manager and with a little bit of searching through the 
company's documentation, he should be able to provide an explanation about 
discrepancies between accounting records and third party's documents or 
confirmations. Similarly, Item 15 (Management is very slow in providing the 
information that you request) could be an indication that management is trying to 
conceal fraud before coming up with the requested information. 
Items 37, 29, 36, 42, 8, and 1 come from the AICPA's website on cases of ethics and 
fraud in business (http://fvs.aicpa.org/Resources/Antifraud+Forensic+Accounting/). 
Item 29 (The accounts manager processes vouchers for payments without checking 
for authorisation) and Item 8 (The purchasing manager added suppliers to the 
vendors' list without proper verification) are cases of gross non-compliance with a 
company's control procedures rather than inexperienced management. Similarly, 
Item 37 (Expired inventory are still included in the valuation of inventory at full 
cost) and Item 42 (Sales orders received are recognised as sales immediately) are 
examples of non-compliance with accounting standards. A competent manager 
would have no difficulty in explaining the dramatic increase in income as in Item 1 
(The accounts manager is unable to answer your question as to why there has been a 
dramatic increase in miscellaneous income over the past year) and to ensure that 
accounting records are correct and thus reconciliations should be an easy and routine 
task as Item 36 (Accounts payable and accounts receivable are not reconciled). 
In summary, there are several items that are indicators of honest (or not honest) 
behaviour that the auditors identify as competent (or not competent) behaviour. In 
such circumstances, there is a possibility that fraud will not be uncovered as the 
focus of the audit will be on discovering errors rather than fraud. 
3.3.3 Neither Responses 
Table 3.4 reports the items that the majority of the participants perceive as neither 
honest (or not honest) nor competent (or not competent) behaviour (N). The auditors 
perceive the first eight items as contributing to high error risk, where the mean 
assessment is higher than 4.00. Most of the results are significant at the p < 0.001 
level except for Item 33, whose p-value is significant at the p < 0.05 level, and Items 
24 and 34, whose results are not significant. Nevertheless, these items may be 
indicative of potential fraud as explained in the following paragraphs. 
Table 3.4 
Items Perceived as Neither Honesty nor Competency and 
Their Contribution to Risk 
Item 
No. Items 
Frequency, % 
H C N 
X2 value Assessment of 
Contribution 
to Risk 
Mean (SD) 
33 The CEO and CFO purposely 
assign the internal audit 
department projects that leave the 
staff little time to perform audit 
functions. 
34.06 23.19 42.75 7.957* 4.85 (0.112) 
24 You have not been provided with a 
complete list of vendors' addresses 
even after a few requests 
28.68 31.62 39.71 2.662 4.65(0.109) 
30 Top management has been in 
dispute with you, the auditor, over 
inventory policies. 
10.22 35.77 54.01 39.781*** 4.55(0.115) 
10 The CEO and CFO have not made 
available to all managers reports on 
adjustments made at the corporate 
level, which are not derived from 
operating activities. 
30.66 19.71 49.64 18.847*** 4.41 (0.139) 
47 Management does not assist you in 
accessing electronic files to carry 
out computerised audit procedures. 
18.84 24.64 56.52 34.087*** 4.26 (0.124) 
34 Some purchase orders have no 
original copies, just photocopies 
25.36 35.51 39.13 4.217 4.25 (0.115) 
17 The chief accountant never takes a 
vacation and when employees are 
urged to take a reasonable length 
of vacation each year, he took one 
day at a time. 
41.04 8.21 50.75 39.955*** 4.24 (0.163) 
46 Four years ago, the senior 
accountant filed for personal 
bankruptcy because he had over-
extended his credit cards by taking 
too many cash advances. 
28.47 12.41 59.12 46.307*** 4.01 (0136) 
21 The CEO has pledged his shares in 
the company as collateral for loan 
to finance the purchase of his 
personal outside business interests. 
31.88 5.07 63.04 69.696*** 3.87(0.160) 
32 The chief accountant is having an 
affair with an employee. 
23.91 1.45 74.64 116.391*** 2.64 (0.136) 
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
Item 33 (The CEO and CFO purposely assign the internal audit department projects 
that leave the staff little time to perform audit functions) is an actual occurrence in 
the Worldcom case (Zekany et al. 2004). The internal audit department was not able 
to detect fraudulent intention by top management as they were instructed to perform 
"special projects" that consumed most of the Internal Audit's staff time, which led to 
delays in scheduled audits. This could be the reason why fraud had not been 
discovered much earlier as the Internal Audit's staff were pre-occupied with projects 
such as generating an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system, which involved 
compilation of schedules and trend analyses for tracking orders, activations, 
disconnections, and cancellations received by the company from its customers each 
month, and estimating revenues associated with those orders. However, the 
participants in this survey perceive this act as neither not honest nor not competent. 
Item 47 {Management does not assist you [the auditor] in accessing electronic files 
to carry out computerised audit procedures) is one of the potential fraud indicators 
listed in ASA 240. However, participants in this survey do not perceive this as a 
fraud risk factor. Auditors should be curious as to the reason why management does 
not assist them in accessing electronic files and this puts a limit on their work. As 
such, the effectiveness of the audit could be questioned. 
Item 17 (The chief accountant never takes a vacation and when employees are urged 
to take a reasonable length of vacation each year, he took one day at a time) and 
Item 46 (Four years ago, the senior accountant filed for personal bankruptcy 
because he had over-extended his credit cards by taking too many cash advances) 
are circumstances extracted from a fictitious case of a city council in the US (Strand 
et al. 2002). In many actual instances, when these people do take leave, discrepancies 
and often fraud is discovered (Albrecht 2003). Auditors are often cautioned about 
employees of audit clients who never take leave (Item 17). Being declared a bankrupt 
previously (Item 46) does not affect the perceptions of the majority of auditors about 
management's honesty, whereas this could be identified as a pressure (or incentive) 
for an employee to commit fraud. Albrecht (2003) identifies pressure from personal 
life as one of the incentives (pressures) for an employee to commit fraud. 
Sixty-three percent (63%) of the participants classified Item 21 {The CEO has 
pledged his shares in the company as collateral for loan, to finance the purchase of 
his personal outside business interests) as neither not honest nor not competent 
behaviour. Only 31.9% of the auditors perceived this act as a not honest behaviour 
(mean contribution to risk = 3.87). Perhaps the impact of such an act on the truth and 
fairness of the financial statements may not be so obvious to the auditors whereas 
such pressure may lead the CEO to act fraudulently. In such circumstance, the CEO's 
financial well-being could be dependent on the company's stock price because if the 
company's stock price falls substantially, the collateral might be insufficient to 
secure the loans. This was what actually transpired in the WorldCom case and in 
other companies experiencing going-concern problems. In the WorldCom case, the 
CEO's shareholding was put up as collateral for his personal outside business 
interests. This created pressure on him to keep WorldCom stock from declining 
(Zekany et al. 2004). 
Item 30 (Top management has been in dispute with you, the auditor, over inventory 
policies) is an important inherent risk factor (Monroe et al. 1993). However, only 
10.22% of the auditors regard this as behaviour that is not honest and 35.77% regard 
this as behaviour that is not competent. Participants may have viewed this as a 
technical issue in an audit and did not relate this to the behaviour of client 
management. 
Item 32 (The chief accountant is having an affair with an employee) is also not 
perceived as honest (or not honest) or competent (or not competent) behaviour by the 
majority of the respondents (74.64%). However, if the employee's job specification 
relates to the job of the management involved (in this case, the chief accountant), this 
could affect the chief accountant's objectivity in performing his job, which may lead 
to unethical acts. 
3.4 Sensitivity Test 
Tests for equality of variances and means are carried out to determine that the two 
groups, auditors undergoing training and auditors from the mailed questionnaire 
groups, are not significantly different. Mann-Whitney two-independent-samples tests 
are performed on the classifications of behaviours. The null hypothesis is that the 
two groups are drawn from the same population and, therefore, their probability 
distributions are equal. 
The Mann-Whitney two-independent-samples tests show that the classifications of 
behaviours for the two groups are not significantly different except for one item, i.e., 
Item 48 (Half of the directors have been absent from board meetings, and, when they 
are there, they do not contribute significantly in the discussion) for which a two-
tailed test results in a p-value of 0.006. Thus, in examining this item, the two groups 
cannot be assumed as identical. Hence, analysis of the classification of behaviour is 
separated for this item. The analyses for the classifications of behaviours for the rest 
of the variables are done together because none of the significance levels exceed p-
value of 0.10. 
Table 3.5 
Test for Equality of Variances and Means for Risk Assessments 
Item 
No. 
Levene's Test 
p-value 
2-tailed t-test 
t-value (p-value) 
6. The directors engage companies that they (and 
their families) own to do work for the company, 
for example, interior decoration service. 
0.031 .534 (0.595) 
11. A significant amount of physical inventory is 
missing. 
0.005 -.674 (0.504) 
13. The credit manager has not been observing the 
policy to authorise the adjustments of customers' 
credit limits. 
0.038 -.359(0.721) 
23. The sales manager sometimes made adjustments to 
the amounts of credit sales in writing on some of 
the carbon copies of sales vouchers. 
0.039 -1.424(0.162) 
30. Top management has been in dispute with you, the 
auditor, over inventory policies. 
0.028 -1.207 (0.234) 
34. Some purchase orders have no original copies, just 
photocopies. 
0.012 -2.307 (0.024)* 
37. Expired inventory are still included in the 
valuation of inventory at full cost. 
0.001 -1.197(0.238) 
Levene's test for equality of variances and means shows no significant difference in 
the variances from the two groups, except for the items shown in Table 3.5. The two-
tailed t-test also shows that the means for the two groups are not significantly 
different except for Item 34 (Some purchase orders have no original copies, just 
photocopies). Separate % 2-test of the two groups also shows no significant difference 
with % 2-values of 2.364 (p-value = 0.307) for the mailed questionnaire group and 
1.771 (p-value = 0.412) for the other group. 
3.5 Limitations of the Study 
While a questionnaire is useful for measuring auditors' perceptions of the behaviour 
of client management, a limitation is that complete scenarios are not provided, as the 
case in any questionnaire. Questionnaires must be kept short and, therefore, more 
detailed information could not be provided for each of the items. Different answers 
may be generated if the items are described in more complete scenarios. Another 
limitation is that a "Both H and C" category is not included. Participants are forced 
to answer either "Honesty" or "Competency" even if they thought a variable could 
indicate both behaviours. 
3.6 Conclusions 
The purpose of this study is to identify behaviours that auditors perceive as indicative 
of the honesty and competency of the audit client's management and how these 
perceptions contribute to the risk of fraud and error. Dishonesty may be portrayed by 
company's top and middle level management through their behaviour and attitude in 
managing the company, which may signal their unethical acts. As such, their 
behaviour and attitude could be a portrayal of their own interests and greed for 
example, firing of officers who question their unethical decisions. 
The 48 items in the survey are based on ASA 240, actual and fictitious fraud cases 
the academic literature, and the AICPA's website on Ethics and Business Fraud. The 
results show that auditors do perceive different behaviours of client management as 
behaviours indicating honesty or competency Several potential fraud indicators that 
have not been appropriately identified by auditors should raise concerns because if 
fraud indicators are not appropriately identified as fraud risk factors, the selected 
audit approaches and procedures may not uncover the fraud. The results also show 
that auditors' perceptions of the honesty and competency of the audit client impact 
on fraud risk and error risk, whereby negative behaviours produce a high 
contribution to risk and positive behaviours produce a low contribution to risk. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
POSITIVTTY AND NEGATIVITY BIASES IN AUDITORS' 
ASSESSMENTS OF AUDIT RISK: 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
4.1 Introduction 
Studies in psychology report that people go through the process of impression 
formation before arriving at a particular perception or judgment of another person's 
behaviour. The perceiver observes and assesses the various traits or characteristics of 
the perceived person and adjusts their prior belief about the person. During this 
process, the perceiver is "anchoring and adjusting" their perceptions, and the 
perception formed depends on the persuasiveness of the traits or characteristics, 
which either confirms or disconfirms the initial belief (Anderson and Marchant 1989; 
Ashton and Ashton 1988). 
In perceiving the behaviour of another person, an individual categorises the other 
individual's characteristics using the available information cues, especially learned 
or observed behaviours and views some behaviours as more helpful than others in 
discriminating between alternative trait categorisations (Skowronski and Carlston 
1989). Such discrimination is referred to as category diagnosticity, where negative 
attributes' are more influential in the impression formation on honesty and positive 
attributes are more influential in the impression formation of competency (or ability) 
(Anderson 1981; Birnbaum 1972; Nisbett et al. 1981; Wyer 1974), i.e., people are 
subject to positivity and negativity biases in perceiving others' honesty and 
competency. 
Auditors, as professionals, are also subject to these positivity and negativity biases 
(Anderson and Marchant 1989; Jones 2001). They also display other types of biases 
in their judgments. Depending on certain factors, auditors display confirmatory and 
disconflrmatory behaviour in their belief revision process (Ashton and Ashton 1988; 
Ashton and Ashton 1990; Bamber et al. 1997; Bedard and Biggs 1991; Church 
1990). 
In addition, negative cues cause auditors to act more cautiously. For example, 
auditors assess risk as higher, collect more evidence and charge higher fees for low-
reputation firms (Ayers and Kaplan 2003; Beaulieu 2001; Johnstone 2000; Kizirian 
et al. 2005), and auditors are less certain that management information is reliable 
when management is aggressive (Anderson et al. 2004). In other words, auditors 
associate management integrity with the risk of material misstatements (Iyer and 
Reckers 2007). Further, auditors gather more evidence when financial information is 
negative trending (Coram et al. 2011). 
While a few studies in psychology demonstrate such positivity and negativity biases 
(Klein 1991; Peeters and Czapinski 1990; Singh and Teoh 2000; Skowronski 2002; 
Skowronski and Carlston 1987; Vonk 1993), only one study examines this issue 
using auditors as participants. (Anderson and Marchant 1989) find that, in perceiving 
and evaluating the honesty and competency of client management, auditors display 
the same biases as other people in that they are negatively biased in perceiving 
honesty and positively biased in perceiving competency. They find that auditors, in 
perceiving the honesty and competency of client management, perceive negative 
behaviours are more diagnostic than positive behaviour in their judgement of honesty 
and they perceive positive behaviours are more diagnostic than negative behaviour in 
their judgment of competency. However, their study does not examine how such 
biases affect auditors' judgments, such as risk assessments. This thesis examines 
positivity and negativity biases associated with audit client management's behaviour 
in an experiment as reflected in their audit judgments. Participants make assessments 
of the truth of an audit assertion based on the descriptions of the honesty and 
competency of an audit client management and also posterior assessments following 
the information about a positive or negative change in the client management's 
behaviour. Further, the present study examines both honesty and competency 
simultaneously, where a participant is making the assessments based on both the 
honesty and competency of the client management. 
The next section discusses the literature on impression formation. Section 4.3 
discusses the positivity and negativity biases that have been found in people's 
impression formation and that may also have influence on auditors' perceptions and 
judgments. Section 4.4 provides the summary of the discussions in this chapter. 
4.2 Auditors' Impression Formation 
People's behaviours provide clues to their motives and traits. Impression formation is 
a process of behaviour categorisation where people use available cues, such as an 
individual's behaviours, to assign that individual to one or more trait categories 
(Asch 1946), for example, whether the person belongs to an honest or not honest 
category (Rosch 1978). Both the schematic model of attribution (Reeder and Brewer 
1979) and the cue-diagnosticity model of impression formation (Skowronski and 
Carlston 1987) assume that people infer personality traits from others' actions. 
However, not all behaviours are equally informative. Behaviours that are more 
influential in arriving at an impression are considered diagnostic cues. An individual 
is usually described using multiple cues. As such, the categorisation of an 
individual's behaviour is determined primarily by those cues that lead to the most 
confident categorisations, i.e., by the more diagnostic cues. Thus, diagnostic cues 
serve to make particular trait categorisations more salient and more persuasive to a 
perceiver, and less diagnostic information is less persuasive. 
Skowronski and Carlston (1987) illustrate that people form impressions regarding the 
honesty and competency of a person based on certain traits portrayed by that person. 
For example, a person is considered as extremely honest if he returned a lost wallet 
intact. On the other hand, a person is considered as extremely not honest if he stole 
$1 million from a bank. Similarly, a person is considered intelligent if he had several 
essays published in the New Yorker, and a person is considered unintelligent if he 
does not know how to tie his own shoelaces. Skowronski and Carlston (1987) report 
the results of a questionnaire consisting of morality- and competency-related 
behaviour, which they distributed to students in an introductory psychology course. 
After reading a description of a person's behaviour, the students indicate the level of 
honesty and competency on a 9-point scale. They find that behaviours that are not 
honest have more impact than honest behaviours on judgments of honesty/dishonesty 
and intelligent behaviours have more impact than unintelligent behaviours on 
judgments of intelligence/stupidity. 
Mrug and Hoza (2007) find that subjects in an experiment, consisting of children and 
adults, form an impression of whether an actor is likeable or not based on prosocial-
antisocial behaviour, intellectual ability and behavioural withdrawal, which they 
observe on a videotape that portrays both an individual's negative and positive 
behaviours. The subjects in the experiment discriminate between the negative and 
positive behaviours portrayed by the actors and form impressions accordingly. Gupta 
(2009) confirms that a celebrity is blameworthy when he is perceived to have played 
a major role in a negative action and the course of action is under his control. For 
example, Pepsi terminated its contract with Mike Tyson when he was involved in 
blameworthy actions. 
Research in the auditing literature shows that auditors display the same heuristic 
process in forming an impression of their client (Anderson and Marchant 1989). The 
results from Anderson and Marchant (1989) support the results from the survey by 
Skowronski and Carlston (1987), in which they show that auditors' categorisations of 
client management's behaviour are similar to those of an ordinary person. In 
determining the honesty and competency of a client's management, auditors identify 
those cues (behaviours) that help them to categorise the client's management as 
honest (or not honest) or competent (or not competent). 
Management is a source of audit evidence and, therefore, their honesty and 
competency affect the credibility of audit evidence obtained from them. Auditors are 
required to assess the honesty of client management, in particular how management 
may perpetrate and conceal fraudulent financial reporting (AuASB 2009a) and to 
assess the competence of client management in assessing inherent risk (AuASB 
2009b). Not honest management may engage in fraudulent acts, whereas 
management who are not competent may unintentionally produce errors. Both are 
potential causes of material misstatements in the financial report. 
The auditing literature reports that the quality of client management, which normally 
encompasses honesty and competency, affects inherent risk assessments (Colbert 
1987, 1988; Langmead and Michenzi 2010; Messier and Austen 2000a). 
Assessments of an audit client's management integrity influence the auditor's 
evaluation of source credibility of management (Beaulieu 2001; Kizirian et al. 2005; 
Shaub 1996). For example, Kizirian et al. (2005) find that integrity of the audit client 
is negatively related to auditors' risk assessments. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that auditors will assess the truth of an audit assertion as high 
when the client management is both honest and competent; and low when the client 
management is both not honest and not competent. The assessments should be 
highest when client management is both honest and competent and lowest when 
client management is both not honest and not competent and their assessments 
should fall in between these two extremes when client management is not honest but 
competent; or honest but not competent. 
Hla: Auditors' assessments of the truth of an assertion are higher when client 
management is portrayed as honest than when client management is 
portrayed as not honest. 
Hlb: Auditors' assessments of the truth of an assertion are higher when client 
management is portrayed as competent than when client management is 
portrayed as not competent 
Hlc: There is an interaction between client management's honesty and client 
management's competency on auditors' assessments of the truth of an 
assertion. 
In the experiment used to test these hypotheses, client management is the client's 
financial controller. Participants are provided with an initial description of the 
client's financial controller and then asked to make a set of assessments of the truth 
of several assertions. After making the initial assessments, the participants are 
provided with additional information about the client's financial controller and asked 
to make a second set of assessments on the truth of several assertions. With regard to 
initial assessments, comparisons are made between auditors' assessments of initial 
honesty and initial dishonesty; and initial competency and initial incompetency. With 
regard to auditors' second assessments, comparisons are made between auditors' 
assessments of honesty and dishonesty; and competency and incompetency after they 
read the additional information about the financial controller's behaviour. 
Research into impression formation indicates that an individual's negative or 
extreme attributes have an inordinate influence on the perceiver's judgments of their 
personality characteristics (Anderson 1974; Birnbaum 1972; Fiske 1980; Wyer 1974) 
as posited by the schematic model of attribution (Reeder and Brewer 1979). Negative 
behaviours are perceived as more diagnostic than positive behaviours. Positive and 
negative behaviours are based on cultural definitions of "bad people" and "good 
people". For example, a person who has been caught cheating would be classified as 
more likely to lie and steal compared to a person who has not (Reeder and Spores 
1983). Further, a single immoral behaviour is often enough to discredit a person and 
such negative evaluation tends to persist even if that person is simultaneously 
credited with good behaviour (Birnbaum 1972). 
From an audit perspective, prior research shows that auditors modify their risk 
assessments and audit planning in response to the presence of risk factors, which 
include behaviour-related factors (Libby 1985; Maletta 1993; Zimbelman 1997). 
Auditors are also sensitive to the reliability of evidence source including the level of 
client's expertise (Rebele et al. 1988); the reliability of internal auditor's attributes 
(Margheim 1986); and the competency and objectivity of the evidence source 
(Bamber 1983; Hirst 1994). 
Auditors are trained to seek out and use evidence about the "fair presentation" of 
financial information, and the quality of financial control. There are legal and 
professional risk consequences of not correctly identifying risk factors as errors and 
fraud. As such, auditors are trained to be particularly sensitive to evidence that is 
negative with respect to the "fair presentation" of financial information and internal 
control due to the professional and legal risk consequences of the audit profession. In 
the process of seeking and gathering evidence, auditors evaluate whether a piece of 
new evidence supports or does not support their existing belief about an audit client. 
This is apparent in studies that examine the relationships between types of evidence 
and professional judgments. 
People's judgments are also influenced by whether information confirms or 
disconfirms a prior belief. Studies in psychology indicate that individuals have a 
greater response to confirming evidence than disconfirming evidence9 (Einhorn and 
Hogarth 1985; Gorman 1986; Klayman and Ha 1987; Lord et al. 1979) and they are 
9 Motivated reasoning is the broader literature of confirmation bias. Motivated reasoning is a process 
whereby a previously held belief or desire affects reasoning in the following steps: (1) hypothesis 
formation; (2) the search for relevant information (this being the point in motivated reasoning related 
to confirmation bias); (3) the interpretation or evaluation of the information once found; and (4) the 
weighting of information in order to arrive at a final judgment (Martin et al. 2006). 
generally confirmation prone in their information search strategy (Klayman and Ha 
1987). 
However, studies in auditing find that auditors display both confirmatory and 
disconfirmatory behaviour in assessing evidential information. In experiments where 
auditors are allowed to generate their own hypotheses, they exhibit confirmatory 
tendencies in the evaluation of evidence (Bedard and Biggs 1991; Church 1990). 
Auditors are also sensitive to confirming evidence when they are provided with an 
initial hypothesis to test (Bamber et al. 1997). However, Ashton and Ashton (1988, 
1990) find that auditors' belief revisions are greater for disconfirming evidence when 
they are given an initial likelihood of the error's occurrence. This is consistent with 
Jones (2001), who finds that auditors seek and use more negative information than 
positive information given a negative initial impression. 
Studies also show that hypothesis framing influences auditors' evaluation of audit 
evidence. They show a preference for failure cues (as opposed to viable cues) when 
prior indication indicated failure of company (Trotman and Sng 1989). In addition, 
depending on the frame of the hypothesis that auditors favour, they react differently 
to audit evidence. Auditors who favour an error frame (i.e., a hypothesis that a 
material error exists in the financial statements) react more strongly to confirming 
and disconfirming evidence than those favouring a non-error frame (McMillan and 
White 1993). 
These findings are consistent with the proposals by Snyder and Swan (1978). They 
propose that there are three information search strategies, in which individuals: 
1. Search for evidence that confirms their hypothesis. 
2. Search for evidence that disconfirms their hypothesis. 
3. Conduct a "balanced" search where an equal amount of effort is employed to 
uncover both confirming and discontinuing facts. 
In these studies, the negative circumstances (e.g., the failing company) trigger 
auditors' sensitiveness to audit evidence rather than the positive circumstances (e.g., 
the viable company). This inclination to information indicating failure of companies 
is consistent with the professional and legal environment of auditing, which label it 
as a "conservative" search strategy. Conservative behaviour suggests that auditors 
would be inclined to employ a search strategy that is biased toward the uncovering of 
material error (Smith and Kida 1991). However, research on Spanish auditors does 
not support these findings (Guiral and Esteo 2006). This recent study shows no 
difference in auditors' behaviour in a negative evaluation framework and those in a 
viability framework. 
Auditors also behave quite differently than business executives in their reactions to 
evidence (Einhorn and Hogarth 1985; Solomon 2005). While disconfirming evidence 
causes greater belief revisions than confirming evidence for auditors, confirming and 
disconfirming evidence have the same effects on decision-making for business 
executives (Ashton and Ashton 1990). On the other hand, tax professionals exhibit 
confirmatory behaviour, whereby they prefer information that supports their client's 
position. As such, they are prone to make recommendations that are preferred by the 
client (Cloyd and Spilker 1999). This is understandable as they can be seen as 
advocates of their clients, acting in favour of their clients within the taxation 
legislation framework whereas auditors are expected to protect the client firm's 
stakeholders through their professional scepticism and due process of audit (Pinsker 
et al. 2009). 
Drawing from the schematic model of attribution (Reeder and Brewer 1979), it is 
predicted that the magnitude of auditors' revisions to their assessments will depend 
on the consistency or inconsistency of the information about the honesty and 
competency of the client's management. This is stated in the following hypotheses. 
H2a: Auditors' revisions to their assessments on the truth of an audit assertion 
are negative or are negative and larger when management is consistently 
described as not honest (not competent) than their revisions when 
management is consistently described as honest (competent). 
H2b: Auditors' revisions to their assessments on the truth of an audit assertion 
are negative or are negative and larger when management is initially 
described as honest (competent) and is subsequently described as not 
honest (not competent) compared to when they are initially described as 
not honest (not competent) and are subsequently described as honest 
(competent). 
H2c: Auditors' revisions to their assessments on the truth of an audit assertion 
are negative or are negative and larger when management is initially 
described as honest (competent) and subsequent information describes 
them as not honest (not competent) than when management is initially 
described as honest (competent) and subsequent information also 
describes them as honest or (competent). 
H2d: Auditors' revisions to their assessments on the truth of an audit assertion 
are negative or are negative and larger when management is consistently 
described as not honest (not competent) than their revisions when they are 
initially described as not honest (not competent) and subsequent 
information describes them as honest (competent). 
Hypothesis 2a predicts that auditors' revisions to their initial assessments are greater 
when management is initially described as not honest or not competent and 
subsequent information also indicates that they are not honest or not competent 
compared to when they are initially described as honest or competent and subsequent 
information also indicates that they are honest or competent. 
Hypothesis 2b predicts that auditors' revisions to their initial assessments are greater 
in situations when management is initially described as honest or competent and is 
subsequently described as not honest or not competent compared to when they are 
initially described as not honest or not competent and are subsequently described as 
honest or competent. 
Hypothesis 2c predicts that auditors' revisions to their initial assessments are larger 
when management is initially portrayed as honest or competent and subsequent 
information describes them as not honest or not competent than when management is 
initially portrayed as honest or competent and subsequent information also indicates 
that they are honest or competent. 
Hypothesis 2d predicts that auditors' revisions to their initial assessments are larger 
when management is initially described as not honest or not competent and 
subsequent information also describes them as not honest or not competent compared 
to when they are initially described as not honest or not competent and subsequent 
information describes them as honest or competent. 
4.3 Positivity and Negativity Biases in Auditors' Perceptions of Client 
Management 
Asch (1946) introduces two theories to describe the process of impression formation. 
The first theory is that the total impression of a person is the sum of several 
independent characteristics plus a general factor.10 Each characteristic produces its 
own impression. Forming an impression is an organised process, in which a 
characteristic is recognised in its particular quality and the next characteristic is 
similarly recognised and so on until a general impression is conceived. The second 
theory, which is generally held by psychologists, asserts that in forming an 
impression of another person, one tries to get at the root of the personality. This 
10 Impression = a+b+c+d+e+G where a to e are characteristics and G is the general impression. 
involves perceiving the characteristics in relation to each other. A quality that is 
central in one impression may become peripheral in another. This explains why 
negative cues are more diagnostic than positive cues in people's perceptions of 
honesty/dishonesty and positive cues are more diagnostic than negative cues in their 
perceptions of competency/incompetency. 
Studies examining impression formation find that negative attributes or cues have an 
inordinate influence on judgments of personality characteristics (Singh and Teoh 
2000; Skowronski and Carlston 1987; Vonk 1993; Wyer 1974; Ybarra et al. 2001). 
This means judgments on impression or impression formation are based on 
combinations of negative cues that are perceived as diagnostic and positive cues that 
are not. With morality, positive behaviours may be attributed to factors such as 
conformity (Jones and Davis 1965) and ingratiation (Jones 1964). People are 
expected to behave according to "norms", i.e., one has to act honestly to be 
considered as having high morals. When a person commits an act that deviates from 
this expectation of high morality, that person will be considered immoral. For 
example, the public may have the opinion that a political leader who is caught 
drinking and driving may be forced to step down regardless of the contributions he 
has made to society. Hence, morality has become the default dimension that people 
use to understand and think about others. 
Asch's proposition is consistent with the integration bias literature (Birnbaum 1972; 
Fiske 1980; Jones and Davis 1965; Sherif and Sherif 1967; Skowronski and Carlston 
1989; Wyer 1973, 1974), which suggests that in judging the honesty or integrity of a 
person, negative traits or characteristics are central or more deterministic than 
positive ones and positive traits become peripheral or incidental. On the other hand, 
positive traits are more deterministic than negative traits in an individual's judgment 
of another person's competency. 
There are three other distinguishable classes of theories commonly cited as 
explanations for integration biases, namely the expectancy-contrast theories, the 
frequency-weight theories, and the range theories as shown in Table 4.1. The 
different views taken by these theories are considered as a measure of bias or 
extremity. 
Table 4.1 
Theories Explaining Integration Biases 
Expectancy-Contrast Theories Adaptation level theory 
(Helson, 1964) 
Social judgment theory 
(SherifandSherif, 1967) 
Integration Biases 
Frequency-Weight Theories Inference theory (Jones and 
Davis, 1965) 
Novelty approach (Fiske, 
1980) 
Range Theories Birnbaum (1972) and Wyer 
(1973, 1974) 
Category-Diagnosticity 
Theory 
Skowronski and Carlston 
(1989) 
Expectancy-contrast theories assume that integration biases are due to contrast 
effects in judgment (Helson 1964; Sherif and Sherif 1967). A contrast effect occurs 
when a stimulus is perceived to be more extreme than it otherwise would be because 
of comparison of the stimulus with some standard of reference point (or anchor 
point). This anchor point is assumed to be on the positive end of the scale and is 
moderate in extremity.11 For example, people are expected to behave morally but a 
"perfect" behaviour is "too good to be true". Thus, negative information is judged as 
more extremely negative than if the anchor is at true neutral (a contrast effect). 
Frequency-weight theories view integration biases as a function of the relative 
influence of different stimulus cues, i.e., informative cues may be more influential 
determinants of an impression than less informative cues (Fiske 1980; Jones and 
Davis 1965). One of the major factors affecting the informativeness of a cue is its 
incongruity from what is expected. Unexpected cues are thus, perceived as more 
informative and have greater influence on impressions than expected cues (Jones and 
Davis 1965). Therefore, extreme information gets more weight than moderate 
information; and negative information gets more weight than positive information 
when cues are combined into impressions because people expect others to be 
moderately positive and because moderate information is closer to the normative 
11 Extremity is also explained by these theories. Studies examining extremity under these theories find 
that extreme information or behaviours have more influence in impression formation compared to 
positive or moderate information or behaviours. This is because people are expected to behave more 
moderately or in a positive manner. Thus, when extreme behaviour is observed, more weight is given 
to it (Kaplan 1973). 
expectancy. Similarly, novelty theory argues that rare, novel or distinctive 
information is more informative because it enhances a perceiver's ability to 
distinguish among people (Fiske 1980). 
Range theories (Birnbaum 1972; Wyer 1974) use the overlap in cue distribution to 
narrow the range of trait ratings that are predicted for a stimulus actor. These theories 
view impressions as contingent on the ambiguities and discrepancies of the different 
cues contributing to the impression judgment. Range theories assume that every 
stimulus cue implies some range of possible values along a dimension of judgment. 
The size of this range (or distribution of implications) reflects cue ambiguity or 
uncertainty; the narrower a cue's distribution, the less ambiguous is its implications. 
These theories explain the negativity bias very well, however, they fail to sufficiently 
explain the positivity bias. Category-diagnosticity theory (Skowronski and Carlston 
1987) has the advantage of being able to explain both the positivity and negativity 
biases in a person's perceptions of another person's behaviour. Category-
diagnosticity theory applies the principles of natural object categorisation models to 
person perception to better explain the process and mechanisms involved in the 
integration biases.12 When an individual is defined by several cues, categorisation is 
12 Cantor and Mischel (1979) define the classification of objects into categories as the grouping of 
objects and other people according to similarities in their essential features. Cantor and Mischel 
(1979) and Lingle et al. (1984) apply the natural object categorisation models successfully in person 
perception studies. It is an approach to integration biases that views impression formation as a 
categorisation process. When a target is defined by multiple cues, categorisation should be determined 
by the more diagnostic cues. 
determined by those cues that are more diagnostic. For example, stealing money is 
likely to be perceived as more informative with regard to a person's dishonesty or 
honesty than his eating habits. Individuals possessing both positive and negative 
traits may perform actions that are inconsistent with their character. When the traits 
involved are related to morality dimensions, people generally expect more 
inconsistency from those perceived as possessing negative traits than from those 
perceived as possessing positive traits. Thus, when confronted with two equal but 
opposite cues when assessing morality, an individual generally assigns the negative 
cues more weight thus, producing a negativity bias (Anderson and Marchant 1989; 
Klein 1991; Skerratt and Woodhead 1992; Skowronski 2002; Vonk and Van 
Knippenberg 1994; Wojciszke et al. 1998; Ybarra 2001, 2002). 
On the other hand, when the observed traits are related to competency, the ability of 
an individual is defined more positively. People reason out an individual's non-
performance and attribute it to some other reason than the attributes of the observed 
individuals. With ability categories, non-performance is attributed to factors such as 
fatigue and lack of motivation (Anderson and Butzin 1974; Kun 1977; Surber 1984), 
while success is indicative of ability (Heider 1958). Therefore, when faced with two 
equal but opposite cues in assessing competency, an individual generally assigns the 
positive cues more weight, thus producing a positivity bias. For example, a tennis 
champion who has been winning all games but loses one game will still be regarded 
as a champion. Losing a game is not considered as an indication of the athlete's 
whole life's performance and ability. He may not be able to perform at his best due 
to fatigue or his surroundings. Later studies find that perceptions of a person's 
competency are affected by a positivity bias (Anderson and Marchant 1989; Betz et 
al. 1992; Gannon et al. 1994; Hess et al. 1999; Singh and Teoh 2000; Skowronski 
2002; Skowronski and Carlston 1987). 
The cue-diagnosticity theory of impression formation (Skowronski and Carlston 
1987) hypothesises differences in the processing of morality and competency 
information. This theory proposes that morality judgements are more saturated with 
affect than competency judgements. Morality judgments are therefore more 
dominant in global impression formation and information on competence plays a 
modifier role. It comes to play only after the basic approach-avoidance decision (i.e., 
moral judgement) has been made. It is then expected that morality categories play an 
important role at different stages of impression formation. Therefore, the integration 
of incongruent information results in a negativity bias in the morality domain, and a 
positivity bias in the competency domain (Skowronski 2002; Skowronski and 
Carlston 1987; Wojciszke 2005a, b; Wojciszke et al. 1998). Thus, in revising a prior 
belief of honesty, individuals are negatively biased; and in revising a prior belief of 
competency, individual are positively biased (Anderson and Marchant 1989; 
Birnbaum 1972; Skowronski and Carlston 1987, 1992; Wyer 1974). 
Studies find that auditors are subject to biases in their judgments and decision-
making, for example, confirming and disconfirming evidence affect their information 
search techniques (Jones 2001; Klayman and Ha 1987; Snyder and Swann 1978), and 
evaluation of evidence (Bedard and Biggs 1991; Church 1990) as discussed in the 
previous section. Auditors' judgments are also affected by the order of the evidence 
(Ahlawat 1999; Asare 1992; Ashton and Ashton 1988; Brown 2009; Cuccia and Mc 
Gill 2000); the types of the evidence (Ashton and Ashton 1988; Ashton and Ashton 
1990; Butt and Campbell 1989; Hogarth and Einhorn 1992; Pei et al. 1992); and the 
integrity of the evidence source (Anderson et al. 2004; Beaulieu 2001; Cohen and 
Hanno 2000; Iyer and Reckers 2007; Kizirian et al. 2005). 
The integrity of the source of evidence is very much related to the characteristics of 
the audit client's management. Information gathered from honest and competent 
management is more reliable than the information obtained from management who 
are not competent and not honest. ASA 240 requires auditors to discuss any unusual 
or unexplained changes in the behaviour of management or staff. SAS 99 
recommends that auditors attend to management's behavioural characteristics in 
interviews as such behaviours may suggest the use of deception to conceal fraud. 
This requires auditors to observe and perceive the competency and integrity of 
management. 
The findings from Anderson and Marchant (1989) are consistent with the findings in 
Skowronski and Carlston (1987). Auditors do not act differently than ordinary people 
in perceiving their clients' behaviours. They are affected by a negativity bias in 
perceiving the honesty of the client management and by a positivity bias in 
perceiving the competency of client management (Anderson and Marchant 1989). 
Based on the preceding explanations, it is hypothesised that auditors are negatively 
biased in perceiving honesty and positively biased in perceiving competency of audit 
client management. These biases should affect their risk assessments when making 
judgements based on evidence provided by client management. Their audit 
judgments should also reflect a negativity bias for information related to the honesty 
of client management and a positivity bias for information related to the competency 
of client management. Therefore, auditors' revisions to their initial assessments of 
whether an audit assertion is true will be larger when there is a positive change to 
competency (i.e., the financial controller is initially described as not competent and 
subsequently described as competent) than when there is a positive change to 
honesty (i.e., the financial controller is initially described as not honest and 
subsequently described as honest); and also when there is a negative change to 
honesty (i.e., the financial controller is initially described as honest and subsequently 
described as not honest) than when there is a negative change to competency (i.e., the 
financial controller is initially described as competent and subsequently described as 
not competent). These are stated in the following hypotheses: 
H3a: Auditors' revisions to their assessments of the truth of an audit assertion 
are positive or positive and larger when there is a positive change in the 
descriptions about client management's competency than their revisions 
when there is a positive change in the descriptions about client 
management's honesty. 
H3b: Auditors' revisions to their assessments of the truth of an audit assertion 
are negative or negative and larger when there is a negative change in the 
description about client management's honesty than their revisions when 
there is a negative change in the description about client management's 
competency. 
4.4 Summary 
Biases occur in people's perceptions of others. Research in the integration bias 
literature finds that perceptions of honesty are affected by a negativity bias and 
perceptions of competency are affected by a positivity bias (Betz et al. 1992; Gannon 
et al. 1994; Hess et al. 1999; Singh and Teoh 2000). The category-diagnosticity 
approach to integration biases predicts that not honest (negative morality) behaviour 
is perceived as more diagnostic than honest (positive morality) behaviour and that 
ability categories are defined more in terms of positive than negative performances, 
and thus positive performance is perceived as more diagnostic. 
Generally, greater belief revision occurs when an individual is presented with 
negative information compared to when they are presented with positive information. 
In such a situation, auditors may display confirmatory behaviour where they search 
for more information to confirm their initial belief with regard to issues such as 
going-concern problem, client management's lack of integrity, and client 
management's aggressive approach. In relation to auditors' judgments of client 
management's behaviour, the variables examined by Anderson and Marchant (1989) 
represent general life situations rather than real audit situations. This raises question 
as to whether auditors' judgments based on information provided by client 
management whose behaviour has signalled their honesty and competency are 
influenced by these biases. 
This thesis examines how positivity and negativity biases affect auditors' judgments 
on the assessments of audit assertions. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CASE STUDY DEVELOPMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the development of the case materials to be used in the 
behavioural experiment. Section 5.2 discusses the development of case study for the 
behavioural experiment. It explains the case materials and the operationalisations of 
the audit client management's honesty and competency, which are based on the 
results from the survey (see Chapter Three). Section 5.3 describes the dependent 
variable, which are the audit assertions to be assessed by the participants. 
5.2 Case Study Development 
A partial factorial design from a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (initial honesty x initial competency x 
second honesty x second competency) research design is used to test the hypothesis. 
The variables manipulated are two descriptions (initial description and a second 
description) about the honesty and competency of client management, which are 
manipulated at two levels; positive (honest and competent) and negative (not honest 
and not competent). 
Based on an experimental case study, the participants make a series of risk 
assessments with respect to three assertions and two overall assertions relating to 
cash transactions and account balances. The three assertions the participants assess 
are completeness, cut-off and accuracy of cash transactions. The overall assertions 
concern the truth and fairness of the audit client's cash transactions and the cash and 
cash equivalent balances on the balance sheet. These assertions are used as they 
relate to the information provided in the experiment. 
As a result of this design there are 16 possible cases. However, only 12 cases are 
used, resulting in a partial factorial design. This is due to the reason that I had access 
to only 200 auditors and, therefore, I restricted the design to 12 cells so that I could 
have an average of 16 - 17 observations for each cell. Accordingly, I decided to 
exclude the cases where the subsequent information indicated the same honesty and 
competency traits as the initial information provided to the participants, i.e., where 
honest and competent management is still honest and competent; not honest and not 
competent management is still not honest and not competent; honest but not 
competent is still honest but not competent; and not honest but competent is still not 
honest but competent. The objective of the experiments is to show the best (superior) 
treatments. Thus, I am more interested in using the cases that would produce the 
largest differences in risk assessments when there are changes in the descriptions of 
management's behaviour. For these cases, I expected there would be no change in 
risk assessments or the smallest change in risk assessments compared to the other 
cases (if there were to be any changes) for these cases where the second set of 
information indicates that management maintains their initial behaviour for both 
honesty and competency. The manipulations of honesty and competency included in 
the study are shown in Table 5.1 below. 
Table 5.1 
Combinations of the Manipulations of Variables 
From To 
Honest and Competent Honest and not competent 
Not honest and competent 
Not honest and not competent 
Honest and not competent Honest and competent 
Not honest and competent 
Not honest and not competent 
Not honest and competent Honest and competent 
Honest and not competent 
Not honest and not competent 
Not honest and not competent Honest and competent 
Honest and not competent 
Not honest and competent 
5.2.1 Tasks in the Case Study 
The case study used in the experiment is based on a real company listed on the ASX. 
The reason the case material is based on an actual company is to ensure that the 
relativity between figures presented over the two years is reasonable and realistic. 
However, the information on audit procedures and findings and behaviours of 
manager are made up for the purpose of manipulating the independent variables. The 
case was pilot tested by seven (7) attendees at the Australia National Centre of Audit 
and Assurance Research (ANCAAR) Conference. Based on their responses and 
suggestions to the case material, improvements were made to the case study. 
The flow of tasks to be performed by participants is presented in Exhibit 5.1 while 
the fall case instrument is presented in Appendix 3. The case study consists of three 
parts and can be completed in approximately 20 - 25 minutes. Part 1 of the case study 
consists of the background information of the company, which includes financial 
information, general descriptions on internal controls and statement of corporate 
governance, and descriptions of financial controller that relate to the honesty and 
competency of the financial controller. 
Exhibit 5.1 
Task Description 
PART 1 
Background Information Including Initial Descriptions of the Honesty and 
Competency of the Financial Controller 
I 
PART 2 
Audit Evidence on Five Audit Assertions Relating to Cash Transactions 
I 
Assessments of Five Cash-related Audit Assertions 
1 Subsequent Information in Relation to the Honesty or Competency of the Financial Controller 
i . , 
Assessments of the Same Five Audit Assertions 
y 
PART 3 
Debriefing Questions:-
Set 1: Manipulation checks 
Set 2: Demographic information 
MAIN 
TASK 
Participants are told to assume the role of the auditor of the client company in the 
case material. The client company in the case material, Telcom Limited (not the 
actual name) is the largest specialist mobile communications retailer in Australia. It 
started as a single mobile communication store about a decade ago and has grown 
into a company that has 150 stores around the country and it has plans to open more 
stores. It was first listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in November 
2005. Telcom is described as enjoying good growth in profits for the past years and 
the chairman is confident that the company can maintain this. Other information such 
as the share price, which shows a significant increase since its initial public offering; 
and brief information on a few post-balance sheet events are also given. The mobile 
telecommunication industry is described as competitive and the environment is 
described as always changing with various ranges of products offered by major 
service providers in Australia. The statement on corporate governance, remuneration 
of directors, and audit engagement are also included in the case study. A summary of 
financial information, comprising income statements, balance sheets, and cash flow 
statements for the past two years are presented as part of the case material. This 
information is not manipulated in the experiment and, therefore, remains the same 
for all the cases. 
With regard to the audit engagement, participants are informed that Telcom is an 
existing audit client and the audit firm has been auditing Telcom since it became a 
publicly listed company. The reason for choosing a task where there is an existing 
client is to indicate to participants that the auditors already have some experience 
with the company and are able to assess the impact of any changes to management 
behaviour on their work. 
Part 1 also includes information on the materiality levels for balance sheet items and 
income statement items. Participants are also informed that internal control is 
assessed as moderate. All participants receive the same background information 
except for the information that relates to the financial controller's honesty and 
competency. 
The initial description of the behaviour of the financial controller is also presented in 
Part 1. This is one of the manipulated variables. Participants receive different 
descriptions of the honesty and competency of the financial controller. For example, 
a financial controller who is initially described as honest and competent has the 
description shown in Panel A of Exhibit 5.2. The first paragraph relates to honesty of 
the financial controller while the second paragraph relates to his competency. Panel 
B of Exhibit 5.2 shows the description of the financial controller who is initially 
described as not honest and not competent. The name of the financial controller in 
the case materials is Mr Stewart. 
Exhibit 5.2 
An Example of Initial Manipulation of Honesty and Competency 
Panel A: Initial behaviour is honest and competent 
Mr Stewart always expresses his concerns whenever he feels that some aspects of internal 
control are not observed. Telcom's internal control is assessed as moderate. However, in 
most cases where breakdowns have been observed in Telcom's internal control procedures in 
past audits, and with Mr Stewart's help, you were able to perform related substantive audit 
procedures to identify any material misstatements that might exist in the accounts. 
Mr Stewart is a Chartered Accountant. He joined Telcom in June 2004 as a Financial 
Controller. Before taking up the position at Telcom, Mr Stewart had been working with 
Telstra in a similar position for ten years. 
Panel B: Initial behaviour is not honest and not competent 
During the previous year's audit, you audited a sample of non-inventory transactions in the 
cash payments journal. You discovered that one of the travel expenditures paid by Telcom 
was for airfares to Hawaii for Mr Stewart and his family. The expenditure had been 
approved only by Mr Stewart. You had pointed this out to Mr. Stewart. Nevertheless, there 
was no adjustment made with respect to this personal payment. 
Your current year's audit also revealed that there were a number of sales invoices included in 
the current year's results for product sales that were actually delivered on the first two days 
of the next financial year despite the fact that title to the goods did not transfer until the 
goods were delivered to the customer. The items had not been included in inventory, but the 
profit on these sales had effectively been "anticipated". The effect was a material increase in 
profit. Mr Stewart refused to reverse the sales as he argued there was no question about 
whether the profits were real or not, it was just a matter of one or two day's timing. 
Subsequent discussions with Mr Stewart indicated to you that he was not aware that title to 
the goods did not transfer until the goods were delivered to the customer. 
Part 2 of the instrument instructs participants to provide their assessments of the 
audit assertions on a seven-point scale that indicates how strongly they believe that 
the assertion is true or not true based on audit evidence provided regarding particular 
audit assertions and the background information. The audit findings pertaining to the 
three assertions are consistent in all the cases. The scales are anchored by "1" -
"Strongly believe that the assertion is NOT true" and "7" - "Strongly believe that the 
assertion is true". Exhibit 5.3 sets out this instruction. Participants are specifically 
required not to change their answers to the audit assertions once they moved on to 
the next section of the case study. 
Exhibit 5.3 
Instruction for Part 2 of the Instrument 
For this part, please provide your assessments on the audit assertions. Your judgment will be 
in the form of circling a number on a seven-point rating scale that indicates how strongly you 
believe that the assertion is true or not true. The scales are anchored by "Strongly believe 
that the assertion is NOT true" and "Strongly believe that the assertion is true". The 
following pages describe some of the audit procedures and the audit evidence you have 
obtained relating to the determination of the three assertions. In stating your assessment on 
one audit assertion, you should take into consideration only (1) audit evidence regarding that 
particular audit assertion and (2) the background information. 
The next section of Part 2 provides the participants with additional information that 
also relates to the honesty and competency of the financial controller. This is also a 
manipulated independent variable. The information is either consistent or 
inconsistent with the initial description of the financial controller's honesty and 
competency. After reading this additional information, the participants make a 
revised assessment of the same audit assertions. The posterior assessments represent 
the auditors' judgments that reflect their perceptions including the additional 
information about the behaviour of the financial controller. Exhibit 5.4 illustrates an 
example of the description of honest but not competent controller. The first 
paragraph relates to the honesty of the financial controller and the second paragraph 
relates to his competency. 
Exhibit 5.4 
An Example of Subsequent Manipulation of Honesty and Competency 
During the current year's audit, Mr Stewart has been frank and forthright in his 
communications with you about the company's internal control systems. For example, he has 
brought to your attention a weakness in the control systems with respect to the lack of proper 
authorisation of payments to some vendors. You had a few discussions with him regarding 
this and then performed additional audit procedures. 
Your current year's audit also revealed that there were a number of sales invoices included in 
the current year's results for product sales that were actually delivered on the first two days 
of the next financial year despite the fact that title to the goods did not transfer until the 
goods were delivered to the customer. The items had not been included in inventory, but the 
profit on these sales had effectively been "anticipated". The effect was a material increase in 
profit. Mr Stewart refused to reverse the sales as he argued there was no question about 
whether the profits were real or not, it was just a matter of one or two day's timing. 
Subsequent discussions with Mr Stewart indicated to you that he was not aware that title to 
the goods did not transfer until the goods were delivered to the customer. 
There are 12 different versions of the instrument. The full variations of these 
versions are presented in Exhibit 5.5. The first column in Exhibit 5.5 contains the 
initial honesty and competency; in which the first paragraph describes the honest/not 
honest behaviour of the financial controller and the second paragraph describes the 
competent/not competent behaviour of the financial controller. There are four 
variations of the initial behaviours; the financial controller is described as honest and 
competent in Condition 1, he is described as honest and not competent in Condition 
2, he is described as not honest and competent in Condition 3 and as not honest and 
not competent in Condition 4. 
The second column contains the additional information on the behaviour of the 
financial controller. There are three types of additional information for each initial 
behaviour. For example, in Condition 1, the financial controller is initially described 
as honest and competent and the additional information describes his behaviour as 
either: (1) honest and not competent; (2) not honest and competent; or (3) not honest 
and not competent. 
Exhibit 5.5 
Variations of Case Instrument 
CONDITION 1 
Initial Behaviour Subsequent Behaviour 
Honest and Competent 
Mr Stewart always expresses his concerns whenever he feels 
that some aspects of internal control are not observed. Telcom's 
internal control is assessed as moderate. However, in most cases 
where breakdowns have been observed in Telcom's internal 
control procedures in past audits, and with Mr Stewart's help, 
you were able to perform related substantive audit procedures to 
identity any material misstatements that might exist in the 
accounts. 
Mr Stewart is a Chartered Accountant. He joined Telcom in 
June 2004 as a Financial Controller. Before taking up the 
position at Telcom, Mr Stewart had been working with Telstra 
in a similar position for ten years. 
Honest and Not Competent 
During the current year's audit, Mr Stewart has been frank and forthright in his communications with you about the company's internal 
control systems. For example, he has brought to your attention a weakness in the control systems especially with respect to the lack of 
proper authorisation of payments to some vendors. You had a few discussions with him regarding this and then performed additional audit 
procedures. 
Your current year's audit also revealed that there were a number of sales invoices included in the current year's results for product sales that 
were actually delivered on the first two days of the next financial year despite the feet that title to the goods did not transfer until the goods 
were delivered to the customer. The items had not been included in inventory, but the profit on these sales had effectively been 
"anticipated". The effect was a material increase in profit. Mr Stewart refused to reverse the sales as he argued there was no question about 
whether the profits were real or not, it was just a matter of one or two day's timing. Subsequent discussions with Mr Stewart indicated to 
you that he was not aware that title to the goods did not transfer until the goods were delivered to the customer. 
Not Honest and Competent 
You audited a sample of non-inventory transactions in the cash payments journal. You discovered that one of the travel expenditures paid 
by Telcom was for airfares to Hawaii for Mr Stewart and his family. The expenditure had been approved only by Mr Stewart. You had 
pointed this out to Mr. Stewart. Nevertheless, there was no adjustment made with respect to this personal payment. 
Mr Stewart was recently honoured with the prestigious CFO of the Year Award. This award is presented annually to an outstanding CFO 
who has demonstrated, to an independent panel, outstanding levels of achievements across six professional attributes including a high 
technical competence in corporate accounting and financial reporting. 
Not Honest and Not Competent 
You audited a sample of non-inventory transactions in the cash payments journal. You discovered that one of the travel expenditures paid 
by Telcom was for airfares to Hawaii for Mr Stewart and his family. The expenditure had been approved only by Mr Stewart. You had 
pointed this out to Mr. Stewart. Nevertheless, there was no adjustment made with respect to this personal payment. 
Your current year's audit also revealed that there were a number of sales invoices included in the current year's results for product sales that 
were actually delivered on the first two days of the next financial year despite the feet that title to the goods did not transfer until the goods 
were delivered to the customer. The items had not been included in inventory, but the profit on these sales had effectively been 
"anticipated". The effect was a material increase in profit. Mr Stewart refused to reverse the sales as he argued there was no question about 
whether the profits were real or not, it was just a matter of one or two day's timing. Subsequent discussions with Mr Stewart indicated to 
you that he was not aware that title to the goods did not transfer until the goods were delivered to the customer. 
Exhibit 5.5 (continued) 
CONDITION 2 
Initial Behaviour Subsequent Behaviour 
Honest and Not Competent 
Mr Stewart always expresses his concerns whenever he 
feels that some aspects of internal control are not 
observed. Telcom's internal control is assessed as 
moderate. However, in most cases where breakdowns 
have been observed in Telcom's internal control 
procedures in past audits, and with Mr Stewart's help, 
you were able to perform related substantive audit 
procedures to identify any material misstatements that 
might exist in the accounts. 
Your current year's audit also revealed that there were a 
number of sales invoices included in the current year's 
results for product sales that were actually delivered on 
the first two days of the next financial year despite the 
feet that title to the goods did not transfer until the goods 
were delivered to the customer. The items had not been 
included in inventory, but the profit on these sales had 
effectively been "anticipated". The effect was a material 
increase in profit. Mr Stewart refused to reverse the sales 
as he argued there was no question about whether the 
profits were real or not, it was just a matter of one or two 
day's timing. Subsequent discussions with Mr Stewart 
indicated to you that he was not aware that title to the 
goods did not transfer until the goods were delivered to 
the customer. 
Honest and Competent 
During the current year's audit, Mr Stewart has been ftank and forthright in his communications with you about the 
company's internal control systems. For example, he has brought to your attention a weakness in the control systems 
especially with respect to the lack of proper authorisation of payments to some vendors. You had a few discussions with him 
regarding this and then performed additional audit procedures. 
Mr Stewart was recently honoured with the prestigious CFO of the Year Award. This award is presented annually to an 
outstanding CFO who has demonstrated, to an independent panel, outstanding levels of achievements across six professional 
attributes including a high technical competence in corporate accounting and financial reporting. 
Not Honest and Competent 
You audited a sample of non-inventory transactions in the cash payments journal. You discovered that one of the travel 
expenditures paid by Telcom was for airfares to Hawaii for Mr Stewart and his family. The expenditure had been approved 
only by Mr Stewart. You had pointed this out to Mr. Stewart. Nevertheless, there was no adjustment made with respect to 
this personal payment. 
Mr Stewart was recently honoured with the prestigious CFO of the Year Award. This award is presented annually to an 
outstanding CFO who has demonstrated, to an independent panel, outstanding levels of achievements across six professional 
attributes including a high technical competence in corporate accounting and financial reporting. 
Not Honest and Not Competent 
You audited a sample of non-inventory transactions in the cash payments journal. You discovered that one of the travel 
expenditures paid by Telcom was for airfares to Hawaii for Mr Stewart and his family. The expenditure had been approved 
only by Mr Stewart. You had pointed this out to Mr. Stewart. Nevertheless, there was no adjustment made with respect to 
this personal payment. 
During the year, Telcom Ltd. hired a computer expert to do in-house software development that can help to improve 
communication between all its stores in Australia in order to manage their operations better. Part of the costs involved was 
for the evaluation and final selection of possible alternatives for improved processes and systems, which are considered as 
research costs. Mr Stewart instructed that these costs be capitalised even though this is not in accordance with AASB138 
"Intangible Assets". Subsequent discussions with Mr Stewart indicated that he did not really understand the provisions in 
AASB138 "Intangible Assets". 
Exhibit 5.5 (continued) 
CONDITION 3 
Initial Behaviour Subsequent Behaviour 
Not Honest and Competent 
During the previous year's audit, you audited a sample of non-
inventory transactions in the cash payments journal. You 
discovered that one of the travel expenditures paid by Telcom 
was for airfares to Hawaii for Mr Stewart and his family. The 
expenditure had been approved only by Mr Stewart. You had 
pointed this out to Mr. Stewart. Nevertheless, there was no 
adjustment made with respect to this personal payment. 
Mr Stewart is a Chartered Accountant. He joined Telcom in 
June 2004 as a Financial Controller. Before taking up the 
position at Telcom, Mr Stewart had been working with Telstra 
in a similar position for ten years. 
Honest and Competent 
During the current year's audit, Mr. Stewart has been frank and forthright in his communications with you about the company's internal 
control systems. For example, he has brought to your attention a weakness in the control systems especially with respect to the lack of 
proper authorisation of payments to some vendors. You had a few discussions with him regarding this and then performed additional audit 
procedures. 
Mr Stewart was recently honoured with the prestigious CFO of the Year Award. This award is presented annually to an outstanding CFO 
who has demonstrated, to an independent panel, outstanding levels of achievements across six professional attributes including a high 
technical competence in corporate accounting and financial reporting. 
Honest and Not Competent 
During the current year's audit, Mr. Stewart has been frank and forthright in his communications with you about the company's internal 
control systems. For example, he has brought to your attention a weakness in the control systems especially with respect to the lack of 
proper authorisation of payments to some vendors. You had a few discussions with him regarding this and then performed additional audit 
procedures. 
Your current year's audit also revealed that there were a number of sales invoices included in the current year's results for product sales that 
were actually delivered on the first two days of the next financial year despite the fact that title to the goods did not transfer until the goods 
were delivered to the customer. The items had not been included in inventory, but the profit on these sales had effectively been 
"anticipated". The effect was a material increase in profit. Mr Stewart refused to reverse the sales as he argued there was no question about 
whether the profits were real or not, it was just a matter of one or two day's timing. Subsequent discussions with Mr Stewart indicated to 
you that he was not aware that title to the goods did not transfer until the goods were delivered to the customer. 
Not Honest and Not Competent 
During the current year's audit, you discovered that there have been reductions made to the operating expenses and increases in the 
inventory account on a monthly basis. When asked about this, Mr Stewart explained that these are normal adjustments. However, there was 
no documentation to support this. When asked about the lack of documentation, Mr Stewart became evasive and ended the conversation 
with a promise to "look into it". He has never come back to you on this issue. 
Your current year's audit also revealed that there were a number of sales invoices included in the current year's results for product sales that 
were actually delivered on the first two days of the next financial year despite the fact that title to the goods did not transfer until the goods 
were delivered to the customer. The items had not been included in inventory, but the profit on these sales had effectively been 
"anticipated". The effect was a material increase in profit. Mr Stewart refused to reverse the sales as he argued there was no question about 
whether the profits were real or not, it was just a matter of one or two day's timing. Subsequent discussions with Mr Stewart indicated to 
you that he was not aware that title to the goods did not transfer until the goods were delivered to the customer. 
Exhibit 5.5 (continued) 
CONDITION 4 
Initial Behaviour Subsequent Behaviour 
Not Honest and Not Competent 
During the previous year's audit, you audited a sample of 
non-inventory transactions in the cash payments journal. 
You discovered that one of the travel expenditures paid 
by Telcom was for airfares to Hawaii for Mr Stewart and 
his family. The expenditure had been approved only by 
Mr Stewart. You had pointed this out to Mr. Stewart. 
Nevertheless, there was no adjustment made with respect 
to this personal payment. 
Your current year's audit also revealed that there were a 
number of sales invoices included in the current year's 
results for product sales that were actually delivered on 
the first two days of the next financial year despite the 
fact that title to the goods did not transfer until the goods 
were delivered to the customer. The items had not been 
included in inventory, but the profit on these sales had 
effectively been "anticipated". The effect was a material 
increase in profit. Mr Stewart refused to reverse the sales 
as he argued there was no question about whether the 
profits were real or not, it was just a matter of one or two 
day's timing. Subsequent discussions with Mr Stewart 
indicated to you that he was not aware that title to the 
goods did not transfer until the goods were delivered to 
the customer. 
Honest and Competent 
During the current year's audit, Mr. Stewart has been frank and forthright in his communications with you about the 
company's internal control systems. For example, he has brought to your attention a weakness in the control systems 
especially with respect to the lack of proper authorisation of payments to some vendors. You had a few discussions with him 
regarding this and then performed additional audit procedures. 
Mr Stewart was recently honoured with the prestigious CFO pf the Year Award. This award is presented annually to an 
outstanding CFO who has demonstrated, to an independent panel, outstanding levels of achievements across six professional 
attributes including a high technical competence in corporate accounting and financial reporting. 
Honest and Not Competent 
During the current year's audit, Mr. Stewart has been frank and forthright in his communications with you about the 
company's internal control systems. For example, he has brought to your attention a weakness in the control systems 
especially with respect to the lack of proper authorisation of payments to some vendors. You had a few discussions with him 
regarding this and then performed additional audit procedures. 
During the year, Telcom Ltd. hired a computer expert to do in-house software development that can help to improve 
communication between all its stores in Australia in order to manage their operations better. Part of the costs involved was 
for the evaluation and the final selection of possible alternatives for improved processes and systems; which are considered 
as research costs. Mr Stewart instructed that these costs be capitalised. This is not in accordance with AASB138 "Intangible 
Assets (In Particular Software)". Subsequent discussions with Mr Stewart indicated that he did not really understand the 
provisions in AASB138 "Intangible Assets". 
Not Honest and Competent 
During the current year's audit, you discovered that there have been reductions made to the operating expenses and 
increases in the inventory account on a monthly basis. When asked about this, Mr Stewart explained that these are normal 
adjustments. However, there was no documentation to support this. When asked about the lack of documentation, Mr 
Stewart became evasive and ended the conversation with a promise to "look into it". He has never come back to you on this 
issue. 
Mr Stewart was recently honoured with the prestigious CFO of the Year Award. This award is presented annually to an 
outstanding CFO who has demonstrated, to an independent panel, outstanding levels of achievements across six professional 
attributes including a high technical competence in corporate accounting and financial reporting. 
Part 3 of the instrument consists of debriefing questions. The questions in Set 1 as 
shown in Exhibit 5.5 capture the auditors' perceptions of the honesty and 
competency level of the financial controller. Participants assess the honesty of the 
financial controller on a seven-point scale anchored by "1" - "Dishonest" and "7" -
"Honest". Participants assess the competency of the financial controller on a seven-
point scale anchored by "1" - "Incompetent" and "7" - "Competent". Set 2 consists 
of demographic questions of the participants. 
Exhibit 5.6 
Question Set 1 
1. Please assess the level of honesty of the Financial Controller. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Dishonest Moderately Honest 
7 
Honest 
2. Please assess the level of competency of the Financial Controller. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Incompetent Moderately Competent Competent 
5.2.2 Manipulations of Honesty and Competency of Audit Client's Management 
Studies on the perceptions of people's behaviour find that honesty and competency 
are perceived quite differently (Anderson 1981; Eiser and Stroebe 1972; Fiske 1980; 
Klein 1991; Mezulis et al. 2004; Peeters and Czapinski 1990; Sears 1983; 
Skowronski and Carlston 1989; Vonk 1993; Vonk and Van Knippenberg 1994; 
Ybarra 2001). Auditors also perceive the honesty and competency of audit client 
quite differently and in a manner consistent with the findings in psychology 
(Anderson and Marchant 1989). Category-diagnosticity theory predicts that 
perceptions of honesty are negatively biased while perceptions of competency are 
positively biased. This is discussed in Chapter Four. Generally, the findings from the 
literature support the category-diagnosticity theory. Therefore, the manipulations in 
the case studies are to examine the existence of these biases in auditors' perceptions. 
The case material in the experiment uses cues to indicate honest or not honest and 
competent or not competent behaviour, which are selected based on the results from 
the survey discussed in Chapter Three. The results from the survey form the basis to 
the operationalisation of the variables in the case study. The descriptions of the client 
behaviour chosen to operationalise honest and competent are selected from the items 
in the survey that scored the lowest assessed mean risks and the items chosen to 
operationalise not honest and not competent are selected from those that scored the 
highest assessed mean risks. Table 5.2 shows the summary of this analysis. Panel A 
of the table lists the ranking of the variables categorised as honest, Panel B ranks the 
variables categorised as not honest. Panels C and D in Table 5.2 show the ranking of 
the variables categorised as competent and not competent, respectively. 
Table 5.2 
Items from the Survey with the Highest and Lowest Mean Assessed Ris ts 
Descriptions of Variables 
Mean 
Assessed 
Risk 
Panel A: Ranking of "not honest" items, where "contribution to risk" ratings are the 
highest 
The financial director gives an instruction to delete valid accounts payable two months 
before the year end and reinstate them around middle of the financial year. 
6.09 
A significant amount of physical inventory is missing. 5.94 
The CEO terminated the vice president and a director who questioned the CEO's action to 
capitalise start-up costs with the intention to maintain or increase the stock price and 
earnings. 
5.66 
Management approves non-related expenses (e.g., personal travelling expenses) as a 
company expenses. 
5.38 
Individuals related to the directors sell their shares in a subsidiary before the subsidiary was 
sold. 
5.36 
There have been adjustments showing a reduction in operating expenses and an increase in 
inventory on a monthly basis but no documentation exists to support these. 
5.36 
The sales manager sometimes made adjustments to the amounts of credit sales in writing on 
some of the carbon copies of sales vouchers. 
5.13 
There have been regular instructions from the chief accountant to transfer inventory to the 
equipment account. 
5.08 
Panel B: Ranking of "Honest" items, where "contribution to risk" ratings are the lowest 
Directors are committed to attend the board of directors meetings and you observe that 
decision-making in these meetings is always thorough. 
1.83 
The financial controller tells the auditor his concern about a weakness in the control system. 3.72 
Panel C: Ranking of "not competent" items, where "contribution to risk" ratings are the 
highest 
Customers complain about overdue notices. They say they have paid and have receipts to 
prove it. The staff accountant is unable to locate records of the related accounts receivable. 
5.69 
The Financial Controller does not comply with GAAP on some material matters. 5.65 
Expired inventory are still included in the valuation of inventory at full cost. 5.51 
The accounts manager processes vouchers for payments without checking for authorisation. 5.14 
The credit manager is unable to explain discrepancies between accounts receivable balances 
and debtors' confirmations. 
5.12 
Accounts payable and accounts receivable are not reconciled. 5.09 
Sales orders received are recognised as sales immediately. 5.01 
The senior accountant has been unable to provide a list of all fixed assets, asset 
identification numbers, cost, date of purchase, and current location of each item on the list. 
The excuse given is she has always been busy. 
5.00 
Panel D: Ranking of "competent" items, where "contribution to risk" ratings are the 
lowest 
The chief accountant reduced the provision for doubtful debts because the company 
received, just before the year-end, a settlement from a substantial customer, whose account 
had been overdue for months. 
2.99 
The accounts manager is always ready with satisfactory answers when asked about 
fluctuations in revenue. 
2.55 
The CFO has a reputation of impeccable integrity and has won a CFO Excellence Award. 1.87 
The CFO has more than 10 years of experience in the industry. 1.87 
Directors are committed to attend the board of directors meetings and you observe that 
decision-making in these meetings is always thorough. 
1.83 
In describing the honesty and competency of client management, similar phrasing as 
used in the survey is used to avoid changes in auditors' perceptions of honesty (or 
dishonesty) and competency (or incompetency). In addition, the descriptions of the 
client behaviour that are chosen take into account the appropriateness of the 
circumstances in relation to the job of a financial controller who represents the client 
management in the case study. Finally, to avoid any bias that an honest (not honest) 
behaviour is stronger or weaker than a competent (not competent) behaviour, I 
selected cues with similar average scores for the "contribution to risk" ratings 
provided by the survey participants. 
The cue chosen to operationalise honest behaviour in the case instrument is "The 
financial controller tells the auditor his concern about a weakness in the control 
system" (mean = 3.72). One of the cues chosen to operationalise the not honest 
behaviour of the financial controller is "Management approves non-related expenses 
(e.g., personal travelling expenses) as a company expenses" (mean = 5.38). 
Management is represented by the financial controller in the case instrument. 
Another cue, "There have been adjustments showing a reduction in operating 
expenses and an increase in inventory on a monthly basis but no documentation 
exists to support these" (mean =?• 5.36) is also chosen to operationalise financial 
controller dishonesty. 
The cues chosen to describe the financial controller as competent are "The CFO has 
a reputation of impeccable integrity and has won a CFO Excellence Award" (mean 
= 1.87); and the "The CFO has more than 10 years of experience in the industry" 
(mean = 1.87). The word CFO is replaced by financial controller in the case 
instrument. 
The cue that is chosen to describe the financial controller as not competent is "The 
Financial Controller does not comply with GAAP on some material matters " (mean 
= 5.65). This is represented by two different non-compliances; the revenue on sale 
was recognised even though the title of goods has not actually been transferred, and 
research costs were capitalised. 
5.3 Audit Assertions 
The dependent variables in this experiment are the auditors' assessments of the truth 
of audit assertions. Understanding risk assessments made at the assertion level is 
important to the understanding of audit risk assessments in general. Standard-setters 
and proponents of an assertion-level approach argue that it has the potential of 
creating a more efficient and effective linkage of assessed risk to planned audit work. 
There have been a few studies involving assertion-level risk assessments (Braun 
2000; Mock and Wright 1993; Waller 1993), and findings from these studies indicate 
that auditors' evidential planning judgments are influenced by risk factor information 
at the assertion level. Similarly, Martinov and Roebuck (1998) suggest that 
understanding assertion-level risk assessments are relevant to understanding the audit 
approaches of audit firms. 
In the experiment, the participants assess the truth of the assertions relating to 
completeness, cut-off, accuracy of cash transactions as the information provided in 
the experiment relates to these assertions. In addition, participants assess two other 
assertions on the overall truth and fairness of the cash transactions; and the overall 
cash and cash equivalent balances. 
The next chapter presents the results from the behavioural experiment. 
CHAPTER SIX 
RESULTS FOR THE EXPERIMENT 
6.1 Introduction 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 presents the demographic data of the 
participants. Following this, Section 6.3 reports the test of category-diagnosticity of 
the variables to ensure that the changes to the descriptions of financial controller's 
behaviour are correctly perceived by the auditors. Section 6.4 reports the effects of 
initial honesty and competency of the financial controller on auditors' assessments of 
audit assertions prior to additional information confirming or disconfirming 
management's honesty and competency. Section 6.5 reports the effects of consistent 
or inconsistent information about the honesty and competency of the financial 
controller on auditors' assessments of audit assertions. The analyses in this section 
are divided into two parts. The first part reports on the effects of consistent and 
inconsistent information about the honesty and competency of the financial 
controller on the revisions of auditors' assessments (i.e., the differences between 
auditors' initial and second assessments). The second part reports on the effects of 
consistent and inconsistent information about the honesty and competency of the 
financial controller on auditors' second assessments. Second assessments are the 
posterior assessments made by the participants after reading the additional 
information that is either consistent or inconsistent with the initial description about 
the honesty and competency of the financial controller. Finally, the last section 
provides a summary of the results. 
6.2 The Participants 
The experimental case materials were distributed to attendees of professional 
accounting and auditing training sessions in Australia. They are auditors and 
accountants receiving training as part of the preparation for their chartered 
accounting program exams. Participants were remunerated with a $20 gift voucher 
for their participation. A total of 199 instruments were completed and returned. Table 
6.1 shows the demographic information of the participants. The number of female 
and male participants is almost the same. The average age is 24.3 years having an 
average of 13.3 months average audit experience. The majority (67.3 percent) work 
for a Big-4 firm. This means they have experience in various types of clients coming 
from various types of industries. Even though 88 (44.2 percent) are not currently 
working as auditors, they all have audit experience. 
Table 6.1 
Demogra phic Data 
Gender N 
Male 108 54.3% 
Female 91 45.7% 
Total 199 100.0% 
Average Age 24.3 years 
Maximum audit experience 180 months 
Minimum audit experience 6 months 
Average audit experience 13.3 months 
Current position 
Audit staff 97 48.8% 
Senior auditor 7 3.5% 
Internal auditor 7 3.5% 
Other 88 44.2% 
Total 199 100.0% 
Type of audit firm 
Big-4 134 67.3% 
Medium size 37 18.6% 
Small 7 3.5% 
Other 21 10.6% 
Total 199 100.0% 
6.3 Category-diagnosticity Test 
Independent t-tests were performed to ensure that the manipulations are seen as 
intended. The manipulation checks are to ensure that when the additional description 
of the behaviour of the financial controller changed from positive to negative and 
from negative to positive behaviours, the participants responded accordingly. This 
means the change from a description of honest to not honest behaviour is different 
from the change from a description of not honest to honest behaviour. Similarly, the 
change from a description of competent to not competent behaviour is perceived as 
different from the change from a description of not competent to competent 
behaviour. The participants are asked the questions: "Please assess the level of 
honesty of the Financial Controller" to assess their perceptions of honesty and 
"Please assess the level of competency of the Financial Controller" to assess their 
perceptions of competency. They are required to respond on a seven-point Likert 
scale, with '1' dishonest/incompetent and '7' honest/competent. The t-tests are used 
to test for significant differences in response to these questions. Table 6.2 below 
shows the results of the t-tests. 
Table 6.2 
"Honesty" and "Competency" Manipulation 
N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
df t Sig. 
Honest to not 65 2.154 1.556 
Level of honest 
Honesty 
Not honest to 
honest 
50 3.520 1.474 113 -4.779 0.000 
Competent to 71 0.732 1.309 
Level of not competent 
Competency 
Not competent 
to competent 
60 1.833 2.226 129 -3.512 0.001 
The results reported in Table 6.2 indicate that the manipulation of the honesty and 
competency of the financial controller is seen as intended by the participants. 
Auditors' assessments on the change of behaviour from honest to not honest are 
significantly different from the change of behaviour from not honest to honest. They 
are also significantly different when the description of the financial controller's 
behaviour changes from competent to not competent and from not competent to 
competent. 
6.4 The Effects of the Honesty and Competency of Financial Controller on 
Auditors' Initial Assessments on Audit Assertions 
Hypothesis la proposes that auditors' initial assessments of the truth of an audit 
assertion are higher when the initial information describes the financial controller as 
honest compared to when initial information describes them as not honest. 
Hypothesis lb proposes that auditors' initial assessments of the truth of an audit 
assertion are higher when the initial information describes the financial controller as 
competent compared to when initial information describes him as not competent. 
Hypothesis lc proposes that auditors' initial assessments of the truth of an audit 
assertion are affected by the interaction between the initial honesty and initial 
competency of the financial controller, i.e., the assessments on audit assertions will 
fall in between these extreme values when the financial controller is described as 
honest but not competent; or when he is described as not honest but competent. Table 
6.3 shows the descriptive statistics for the auditors' initial assessments on the audit 
assertions based on the honesty and competency of the financial controller. These are 
the assessments made by the auditors before they received additional information 
either confirming or discontinuing the financial controller's initial honesty and initial 
competency. 
Table 6.3 
Descriptive Statistics on Auditors' Initial Assessments of Audit Assertions [mean and (standard deviation)] 
Initial 
Behaviour 
Initial 
Honest 
Initial 
Not 
Honest 
Initial 
Competent 
Initial Not 
Competent 
Initial 
Honest and 
Initial 
Competent 
Initial 
Honest and 
Initial Not 
Competent 
Initial Not 
Honest and 
Initial 
Competent 
Initial Not 
Honest and 
Initial Not 
Competent 
Assertion 
Completeness 3.021 
(1.514) 
n = 97 
2.588 
(1.417) 
n = 102 
3.029 
(1.559) 
n=105 
2.543 
(1.341) 
n=94 
3.177 
(1.621) 
n = 51 
2.848 
(1.382) 
n = 46 
2.889 
(1.501) 
n = 54 
2.250 
(1.246) 
n = 48 
Cut-off 2.680 
(1.319) 
n = 97 
2.373 
(1.226) 
n = 102 
2.543 
(1.279) 
n=105 
2.500 
(1.285) 
n=94 
2.882 
(1.366) 
n = 51 
2.457 
(1.242) 
n = 46 
2.222 
(1.110) 
n = 54 
2.542 
(1.336) 
n = 48 
Accuracy 2.268 
(1.396) 
n =9 7 
1.990 
(1.324) 
n = 102 
2.286 
(1.459) 
n=105 
1.947 
(1.230) 
n=94 
2.490 
(1.515) 
n = 51 
2.022 
(1.220) 
n = 46 
2.093 
(1.391) 
n = 54 
1.875 
(1.248) 
n = 48 
Overall cash 
transactions 
2.464 
(1.011) 
n = 97 
2.265 
(1.258) 
n = 102 
2.495 
(1.145) 
n=105 
2.213 
(1.135) 
n=94 
2.667 
(1.125) 
n = 51 
2.239 
(0.822) 
n = 46 
2.333 
(1.149) 
n = 54 
2.188 
( 1.379) 
n = 48 
Overall cash 
and cash 
equivalent 
balances 
2.392 
(1.253) 
n = 97 
2.206 
(1.253) 
n = 102 
2.391 
(1.088) 
n=105 
2.192 
(1.157) 
n=94 
2.490 
(1.065) 
n = 51 
2.283 
(0.834) 
n = 46 
2.296 
(1.110) 
n = 54 
2.104 
(1.403) 
n | 4 8 
Variables: 
Initial Honest (Not Honest) = the initial description of the financial controller's behaviour indicates he is honest (not honest). Initial Competent (Not Competent) = the 
initial description of the financial controller's behaviour indicates he is competent (not competent). Assertion: Subjects' initial assessments of the audit assertion (1 -
"Strongly believe that the assertion is NOT true", and 7 — "Strongly believe that the assertion is true"). 
The first two columns of results in Table 6.3 report that, for each of the assertions, 
the average assessment is higher when the financial controller is described as honest 
compared to when he is described as not honest. Similarly, as shown in the columns 
reporting descriptive statistics for Initial Competent and Initial Not Competent, the 
average assessment is higher for each assertion when the financial controller is 
described as competent compared to when he is described as not competent. 
For the completeness assertion, the average assessment is highest in the condition 
where the financial controller is described as both honest and competent (mean = 
3.177). The average assessment is lowest when his initial behaviour is described as 
both not honest and not competent (mean = 2.250). Auditors' assessments do not 
differ much in conditions when the initial behaviour of the financial controller is 
coupled with another positive or negative behaviour, i.e., the financial controller is 
honest but not competent (mean = 2.848) or not honest but competent (mean = 
2.889). Similar results are found for the accuracy assertion, overall cash transaction 
assertion and overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertion. For all of these 
assertions, the average initial assessments are highest when the financial controller is 
described as both honest and competent and they are lowest when the financial 
controller is described as both not honest and not competent. The initial average 
assessments fall between these two values when the financial controller is initially 
described as honest but not competent, or not honest but competent. The results 
indicate that auditors' initial assessments of whether an audit assertion is true or not 
true are affected by the initial information about the honesty and competency of the 
client's financial controller. 
However, the results for the cut-off assertion are different. The assessment is highest 
for the condition where the financial controller is initially described as honest and 
competent (mean = 2.882). It should be lowest when the initial behaviour is both not 
honest and not competent (mean = 2.542). However, the lowest assessment is for the 
condition where the financial controller is described as not honest but competent 
(mean = 2.222). 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 report the MANOVA and ANOVA results for the auditors' initial 
assessments of the truth of the audit assertions based on the initial description of the 
honesty and competency of the financial controller (i.e., before they read the 
additional information that is either consistent or inconsistent with the initial 
description of his honesty and competency). The post hoc tests are performed using 
the Games-Howell test.1 
Initial Honest has a significant main effect on the auditors' initial assessments of the 
audit assertions (MANOVA p-value = 0.080). However, the ANOVA results show 
that there is a significant main effect for the completeness (p-value = 0.017), cut-off 
(p-value = 0.056), and accuracy (p-value = 0.080) assertions, but no significant main 
effect for the two overall assertions. The p-values are 0.118 for the overall cash 
transaction assertion, and 0.122 for the overall cash and cash equivalent assertion. 
13 The Games-Howell test is powerful but can be liberal when sample sizes are small. It is accurate 
when sample sizes are unequal. The Games-Howell test is recommended because of the uncertainty of 
knowing whether the population variances are equivalent (Field 2005). 
Therefore, Hypothesis la is supported for Initial Honest for the completeness, cut-
off, and accuracy assertions, but not for the two overall assertions. 
Table 6.4 
MANOVA Results for Auditors' Initial Assessments of Audit Assertions Based 
on the Initial Honesty and Competency Descriptions of the Financial Controller 
Effect Pillai's 
Trace 
F-
statistics 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df 
P-
value* 
Initial Honest 0.037 2.445 3.000 193 0.080 
Initial Competent 0.037 2.493 3.000 193 0.092 
Interaction 
Initial Honest x Initial 
Competent 0.026 1.686 3.000 193 0.134 
Box's test of equality of covariance matrices p — 0.006 
*p-values are for one-tail tests. 
Variables: 
Initial Honest = 1 if the behaviour of the financial controller is initially described as honest; 0 if not 
honest. Initial Competent = 1 if the behaviour of the financial controller is initially described as 
competent; 0 if not competent. Assertion: Subjects' initial assessments of the audit assertion (1 I 
"Strongly believe that the assertion is NOT true", and 7§| "Strongly believe that the assertion is true"). 
Table 6.5 
ANOVA Results for Auditors' Initial Assessments of Audit Assertions Based on 
the Initial Honesty and Competency Descriptions of the Financial Controller 
SS df Mean 
Square 
F-statistic p-value* 
Panel A: Completeness Assertion* 
Main Effects 
Initial Honest 9.714 1 9.714 4.624 0.017 
Initial Competent 11.600 1 11.600 5.521 0.010 
Interaction 
Initial Honest x Initial Competent 1.193 1 1.193 .568 0.226 
Error 409.680 195 2.101 
Panel B: Cut-off Assertionb 
Main Effects 
Initial Honest 4.097 1 4.097 2.561 0.056 
Initial Competent 0.140 1 0.140 0.088 0.384 
Interaction 
Initial Honest x Initial Competent 6.883 1 6.883 4.302 0.020 
Error 311.957 195 1.600 
Panel C: Accuracy Assertion0 
Main Effects 
Initial Honest 3.672 1 3.672 2.003 0.080 
Initial Competent 5.832 1 5.832 3.181 0.038 
Interaction 
Initial Honest x Initial Competent 0.780 1 0.780 0.425 0.258 
Error 357.510 195 1.833 
Panel D: Overall Cash Transaction Assertion" 
Main Effects 
Initial Honest 1.836 1 1.836 1.415 0.118 
Initial Competent 4.074 1 4.074 3.140 0.039 
Interaction 
Initial Honest x Initial Competent 0.983 1 0.983 0.758 0.193 
Error 253.015 1.298 
Panel E: Overall Cash and Cash Equivalent Balance Assertion0 
Main Effects 
Initial Honest 1.718 1 1.718 1.363 0.122 
Initial Competent 1.980 1 1.980 1.571 0.106 
Interaction 
Initial Honest x Initial Competent 0.003 1 0.003 0.002 0.481 
Error 245.810 195 1.261 
"Levene's test for equality of variances p=0.263 Levene's test for equality of variances p=0.400 
cLevene's test for equality of variances p=0.333 dLevene's test for equality of variances p=0.168 
eLevene's test for equality of variances p=0.030 
*p-values are for one-tail tests. 
Variables: 
Initial Honest = 1 if the behaviour of the financial controller is initially described as honest; 0 if not honest. 
Initial Competent = 1 if the behaviour of the financial controller is initially described as competent; 0 if not 
competent. Assertion: Subjects' initial assessments of the audit assertion (1 - "Strongly believe that the 
assertion is NOT true", and 7 - "Strongly believe that the assertion is true"). 
Initial Competent also has a significant main effect on auditors' assessments of audit 
assertions (MANOVA p-value = 0.092). However, the ANOVA results show that 
Initial Competent has a significant main effect on the completeness, accuracy and 
overall cash transaction assertions, where the p-value is 0.010 for the completeness 
assertion; 0.038 for the accuracy assertion; and 0.039 for the overall cash transaction 
assertion, but Initial Competent does not have a significant main effect on the cut-off 
(p-value = 0.384) and the overall cash and cash equivalent balance (p-value = 0.106) 
assertions. Therefore, Hypothesis lb is supported for Initial Competent for the 
completeness, accuracy and overall cash transactions assertions, but not for the cut-
off and the overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions. 
The MANOVA result indicates there is no significant interaction effect between 
Initial Honest and Initial Competent (p-value = 0.134). However, the interaction 
effect is significant for the cut-off assertion (ANOVA p-value = 0.020). It is not 
significant for the other assertions, where the p-values are 0.226 for the completeness 
assertion, 0.258 for the accuracy assertion, 0.193 for the overall cash transaction 
assertion, and 0.481 for the overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertion. 
Figure 6.1 shows the significant interaction between the descriptions of the financial 
controller's initial honesty and initial competency. 
Figure 6.1 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Honesty and Initial Competency of the 
Financial Controller on Auditors' Initial Assessments for the Cut-off Assertion 
Table 6.6 
Post Hoc Tests for Auditors' Initial Assessments of Audit Assertions Based on the 
Initial Honesty and Competency of the Financial Controller for the Cut-off Assertion 
(Games-Howell test) 
Mean 
Difference Std. 
(I) (J) (I-J) Error Sig.* 
Initial Honest and Initial Honest and Initial Not Competent 0.426 0.265 0.190 
Initial Competent Initial Not Honest and Initial Competent 0.660 0.244 0.020 
Initial Not Honest and Initial Not 0.340 0.272 0.297 Competent 
Initial Honest and Initial Honest and Initial Competent -0.426 0.265 0.190 
Initial Not Competent Initial Not Honest and Initial Competent 0.234 0.237 0.379 
Initial Not Honest and Initial Not -0.085 0.266 0.495 Competent 
Initial Not Honest and Initial Honest and Initial Competent -0.660 0.244 0.020 
Initial Competent Initial Honest and Initial Not Competent -0.234 0.237 0.379 
Initial Not Honest and Initial Not -0.319 0.245 0.282 Competent 
Initial Not Honest and Initial Honest and Initial Competent -0.341 0.273 0.297 
Initial Not Competent Initial Honest and Initial Not Competent 0.085 0.266 0.495 
Initial Not Honest and Initial Competent 0.319 0.245 0.282 
* p-values are for one-tail tests. 
Initial Honest (Not Honest) indicates the initial description of the financial controller indicates he is 
honest (not honest). Initial Competent (Not Competent) indicates the inital description of the financial 
contoller indicates he is competent (not competent). 
I l l 
Table 6.6 shows the results of the Games-Howell tests for the interaction effect for 
the cut-off assertion. The results from the Games-Howell tests indicate that the 
average assessments when the financial controller is initially described as honest and 
competent are significantly higher than when he is initially described as not honest 
and competent (p-value = 0.020). Thus, Hypothesis lc is supported for the 
interaction between the financial controller's initial honesty and competency but only 
for the cut-off assertion. 
6.5 The Effects of Consistent and Inconsistent Information about the Honesty 
and Competency of Financial Controller on Auditors' Assessments of the 
Audit Assertions 
6.5.1 Differences between Auditors' Initial and Second Assessments 
Studies testing the impression formation theories have found that people are affected 
more by the morality rather than the intelligence of an individual in forming an 
impression of that individual. As such, they are negatively biased in perceiving 
honesty and positively biased in perceiving competency due to the greater 
diagnosticity of morality cues as predicted by the category-diagnosticity theory. 
Therefore, it is proposed that the revisions to the assessments of the truth of an audit 
assertion will be negative or negative and larger when the financial controller is 
consistently described as not honest or not competent than when management is 
consistently described as honest or competent (Hypothesis 2a). Hypothesis 2b posits 
that the revisions to the assessments of the truth of an audit assertion will be negative 
or negative and larger when the financial controller is initially described as honest or 
competent and is subsequently described as not honest or not competent than when 
he is initially described as not honest or not competent and is subsequently described 
as honest or competent. 
Further, Hypothesis 2c proposes that the revisions to the assessments of the truth of 
an assertion will be negative or negative and larger when the financial controller is 
initially described as honest or competent and is subsequently described as not 
honest or not competent than when he is described as consistently honest or 
consistently competent. Hypothesis 2d proposes that the revisions to the assessments 
of the truth of an assertion will be negative or negative and larger when the financial 
controller is consistently described as not honest or consistently described as not 
competent than when he is initially described as not honest or not competent and is 
subsequently described as honest or competent. 
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 show the descriptive statistics for the differences between 
auditors' initial assessments and second assessments. The independent variables are 
the consistency and inconsistency of the descriptions of honesty and competency of 
the financial controller. It is noted that auditors make small revisions to their 
assessments, where the revisions of the assessment means are all less than 1.00. 
Table 6.7 
Descriptive Statistics on the Differences between Auditors' Initial and Second 
Assessments of Audit Assertions Based on Consistent or Inconsistent 
Information about the Honesty and Competency of the Financial Controller 
[mean (stant ard deviation)] 
Consistent Honest Inconsistent Honest Inconsistent Honest 
and Inconsistent and Consistent and Inconsistent 
Initial Behaviour Competent Competent Competent 
Panel A: Completeness Assertion 
Initial Honest and -0.177 -0.375 -0.333 
Initial Competent (2.038) (1.586) (1.645) 
n=17 n=16 n = 18 
Initial Honest and 0.267 -0.529 -0.071 
Initial Not (1.668) (1.841) (1.072) 
Competent n = 15 n=,17 n | | 14 
Initial Not Honest -0.667 0.579 -0.294 
and Initial (1.572) (1.261) (1.829) 
Competent n = 18 n = 19 n = 17 
Initial Not Honest -0.353 0.529 0.429 
and Initial Not (1.455) (1.546) (0.756) 
Competent n = 17 n = 17 n § | 14 
Panel B: Cut-off Assertion 
Initial Honest and -0.588 -0.125 -0.389 
Initial Competent (1.121) (0.619) (1.539) 
n = 17 n - 16 n = 18 
Initial Honest and 0.467 0.118 0.143 
Initial Not (1.187) (0.857) (1.231) 
Competent n j= 15 n = 17 n = 14 
Initial Not Honest -0.111 0.421 -0.706 
and Initial (1.278) (1.121) (1.160) 
Competent n =18 n g l 9 n i l 17 
Initial Not Honest -0.588 0.235 0.071 
and Initial Not (1.417) (1.033) (0.730) 
Competent n = 17 n = 14 n = 14 
Panel C: Accuracy Assertion 
Initial Honest and 0.706 -0.563 0.500 
Initial Competent (1.795) (1.632) (1.425) 
n = 17 n = 16 n = 18 
Initial Honest and 0.333 0.000 0.357 
Initial Not (2.350) (0.935) (1.393) 
Competent n = 15 n = 17 n = 14 
Initial Not Honest -0.167 0.684 0.941 
and Initial (1.425) (1.003) (1.197) 
Competent n = 18 n = 19 n j§ 17 
Initial Not Honest -0.059 0.412 0.857 
and Initial Not (1.819) (1.417) (1.099) 
Competent n = 17 n = 17 n = 14 
Table 6.7 (continued) 
Consistent Honest Inconsistent Honest Inconsistent Honest 
and Inconsistent and Consistent and Inconsistent 
Initial Behaviour Competent Competent Competent 
Panel D: Overall Cash Transaction Assertion 
Initial Honest and 0.118 -0.250 -0.222 
Initial Competent (0.781) (1.571) (1.166) 
n=17 n=16 n = 18 
Initial Honest and 0.467 -0.118 0.143 
Initial Not (1.302) (0.697) (1.099) 
Competent n=15 n = 17 n = 14 
Initial Not Honest -0.222 0.579 0.294 
and Initial (1.060) (1.346) (0.985) 
Competent n = 18 n = 19 n = 17 
Initial Not Honest -0.412 0.118 0.571 
and Initial Not (1.417) (1.219) (0.938) 
Competent n = 17 n H J t n § 1 4 
Panel E: Overall Cash and Cash Equivalent Balance Assertion 
Initial Honest and 0.177 0.438 -0.222 
Initial Competent (0.809) (1.504) (1.003) 
n = 17 n = 16 n = 18 
Initial Honest and 0.267 -0.294 0.000 
Initial Not (1.100) (0.849) (1.038) 
Competent n = 15 n = 17 n = 14 
Initial Not Honest -0.111 0.526 0.235 
and Initial (1.132) (1.219) (1.091) 
Competent n = 18 n = 19 n = 17 
Initial Not Honest -0.177 0.059 0.5000 
and Initial Not (0.529) (1.088) (1.019) 
Competent n = 17 n S i i n f 14 
Variables: 
Initial Honest (Not Honest) = the behaviour of the financial controller is initially described as honest 
(not honest). Initial Competent (Not Competent) = the behaviour of the financial controller is initially 
described as competent (not competent). Consistent (Inconsistent) = the second set of information 
about the financial controller is consistent (inconsistent) with the initial description of his behaviour. 
Assertion = Difference between the auditors' first and second assessments of the audit assertion ( 1 1 
"Strongly believe that the assertion is NOT true", and 7 - "Strongly believe that the assertion is true"). 
Table 6.8 
Descriptive Statistics on the Differences between Auditors' Initial and Second Assessments of Audit Assertions Based on 
Information about the Consistency of Honesty and Competency of the Financial Controller [mean (standard deviation)] 
Behaviour Consistent Consistent Consistent Consistent Not Not Consistent Not Consistent Not Consistent Not Consistent 
Honest Not Honest Competent Competent Honest Not Honest Competent Not Competent 
Assertion 
Completeness -0.254 -0.008 0.073 -0.177 -0.339 0.030 -0.371 0.062 
(1.691) (1.526) (1.612) (1.567) (1.554) (1.589) (1.746) (1.472) 
n = 67 n = 132 n = 69 n = 130 n p 6 5 n18134 n = 70 n = 129 
Cut-off -0.224 -0.167 0.174 -0.377 -0.354 -0.105 -0.700 0.093 
(1.301) (1.205) (0.939) (1.331) (1.280) (1.209) (1.344) (1.079) 
n = 67 n = 132 n = 69 n = 130 n = 65 n = 134 n = 70 n = 129 
Accuracy 0.194 0.402 0.159 0.423 0.077 0.455 0.486 0.248 
(1.844) (1.324) (1.324) (1.608) (1.395) (1.564) (1.501) (1.526) 
n = 67 n = 132 n = 69 n = 130 n = 65 n = 134 n = 70 n = 129 
Overall cash -0.030 0.136 0.101 0.069 -0.123 0.179 -0.014 0.132 
transactions (1.180) (1.171 (1.262) (1.129) (1.153) (1.175) (1.014) (1.252) 
n = 67 n = 132 n = 69 n = 130 n = 65 n = 134 n = 70 n = 129 
Overall cash and 0.030 0.921 0.188 0.069 -0.031 0.179 0.014 0.163 
cash equivalent (0.152) (1.129) (1.204) (0.982) (1.132) (1.025) (1.014) (1.088) 
balances n = 67 n = 132 n = 69 n = 130 n ^ 65 n = 134 n = 70 n = 129 
Consistent Honest (Not Honest) indicates both the initial and second descriptions of the financial controller indicate he is honest (not honest). Consistent Competent 
indicates both the initial and second descriptions of the financial controller indicate he is competent (not competent). Not Consistent Honest indicates the initial 
description of the financial controller indicates he is honest and the second description indicates he is not honest. Not Consistent Not Honest indicates the initial 
description of the financial controller indicates he is not honest and the second description indicates he is honest. Not Consistent Competent indicates the initial 
description of the financial controller indicates he is competent and the second description indicates he is not competent. Not Consistent Not Competent indicates the 
initial description of the financial controller indicates he is not competent and the second description indicates he is competent. 
Hypothesis 2a proposes that there will be negative or negative and larger revision to 
auditors' assessments on the truth of an audit assertion when the financial controller 
is consistently described as not honest or not competent than when he is consistently 
described as honest or competent. Thus, we are comparing the conditions where the 
financial controller is consistently described as not honest (or not competent) with 
the conditions where he is consistently described as honest (or competent). 
Consistently not honest (or not competent) is the condition where the financial 
controller is initially described as not honest (or not competent) and then the 
additional information describes him as not honest (or not competent). Consistent 
honest (or competent) is where the financial controller is initially described as honest 
(or competent) and then the additional information also describes him as honest (or 
competent). I expect that the revisions to auditors' assessments are larger for the 
conditions where the financial controller is consistently described as not honest (or 
not competent) than the revisions for the conditions where the financial controller is 
consistently described as honest (or competent). The average revisions reported in 
Table 6.8 do not have this consistent pattern. For example, for the completeness, cut-
off and overall cash transactions assertions, Consistent Honest has larger average 
negative revisions than Consistent Not Honest. For the accuracy and overall cash and 
cash equivalent balances assertions, Consistent Not Honest has larger average 
positive revisions than Consistent Honest. 
From Table 6.7, for the conditions where the financial controller is initially described 
as competent and is subsequently described as not competent, the average revisions 
to the assessments are -0.667, -0.111, -0.167, -0.222, and -0.111 respectively for the 
completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash 
equivalent balance assertions when the financial controller is consistently described 
as not honest. When the financial controller is consistently described as honest, the 
average revisions to the assessments are -0.177, -0.588, 0.706, 0.118 and 0.177 
respectively for the five assertions. Consistent descriptions of the financial controller 
as not honest cause negative revisions for all the assertions, while consistent 
descriptions of the financial controller as honest cause positive revisions. 
For the conditions where the financial controller is initially described as not 
competent and is subsequently described as competent, consistent not honest 
descriptions result in average revisions of -0.353, -0.588, -0.059, -0.412 and -0.177 
respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and 
overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions; while consistent descriptions 
indicating that the financial controller is honest result in average revisions of 0.267, 
0.467, 0.333, 0.467 and 0.267 respectively for all the assertions. Consistent 
descriptions of the financial controller as not honest result in negative revisions, and 
consistent descriptions of him as honest result in positive revisions. 
With regard to competency, for the conditions where the financial controller is 
initially described as honest and subsequently as not honest, consistent descriptions 
of the financial controller as not competent result in average revisions of -0.529, 
0.118, 0.000, -0.118 and -0.294 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, 
overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions; 
while consistent descriptions of the financial controller as competent result in 
average revisions of-0.375, -0.125, -0.563, -0.250 and 0.438 respectively for all the 
assertions. The completeness, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash 
equivalent balance assertions result in negative revisions when the financial 
controller is consistently described as not competent, and only the completeness 
assertion results in a negative and larger revision. 
For the conditions where the financial controller is initially described as not honest 
and subsequently as honest, consistent descriptions of the financial controller as not 
competent result in positive average revisions of 0.529, 0.235, 0.412, 0.118 and 
0.059 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, 
and overall cash and overall cash equivalent balance assertions. Being described as 
honest seems to have a greater impact than being described as not competent. The 
average revisions are also positive when the financial controller is consistently 
described as competent (mean revisions = 0.579, 0.421, 0.684, 0.579 and 0.526 
respectively for all the assertions). 
Hypothesis 2b proposes that there will be negative revisions or negative and larger 
revisions to the auditors' assessments when the financial controller is not consistently 
described as honest or competent (i.e., the financial controller is initially described as 
honest or competent and subsequently as not honest or not competent), than when he 
is not consistently described as not honest or not competent (i.e., the financial 
controller is initially described as not honest or not competent and subsequently as 
honest or competent). 
With regard to honesty, for the conditions where the financial controller is 
consistently described as competent and he is initially described as honest and 
subsequently as not honest, this results in average revisions of -0.375, -0.125, -0.563, 
-0.250 and 0.438 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash 
transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions. When the 
financial controller is initially described as not honest and subsequently as honest, 
this results in positive average revisions of 0.579, 0.421, 0.684, 0.579 and 0.526 
respectively for all the assertions. Initial descriptions of the financial controller as 
honest and subsequently as not honest results in negative, but not necessarily larger 
revisions than when he is initially described as not honest and subsequently as 
honest, except for the overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertion, where 
consistent dishonesty results in positive average revision. 
For the conditions where the financial controller is consistently described as not 
competent, inconsistent descriptions about the honesty of the financial controller 
(i.e., the financial controller is initially described as honest and subsequently as not 
honest) result in average revisions of -0.529, 0.118, 0.000, -0.118 and -0.294 
respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and 
overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions. The average revisions are 0.529, 
0.235, 0.412, 0.118 and 0.059 respectively for the five assertions when the financial 
controller is initially described as not honest and he is subsequently described as 
honest. The average revisions are positive for all the assertions despite the fact that 
the financial controller is consistently described as not competent. The overall cash 
transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions result in negative 
revisions; and only the overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertion results in a 
negative and larger revision. 
With regard to competency, for the conditions where the financial controller is 
consistently described as honest, inconsistent descriptions about the competency of 
the financial controller (i.e., the financial controller is initially described as 
competent and subsequently as not competent), the average revisions are -0.177, 
-0.588, 0.706, 0.118 and 0.177 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, 
overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions. The 
average revisions are positive when the financial controller is initially described as 
not competent and subsequently as competent (average revisions = 0.267, 0.467, 
0.333, 0.467 and 0.267 respectively for all the assertions). Only the completeness and 
cut-off assertions result in negative, but not necessarily larger revisions, when the 
financial controller is initially described as competent and subsequently as not 
competent. 
For the conditions where the financial controller is consistently described as not 
honest, the average revisions are -0.667, -0.111, -0.167, -0.222 and -0.111 
respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and 
overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions when the financial controller is 
initially described as competent and subsequently as not competent. For the 
conditions where the financial controller is initially described as not competent and 
subsequently as competent, the average revisions are also negative for all the 
assertions (average revisions = -0.353, -0.588, -0.059, -0.412 and -0.177 respectively 
for all assertions). 
Hypothesis 2c proposes that when the financial controller is initially described as 
honest or competent and subsequently as not honest or not competent (inconsistent 
honesty and inconsistent competency), this will result in negative revisions or 
negative and larger revisions to the auditors' assessments of the assertions than when 
the financial controller is consistently described as honest or consistently described 
as competent. 
With regard to honesty, for the conditions where the financial controller is initially 
described as competent and subsequently as not competent, inconsistent descriptions 
of the financial controller's honesty (i.e., the financial controller is initially described 
as honest and subsequently as not honest) result in average revisions of -0.333, 
-0.389, 0.500, -0.222 and -0.222 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, 
overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions. The 
average revisions are -0.177, -0.588, 0.706, 0.118 and 0.177 respectively for all the 
assertions when financial controller is consistently described as honest. The results 
are mixed for these conditions, where the completeness, overall cash transaction, and 
overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions result in negative and larger 
revisions, while the cut-off assertion results in negative but smaller revision. 
For the conditions where the financial controller is initially described as not 
competent and honest and he is subsequently described as competent and not honest, 
the average revisions are -0.071, 0.143, 0.357, 0.143 and 0.000 respectively for the 
completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash 
equivalent balance assertions. Consistently describing the financial controller as 
honest results in average revisions of 0.267, 0.467, 0.333, 0.467 and 0.267 
respectively for all the five assertions. Only the completeness assertion results in an 
average negative revision. For these conditions, competency seems to have a greater 
impact because almost all revisions are positive. 
With regard to competency, for the conditions when the financial controller is 
initially described as honest and competent and subsequently as not honest and not 
competent, the average revisions are -0.333, -0.389, 0.500, -0.222 and -0.222 
respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and 
overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions. Except for the accuracy 
assertion, there are negative revisions for the other assertions when the financial 
controller is initially described as honest and subsequently as not honest. When the 
financial controller is consistently described as competent, the average revisions are 
-0.375, -0.125, -0.563, -0.250 and 0.438 respectively for all the assertions. Only the 
cut-off assertion results in a negative and larger revision when the financial 
controller is initially described as honest and subsequently as not honest compared to 
when financial controller is consistently described as competent. Being described as 
not honest and not competent seem to have a greater impact on auditors' assessments 
as most of the revisions are negative. 
For the conditions where the financial controller is initially described as not honest 
and subsequently as honest, the average revisions are -0.294, -0.706, 0.941, 0.294 
and 0.235 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash 
transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions when the 
financial controller is initially described as competent and subsequently as not 
competent. Only the completion and cut-off assertions result in average negative 
revisions. The mean revisions are 0.579, 0.421, 0.684, 0.579 and 0.526 respectively 
for the five assertions when the financial controller is consistently described as 
competent. For these conditions, honesty and competency seem to have a greater 
impact on the auditors' revisions to their assessments as most of the revisions are 
positive. 
Hypothesis 2d proposes that there will be negative or negative and larger revisions of 
assessments of the truth of an audit assertion when the financial controller is 
consistently described as not honest or not competent than when financial controller 
is initially described as not honest or not competent and is subsequently described as 
honest or competent. 
With regard to honesty, for the conditions where the financial controller is initially 
described as competent and subsequently as not competent, the average revisions are 
-0.667, -0.111, -0.167, -0.222 and -0.111 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, 
accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance 
assertions when the financial controller is consistently described as not honest. When 
the financial controller is initially described as not honest and subsequently described 
as honest, the average revisions are -0.294, -0.706, 0.941, 0.294 and 0.235. The 
revisions for all the assertions are negative when the financial controller is 
consistently described as not honest. The results show that auditors' assessments may 
be influenced by the description of a financial controller who is not honest. 
For the conditions where the financial controller is initially described as not 
competent and subsequently described as competent, the average revisions are 
-0.353, -0.588, -0.059, -0.412 and -0.177 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, 
accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance 
assertions when financial controller is consistently described as not honest. The 
average revisions are 0.429, 0.071, 0.857, 0.571 and 0.500 respectively for the five 
assertions when the financial controller is initially described as not honest and 
subsequently described as honest. For these conditions, the revisions for all the 
assertions are negative when financial controller is consistently described as not 
honest and they are positive when financial controller is consistently described as 
competent. 
This provides evidence that auditors' assessments are negative or negative and larger 
when the financial controller is consistently described as not honest than when they 
are initially described as not honest and subsequently as honest. It is also noted here 
that for all the assertions, when the financial controller is consistently described as 
not honest, the average revisions are negative but not necessarily larger than when he 
is initially described as not honest and subsequently as honest. 
With regard to competency, for the conditions where the financial controller is 
initially described as honest and subsequently described as not honest, the average 
revisions are -0.529, 0.118, 0.000, -0.118 and -0.294 when he is consistently 
described as not competent. This provides evidence that auditors' assessments are 
influenced by the initial description of the financial controller being honest for the 
cut-off and accuracy assertions because the average revisions are positive or constant 
despite the fact that the financial controller is consistently described as not 
competent. The average revisions are -0.071, 0.143, 0.357, 0.143 and 0.000 when the 
financial controller is initially described as not competent and subsequently 
described as competent. Only the completeness, and the overall cash and cash 
equivalent balance assertions result in negative and larger revisions when the 
financial controller is described as consistently not competent. 
For the conditions where the financial controller is initially described as not honest 
and subsequently described as honest, the average revisions are 0.529, 0.235, 0.412, 
0.118 and 0.059 when the financial controller is consistently described as not 
competent. Here, honesty has a greater impact on auditors' assessments than 
dishonesty and incompetency because the revisions are positive for all the assertions 
even though the financial controller is consistently described as not competent. The 
average revisions are 0.429, 0.071, 0.857, 0.571 and 0.500 when the financial 
controller is initially described as not competent and subsequently described as 
competent. 
In summary, the results are mixed. There seems to be evidence of negative and 
greater revisions to auditors' assessments when the financial controller is 
consistently described as not honest or consistently described as not competent. 
However, this does not hold for all the conditions for all the audit assertions. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that honesty or dishonesty seems to have a greater 
impact than competency or incompetency in most of the conditions. 
Category-diagnosticity theory proposes that people are negatively biased in 
perceiving honesty and positively biased in perceiving competency. Hypothesis 3 a 
posits that auditors' revisions to the assessments of an audit assertion will be positive 
or positively larger when there is a consistent description of the financial controller 
as competent and when there is a positive revision to competency (i.e., when the 
financial controller is initially described as not competent and subsequently 
described as competent) than their revisions when there is consistent honesty and 
when there is a positive change to dishonesty (i.e., when the financial controller is 
initially described as not honest and subsequently described as honest). Further, 
Hypothesis 3b posits that auditors' revisions to the assessments of an audit assertion 
will be negative or negative and larger when the financial controller is consistently 
described as not honest and when there is a negative change to honesty (i.e., the 
financial controller is initially described as honest and subsequently described as not 
honest) than their revision when he is consistently described as not competent and 
when there is a negative change to competency (i.e., the financial controller is 
initially described as competent and subsequently described as not competent). 
Table 6.6 reports that the average revisions to the assessments about the truth of the 
assertions are 0.579, 0.421, -0.684, 0.579 and 0.526 respectively for the 
completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash 
equivalent balance assertions for the condition where the financial controller is 
consistently described as competent and there is a positive change to dishonesty, i.e., 
the financial controller is initially described as competent but not honest and 
subsequently as both competent and honest. The average revisions are positive for all 
the assertions (mean revisions = 0.267, 0.467, 0.333, 0.467 and 0.267 respectively) 
when the financial controller is consistently described as honest and there is a 
positive change to incompetency, i.e., the financial controller is initially described as 
honest but not competent and subsequently described as both honest and competent. 
Except for the accuracy assertion, auditors revise their assessments upward when the 
financial controller is consistently described as competent or consistently described 
as honest and there is a positive revision to the description of his incompetency or 
dishonesty. 
For the conditions where the financial controller is consistently described as not 
honest and there is a negative revision to the description of his competency (i.e., the 
financial controller is initially described as not honest and competent, and 
subsequently described as both not honest and not competent), the average revisions 
are negative for all the assertions (mean revisions = -0.667, -0.111, -0.167, -0.222, 
and -0.111 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash 
transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions). The average 
revisions are mixed when the financial controller is consistently described as not 
competent and there is a negative revision to the description of his honesty, i.e., the 
financial controller is initially described as not competent but honest and 
subsequently described as both not competent and not honest (mean revisions = -
0.529, 0.118, 0.000, -0.111, -0.294 respectively). The average revisions are negative 
and larger for the completeness, accuracy and overall cash transaction assertions. 
For the conditions where the financial controller is consistently described as 
competent and there is a negative change to honesty, i.e., the financial controller is 
initially described as both competent and honest and is subsequently described as 
competent but not honest, the average revisions are -0.375, -0.125, -0.563, -0.250 
and 0.438 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash 
transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions. The average 
revisions are -0.177, -0.588, 0.706, 0.118 and 0.177 respectively for the 
completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash 
equivalent balance assertions for the conditions where the financial controller is 
consistently described as honest and there is a negative change to competency, i.e., 
the financial controller is initially described as both honest and competent and is 
subsequently described as honest but not competent. It is noted here that only the 
overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertion results in positive and larger 
revision when the financial controller is consistently described as honest than when 
the financial controller is consistently described as competent. For the other 
assertions, a negative change to honesty (i.e., the financial controller is initially 
described as honest and subsequently described as not honest) has a greater impact as 
it results in negative revisions. 
The average revisions are negative for all the assertions (mean revisions = -0.353, 
-0.588, -0.059, -0.412 and -0.177 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, 
accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance 
assertions) when the financial controller is consistently described as not honest and 
there is a positive change to incompetency (i.e., the financial controller is initially 
described as both not honest and not competent and subsequently described as not 
honest but competent). However, they are not necessarily larger compared to the 
average revisions when the financial controller is consistently described as not 
competent and there is a positive change to dishonesty (i.e., the financial controller is 
initially described as both not competent and not honest and subsequently described 
as not competent but honest). For this condition, the average revisions are positive 
for all the assertions (mean revisions 1 0.529, 0.235, 0.412, 0.118 and 0.059 
respectively). Consistently describing the financial controller as not honest has a 
greater impact on the auditors' assessments than consistently describing him as not 
competent because the average revisions are all negative even though there is a 
positive change to incompetency (i.e., the financial controller is initially described as 
not competent and subsequently described as competent). Honesty has a greater 
impact than incompetency because a positive change to dishonesty (i.e., the financial 
controller is initially described as not honest and subsequently described as honest) 
results in positive average revisions for all the assertions despite the financial 
controller being consistently described as not competent. 
For the condition where there is a positive change to incompetency and a negative 
change to honesty (i.e., the financial controller is initially described as not competent 
but honest and subsequently described as competent but not honest), the average 
revisions are -0.071, 0.143, 0.357, 0.143 and 0.000 respectively for the completeness, 
cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent 
transactions. The average revisions are -0.294, -0.706, 0.941, 0.294 and 0.235 
respectively, when there is a positive change to dishonesty and a negative change to 
competency (i.e., the financial controller is initially described as not honest but 
competent and subsequently described as honest but not competent). The results are 
mixed for the accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash 
equivalent balance assertions, where a positive change to dishonesty (i.e., the 
financial controller is initially described as not honest and subsequently described as 
honest) results in average revisions that are positive and larger than a positive change 
to incompetency (i.e., the financial controller is initially described as not competent 
and subsequently described as competent). For the completeness and cut-off 
assertions, a negative change to competency results in negative and larger revisions 
than a negative change to honesty. 
In summary, the results in testing the positivity bias in auditors' judgments of 
competency and negativity bias in auditors' judgments of honesty are not consistent. 
There seems to be evidence of a negativity bias in auditors' judgments of honesty 
and a positivity bias in auditors' judgments of competency. However, this is not 
consistent for all the conditions for all of the audit assertions. 
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 report the MANOVA and ANOVA results for the differences 
between auditors' initial and second assessments. The Games-Howell post hoc tests 
reported in Table 6.11 are carried out following the multivariate analyses for 
significant interaction effects in the ANOVAs. For brevity, only the results for the 
Games-Howell tests that are significant are reported in Table 6.11. 
Table 6.9 
MANOVA Results for the Differences between Auditors' Initial and Second 
Assessments of Audit Assertions 
Pillai's 
Trace 
F Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df 
p-value* 
Initial Honest 0.007 0.462 3 185 0.355 
Initial Competent 0.032 2.020 3 185 0.057 
Consistent Honest 0.037 2.373 3 185 0.036 
Consistent Competent 0.103 7.102 3 185 0.000 
Initial Honest x Initial Competent 0.043 2.741 3 185 0.023 
Initial Honest x Consistent Honest 0.032 2.006 3 185 0.058 
Initial Honest x Consistent 
Competent 
0.010 0.653 3 185 0.291 
Initial Competent x Consistent 
Honest 
0.027 1.703 3 185 0.084 
Initial Competent x Consistent 
Competent 
0.059 3.846 3 185 0.006 
Initial Honest x Initial Competent x 
Consistent Honest 
0.010 0.632 3 185 0.298 
Initial Honest x Initial Competent x 
Consistent Competent 
0.007 0.427 3 185 0.367 
Box's test of equality of covariance matrices p ~ 0.000 
*p-values are for one-tail tests. 
Variables: 
Initial Honest = 1 if the behaviour of the financial controller is initially described as honest; 0 if not 
honest. Initial Competent = 1 if the behaviour of the financial controller is initially described as 
competent; 0 if not competent. Consistent = 1 if the second set of information about the financial 
controller is consistent with the initial behaviour; 0 if the second set of information about financial 
controller is inconsistent with his initial behaviour. Assertion = Difference between the auditors' first 
and second assessments of the audit assertions (1 - "Strongly believe that the assertion is NOT true", 
and 7 - "Strongly believe that the assertion is true"). 
Table 6.10 
ANOVA Results for the Differences between Auditors' Initial and Second Assessments of Audit Assertions 
Completeness Assertion* Cut-off Assertion" Accuracy Assertion0 Overall Cash Transaction Assertion Overall Cash and Cash Equivalent 
Balance Assertion 
SS df Mean 
Square 
F Sig.* SS df Mean 
Square 
F Sig.* SS df Mean 
Square 
F Sig.* SS df Mean 
Square 
F Sig.* SS df Mean 
Square 
F Sig.* 
Initial Honest 2.561 1 2.561 1.036 0.155 0.286 1 0.286 0.218 0.321 1.391 1 1.391 0.621 0.216 0.189 1 2.561 0.140 0.354 0.067 1 0.067 0.060 0.403 
Initial Competent 2.035 1 2.035 0.823 0.183 5.962 1 5.962 4.543 0.017 0.014 1 0.014 0.006 0.468 0.043 1 0.043 0.032 0.430 1.614 1 1.614 1.447 0.115 
Consistent Honest 0.874 1 0.874 0.354 0.277 2.258 1 2.258 1.721 0.096 6.823 1 6.823 3.047 0.042 1.405 1 1.405 1.044 0.154 0.257 1 0.257 0.231 0.316 
Consistent Competent 0.459 1 0.459 0.186 0.334 13.057 1 13.057 9.950 0.001 9.189 1 9.189 4.103 0.022 0.427 1 0.427 0.317 0.287 0.095 1 0.095 0.085 0.386 
Interactions 
Initial Honest x Initial 
Competent 
0.079 1 0.079 0.032 0.429 10.177 1 10.177 7.755 0.003 0.197 1 0.197 0.088 0.384 2.567 1 2.567 1.914 0.084 0.031 1 0.031 0.028 0.434 
Initial Honest x Consistent 
Honest 
5.470 1 5.470 2.214 0.069 2.846 1 2.846 2.168 0.072 9.788 1 9.788 4.370 0.019 9.413 1 9.413 6.995 0.005 5.733 1 5.733 5.143 0.012 
Initial Honest x Consistent 
Competent 
4.431 1 4.431 1.793 0.091 0.006 1 0.006 0.004 0.474 1.050 1 1.050 0.469 0.247 0.029 1 0.029 0.022 0.442 0.543 1 0.543 0.487 0.243 
Initial Competent x Consistent 
Honest 
0.104 1 0.104 0.042 0.419 6.030 1 6.030 4.595 0.017 0.003 1 0.003 0.001 0.486 0.469 1 0.469 0.349 0.278 0.430 1 0.430 0.385 0.268 
Initial Competent x Consistent 
Competent 
2.883 1 2.883 1.167 0.141 10.351 1 10.351 7.888 0.003 0.545 1 0.545 0.243 0.311 1.925 1 1.925 1.431 0.167 5.801 1 5.801 5.204 0.012 
Initial Honest x Initial 
Competent x Consistent Honest 
0.701 1 0.701 0.284 0.298 1.216 1 1.216 0.927 0.169 0.358 1 0.358 0.160 0.345 0.409 1 0.409 0.304 0.291 0.079 1 0.079 0.071 0.396 
Initial Honest x Initial 
Competent x Consistent 
Competent 
0.259 1 0.259 0.105 0.374 0.217 1 0.217 0.165 0.343 1.630 1 1.630 0.728 0.198 0.522 1 0.522 0.388 0.267 0.100 1 0.100 0.090 0.388 
Error 462.025 187 2.471 245.402 187 1.312 418.834 187 2.240 251.671 187 1.346 208.467 187 1.115 
"Levene's test for equality of variances p=0.896 "Levene's testfor equality of variances p=0.115cLevene's test for equality of variances p=0.406 "Levene's test for equality of variances p=0.865 
"Levene's test for equality of variances p=0.627 *p-values are for one-tail test 
Variables: 
Initial Honest = 1 if the behaviour of the financial controller is initially described as honest; 0 if not honest. Initial Competent §g 1 if the behaviour of the financial controller is 
initially described as competent; 0 if not competent. Consistent = I if the second set of information about the financial controller is consistent with the initial behaviour; 0 if the 
second set of information about financial controller is inconsistent with initial behaviour. Assertion = Difference between the auditors' first and second assessments of the audit 
assertions (1 - "Strongly believe that the assertion is NOT true", and 7 - "Strongly believe that the assertion is true"). 
Table 6.11 
Significant Post Hoc Tests for the Differences between Auditors' Initial and 
Secorn Assessments (Games-Howell test) 
(I) (J) Mean 
Difference 
IB 
Std. 
Error 
Sig.* 
Panel A: Cut-off Assertion 
Initial H&C and 
subsequent NH&C 
Initial H&C and 
subsequent 
NH&NC 
1.264 0.394 0.059 
Initial H&NC and 
subsequent H&C 
Initial H&C and 
subsequent 
NH&NC 
1.856 0.475 0.010 
Initial H&NC and 
subsequent NH&C 
Initial H&C and 
subsequent 
NH&NC 
1.532 0.490 0.061 
Initial H&NC and 
subsequent NH&NC 
Initial H&C and 
subsequent 
NH&NC 
1.507 0.418 0.023 
Initial NH&C and 
subsequent H&C 
Initial H&C and 
subssequent 
NH&NC 
1.810 0.445 0.007 
Initial NH&C and 
subsequent H&C 
Initial NH&C and 
subsequent 
H&NC 
1.127 0.381 0.084 
Initial NH&NC and 
subsequent H&C 
Initial H&C and 
subsequent 
NH&NC 
1.460 0.412 0.028 
Initial NH&NC and 
subsequent H&NC 
Initial H&C and 
subsequent 
NH&NC 
1.624 0.441 0.018 
Panel B: Accuracy Assertion 
Initial H&C and 
subsequent NH&C 
Initial NH&C and 
subsequent 
H&NC 
-1.504 0.501 0.081 
* p-values are for one tail tests. 
H&C is where the financial controller is described as honest and competent. H&NC is where the 
financial controller is described as honest and not competent. NH&C is where the financial controller 
is described as not honest and competent. NH&NC is where the financial controller is described as not 
honest and not compete 
Both the MANOVA and ANOVA results show that Initial Honest does not have a 
significant main effect on the differences between the auditors' initial and second 
assessments. Therefore the initial description about the honesty of the financial 
controller does not affect auditors' revisions to their initial assessments. 
The MANOVA results show that Initial Competent has a significant main effect (p-
value = 0.057), but the ANOVA results indicate that Initial Competent has a 
significant main effect only for the cut-off assertion (p-value = 0.017). There is no 
significant main effect for the completeness, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and 
overall cash and cash balance assertions (p-values = 0.183, 0.486, 0.430 and 0.115 
respectively). 
Hypothesis 2a predicts that auditors' revisions to their initial assessments are greater 
when management is initially described as not honest or not competent and 
subsequent information also indicates that they are not honest or not competent 
compared to when they are initially described as honest or competent and subsequent 
information also indicates that they are honest or competent. Consistent Honest has a 
significant main effect on auditors' assessment revisions, where the MANOVA p-
value is 0.036. However, the ANOVA results are mixed. It has a significant main 
effect for the cut-off assertion (p-value = 0.096) and the accuracy assertion (p-value 
= 0.042) but is not significant for the completeness, overall cash transaction, and 
overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions (p-values are 0.277, 0.154 and 
0.316 respectively). The MANOVA results show a significant p-value of 0.000 for 
Consistent Competent. The ANOVA results show that it is significant for the cut-off 
(p-value = 0.001) and accuracy (p-value = 0.022) assertions but is not significant for 
the completeness (p-value = 0.334), overall cash transaction (p-value = 0.287), and 
overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertion (p-value = 0.386). 
Although there are significant main effects for Consistent Honest and Consistent 
Competent, the revisions are not always in the right direction. For the cut-off 
assertion, Table 6.8 shows that the revisions are negative when the financial 
controller is consistently described as honest and consistently described as not 
honest, but the revisions are larger and negative for the consistent descriptions as 
honest. For the accuracy assertion, the auditors actually increase their assessments 
when the financial controller is consistently described as not honest. Therefore, H2a 
is not supported for consistent honest (not honest) descriptions of the financial 
controller. 
For Consistent Competent (Not Competent) for the cut-off assertion, the revisions 
are positive for consistent Competent and negative for Consistent Not Competent, 
which supports H2a for consistent competent (not competent) descriptions of the 
financial controller for the cut-off assertion. For the accuracy assertion, the auditors 
actually increased their assessments when the information consistently described the 
financial controller as not competent, which does not support H2a for consistent 
competent (not competent) descriptions of the financial controller. 
The MANOVA results indicate a significant interaction effect between Initial Honest 
and Initial Competent (p-value = 0.023), but the ANOVA results show that this 
interaction is only significant for the cut-off assertion (p-value = 0.003) and the 
overall cash transaction assertion (p-value = 0.084). The p-values are 0.429, 0.384 
and 0.434 for the completeness, accuracy and overall cash and cash equivalent 
balance assertions respectively. The significant interaction for the cut-off assertion is 
shown in Figure 6.2 
Figure 6.2 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Honesty and Initial Competency of the Financial 
Controller on the Differences between Auditors' Initial and Second Assessments of the 
Cut-off Assertion 
The Games-Howe 11 tests for the cut-off assertion indicate that the average assessment 
revisions are higher when the financial controller is initially described as honest and 
not competent compared to when he is initially described as honest and competent 
(p-values = 0.010, 0.061, 0.023 and 0.007). The average assessment revisions are 
also higher when the financial controller is initially described as not honest and not 
competent than when he is initially described as honest and competent (p-values = 
0.028 and 0.018). Initially describing the financial controller as not honest and/or not 
competent may result in higher revisions to auditors' assessments. Therefore, H2b is 
supported for the interaction between Initial Honest and Initial Competent for the 
cut-off assertion. 
The MANOVA results show there is a significant interaction between Initial Honest 
and Consistent Honest (p-value = 0.058). The ANOVA results are consistent with the 
MANOVA results. The p-values are 0.069 for the completeness assertion, 0.072 for 
the cut-off assertion, 0.019 for the accuracy assertion, 0.005 for the overall cash 
transaction and 0.012 for the overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions. 
Figure 6.3 depicts the significant interactions between Initial Honest and Consistent 
Honest for the completeness assertion. However, the post hoc tests do not show 
significant results for the completeness assertions. Thus, Hypotheses 2b, 2c and 2d 
are not supported for the interaction between Initial Honest and Consistent Honest 
for the completeness assertion. 
Figure 6.3 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Honesty and Consistency of Honesty of the 
Financial Controller on the Differences between Auditors' Initial and Second 
Assessments of the Completeness Assertion 
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Figure 6.4 shows the significant interaction between the financial controller's initial 
honesty and his consistency of honesty for the cut-off assertion. 
Figure 6.4 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Honesty and Consistency of Honesty of the 
Financial Controller on the Differences between Auditors' Initial and Second 
Assessments of the Cut-off Assertion 
Initially Not Honest 
Initial Honesty 
Consistently Not Honest 
' Consistently Honest 
H2b predicts that auditors' revisions to their initial assessments are greater when 
management is initially described as honest or competent and is subsequently 
described as not honest or not competent compared to when they are initially 
described as not honest or not competent and are subsequently described as honest or 
competent. Several of the post-hoc tests reported in Table 6.11 support H2b for the 
cut-off assertion. 
H2c predicts that auditors' revisions to their initial assessments will be larger when 
management is initially portrayed as honest or competent and subsequent 
information describes them as not honest or not competent than when management is 
initially portrayed as honest or competent and subsequent information also indicates 
that they are honest or competent. None of the post-hoc tests reported in Table 6.11 
support H2c. 
H2d predicts that auditors' revisions to their initial assessments will be larger when 
management is initially described as not honest or not competent and subsequent 
information also describes them as not honest or not competent compared to when 
they are initially described as not honest or not competent and subsequent 
information describes them as honest or competent. Only one of the post-hoc tests 
supports H2d. 
For the conditions where the financial controller is initially described as not honest 
and subsequently described as honest, the assessment revisions are significantly 
higher than when he is initially described as honest and subsequently as not honest 
(p-value = 0.007, 0.028 and 0.018). Initially describing the financial controller as not 
honest and subsequently describing him as still not honest does not necessarily result 
in higher revisions to auditors' average assessment revisions compared to when he is 
initially described as honest and subsequently described as still honest or not honest. 
Similarly, when the financial controller is not consistently described as honest (i.e., 
he is initially described as honest and subsequently described as not honest) does not 
necessarily result in larger average assessment revisions compared to when he is 
initially described as not honest or honest and is subsequently described as honest. 
Figure 6.5 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Honesty and Consistency of Honesty of 
the Financial Controller on the Differences between Auditors' Initial and 
Second Assessments of the Accuracy Assertion 
Figure 6.5 shows that there is a significant interaction between the financial 
controller's initial honesty and his consistency of honesty for the accuracy assertion. 
The post hoc tests indicate that the auditors' average assessment revisions are 
significantly lower when the financial controller is initially described as honest and 
consistently competent compared to when he is initially described as not honest and 
not consistently described as competent, i.e., he is initially described as competent 
and subsequently not competent (p-value = 0.081). Positive descriptions of the 
financial controller do not result in higher revisions to auditors' assessments. 
Therefore, H2b is not supported for the interaction between Initial Honest and 
Consistent Honest for the accuracy assertion. 
Figure 6.6 depicts the significant interaction between the initial honesty and 
consistency of honesty of the financial controller for the overall cash transaction 
assertion. However, the post hoc tests do not show significant results and, therefore, 
H2b, 2c and 2d are not supported for the interaction between Initial Honest and 
Consistent Honest for the overall cash transaction assertion. 
Figure 6.6 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Honesty and Consistency of Honesty of the 
Financial Controller on the Differences between Auditors' Initial and Second 
Assessments of the Overall Cash Transaction Assertion 
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Figure 6.7 depicts the significant interaction between initial honesty and consistency 
of honesty of the financial controller for the overall cash and cash equivalent balance 
assertion. However, the post hoc tests do not show any significant results. Therefore, 
H2b, 2c and 2d are not supported for the interaction between Initial Honest and 
Consistent Honest. 
Figure 6.7 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Honesty and Consistency of Honesty of the 
Financial Controller on the Differences between Auditors' Initial and Second 
Assessments of the Overall Cash And Cash Equivalent Balance 
'••* Consistently Not Honest 
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The MANOVA results show that there is no significant interaction effect between 
Initial Honest and Consistent Competent (p-value = 0.291). However, the ANOVA 
results show that the interaction is significant for the completeness assertion (p-value 
= 0.091). The interaction is not significant for the other assertions (p-values = 0.474 
for the cut-off assertion, 0.247 for the accuracy assertion, 0.442 assertion for the 
overall cash transaction assertion, and 0.243 for the overall cash and cash equivalent 
balance). The significant interaction between initial honesty and consistency of 
competency of the financial controller for the completeness assertion is shown in 
Figure 6.8. 
Figure 6.8 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Honesty and Consistency of Competency of the 
Financial Controller for the Differences between Auditors' Initial and Second 
Assessments of the Completeness Assertion 
However, the Games-Howell tests do not show any significant differences in the 
comparisons of the conditions for the completeness assertion. Therefore, H2b, 2c and 
2d are not supported for the interaction between Initial Honest and Consistent 
Competent for the completeness assertion. 
The MANOVA results show a significant interaction effect between Initial 
Competent and Consistent Honest (p-value = 0.084). However, the ANOVA results 
show that the interaction is significant only for the cut-off assertion (p-value = 
0.017). The interaction is not significant for the other assertions, where the p-values 
are 0.419 for the completeness assertion, 0.486 for the accuracy assertion, 0.278 for 
the overall cash transaction, and 0.268 for the overall cash and cash equivalent 
balance transaction. Figure 6.9 show the interaction effect between initial 
competency and consistency of honesty for the cut-off assertion. 
Figure 6.9 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Competency and Consistency of Honesty of the 
Financial Controller for the Differences between Auditors' Initial and Second 
Assessments of the Cut-off Assertion 
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The Games-Howell post hoc tests indicate that the average assessment revisions are 
significantly higher when the financial controller is initially described as not 
competent and is not consistently described as honest (i.e., he is initially described as 
honest and subsequently described as not honest) compared to when he is initially 
described as competent and is not consistently described as honest (p-value = 0.061 
and 0.023). Initially describing the financial controller as competent or not competent 
may affect auditors' assessments particularly for the conditions where he is not 
consistently described as honest (i.e., he is initially described as honest and 
subsequently described as not honest). Therefore, H2b is supported for Initial 
Competent and Consistent Honest for the cut-off assertion. 
However, the assessment revisions are significantly higher when the financial 
controller is initially described as competent and not honest but is subsequently 
described as honest compared to when he is initially described as competent and 
honest but is subsequently described as not honest (p-value = 0.007) for the cut-off 
assertion. H2c is not supported for the interaction between Initial Honest and 
Consistent Competent for the cut-off assertion. 
The MANOVA results indicate that the interaction between Initial Competent and 
Consistent Competent is significant (p-value = 0.006). However, the ANOVA results 
are mixed. The interaction is significant for the cut-off (p-value = 0.003) and overall 
cash and cash equivalent balance assertion (p-value = 0.012). It is not significant for 
the completeness (p-value = 0.141), accuracy (p-value = 0.311) and overall cash 
transaction (p-value = 0.167) assertions. Figure 6.10 depicts the significant 
interaction between initial competency and consistency of competency of the 
financial controller for the cut-off assertion. 
Figure 6.10 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Competency and Consistency of Competency of 
the Financial Controller for the Differences between Auditors' Initial and Second 
Assessments of the Cut-off Assertion 
The Games-Howell results for the cut-off assertion show that the auditors' 
assessment revisions are significantly higher when the financial controller is initially 
described as competent and is consistently described as competent compared to when 
he is initially described as competent and is not consistently competent (p-value = 
0.059, 0.007 and 0.084). Therefore, H2c is not supported for Initial Competent and 
Consistent Competent. The average assessment revisions are also significantly higher 
for the conditions where the financial controller is initially described as not 
competent and is subsequently described as competent compared to the conditions 
where he is initially competent and subsequently described as not competent (p-
values = 0.010, 0.061 and 0.028). Therefore, H2b is not supported for the interaction 
between Initial Competent and Consistent Competent. However, the average 
assessment revisions are significantly higher when the financial controller is initially 
described as not competent and is consistently described as not competent compared 
to when he is initially described as competent and is not consistently described as 
competent (p-values = 0.023 and 0.018). Thus, H2d is supported for the interaction 
between Initial Competent and Consistent Competent only for the cut-off assertion. 
Figure 6.11 shows the significant interactions between the financial controller's 
initial competency and his consistency of competence for the overall cash and cash 
equivalent balance assertion. However, the Games-Howell post hoc tests do not show 
significant results and therefore, H2b, 2c and 2d are not supported for Initial 
Competent and Consistent Competent for the overall cash and cash equivalent 
balance assertion. 
Figure 6.11 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Competency and Consistency of Competency of 
the Financial Controller for the Differences between Auditors' Initial and Second 
Assessments of the Overall Cash and Cash Equivalent Balance Assertion 
The three-way interactions between Initial Honest, Initial Competent and Consistent 
Honest show insignificant results for both the MANOVA (p-value = 0.298) and the 
ANOVAs for all the assertions, where the p-values are 0.298, 0.169, 0.345, 0.291 
and 0.396 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash 
transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions. 
There is also no significant interaction between Initial Honest, Initial Competent, and 
Consistent Competent for both the MANOVA (p-value = 0.367) and the ANOVAs 
(p-values are 0.374, 0.343, 0.198, 0.267 and 0.388 respectively for the completeness, 
cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent 
balance assertions). 
The Games-Howell post hoc tests do not indicate any significant results for any of 
the conditions to indicate a positivity bias or a negativity bias. Some of the results 
indicate that the average assessment revisions are higher when the financial 
controller is consistently described as competent than when he is consistently 
described as honest. However, these findings are not significant. Similar results are 
found for the conditions where the financial controller is initially described as not 
competent and subsequently described as competent. There is no evidence to show 
that the average assessment revisions are larger when there is a positive change in the 
descriptions about the financial controller's competency compared to when there is a 
positive change in the descriptions about the financial controller's competency. 
Therefore, H3a is not supported for the positivity bias. 
Similarly, there are no significant findings to indicate that the average assessment 
revisions of the audit assertions are larger when there is a negative change in the 
descriptions about the financial controller's honesty than when there is a negative 
change in the descriptions about the financial controller's competency. Thus, H3b is 
also not supported for the negativity bias. 
6.5.2 Second Assessments 
Table 6.12 shows the descriptive statistics for the auditors' second assessments after 
they read the additional information that either confirms or disconfirms the initial 
honesty and competency of financial controller. The figures in this table are based on 
the initial information about the financial controller's honesty and competency. Table 
6.12 reports that, for each of the assertions, the average second assessment is higher 
when the financial controller is initially described as honest compared to when he is 
initially described as not honest. Similarly, as shown in the columns reporting 
descriptive statistics for Initial Competent and Initial Not Competent, the average 
second assessment is higher for each assertion when the financial controller is 
initially described as competent compared to when he is initially described as not 
competent, except for the cut-off assertion. For the cut-off assertion, the average 
second assessment is higher when the financial controller is initially described as not 
competent compared to when he is described as competent. 
Table 6.12 
Descriptive Statistics on Auditors' Second Assessments of Audit Assertions 
Based on Initial Information about the Honesty and Competency of the 
Financial Controller [mean (standard deviation)] 
Behaviour Initial Initial Not Initial Initial Not 
Honest Honest Competent Competent 
Assertion 
Completeness 2.804 2.618 2.829 2.575 
(1.448) (1.435) (1.397) (1.485) 
n = 97 n = 102 n = 105 n = 94 
Cut-off 2.412 2.265 2.133 2.564 
(1.205) (1.274) (1.084) (1.364) 
n = 97 n= 102 n = 105 n = 94 
Accuracy 2.495 2.422 2.648 2.245 
(1.480) (1.331) (1.400) (1.381) 
n ' 97 n= 102 n = 105 n i 9 4 
Overall cash 2.474 2.412 2.552 2.319 
transactions (1.331) (1.367) (1.293) (1.401) 
n = 97 n= 102 n = 105 n = 94 
Overall cash and 2.443 2.373 2.562 2.234 
cash equivalent (1.369) (1.327) (1.351) (1.323) 
balances n = 97 n= 102 n = 105 n | 9 4 
Variables: 
Initial Honest (Not Honest) = the initial description of the financial controller's behaviour indicates he 
is honest (not honest). Initial Competent (Not Competent) = the initial description of the financial 
controller's behaviour indicates he is competent (not competent). Assertion: Subjects' initial 
assessments of the audit assertion (1 - "Strongly believe that the assertion is NOT true", and 7 -
"Strongly believe that the assertion is true"). 
Table 6.13 shows the descriptive statistics for the auditors' second assessments based 
on whether the financial controller is consistently described as honest or consistently 
described as competent. For each of the assertions, the average second assessment is 
lower when the financial controller is consistently described as honest compared to 
when he is consistently described as not honest. As shown in columns reporting 
descriptive statistics for Consistent Competent and Consistent Not Competent, the 
average second assessment is higher for each assertion when the financial controller 
is consistently described as competent compared to when he is consistently described 
as not competent, except for the accuracy assertion. For the accuracy assertion, the 
average second assessment is higher when the financial controller is consistently 
described as not competent compared to when he is consistently described as 
competent. 
Table 6.13 
Descriptive Statistics on Auditors' Second Assessments of Audit Assertions Based on Information about the Consistency of Honesty 
and Competency of the Financial Controller [mean (standard deviation)] 
Behaviour Consistent Consistent Consistent Consistent Not Not Consistent Not consistent Not Consistent Not Consistent 
Honest Not Honest Competent Competent Honest Not Honest Competent Not Competent 
Assertion 
Completeness 2.403 2.864 2.812 2.654 2.800 2.664 2.700 2.713 
(1.303) (1.487) (1.517) (1.402) (1.492) (1.419) (1.301) (1.517) 
n = 67 n = 132 n = 69 n = 130 n = 65 n = 134 n = 70 n i | 1 2 9 
Cut-off 2.194 2.409 2.638 2.177 2.308 2.351 1.857 2.597 
(1.294) (1.210) (1.260) (1.204) (1.089) (1.311) (0.952) (1.302) 
n = 67 n = 132 n = 69 n = 130 n = 65 n = 134 n = 70 n = 129 
Accuracy 2.403 2.485 2.420 2.477 2.339 2.515 2.629 2.364 
(1.371) (1.422) (1.509) (1.348) (1.417) (1.397) (1.287) (1.457) 
N = 67 N = 132 N = 69 n = 130 n = 65 n = 134 n = 70 n = 129 
Overall cash 2.313 2.508 2.478 2.423 2.339 2.493 2.371 2.481 
transactions (1.246) (1.395) (1.421) (1.311) (1.314) (1.364) (1.079) (1.474 
n = 67 n = 132 n = 69 n = 130 n = 65 n = 134 n = 70 n = 129 
Overall cash and 2.299 2.462 2.507 2.354 2.369 2.425 2.343 2.442 
cash equivalent (1.279) (1.378) (1.481) (1.269) (1.431) (1.306) (1.128) (1.452) 
balances n = 67 n = 132 n = 69 n = 130 n = 65 n = 134 n = 70 n = 129 
Variables: 
Consistent Honest (Not Honest) indicates both the initial and second descriptions of the financial controller indicate he is honest (not honest). Consistent Competent 
indicates both the initial and second descriptions of the financial controller indicate he is competent (not competent). Not Consistent Honest indicates the initial 
description of the financial controller indicates he is honest and the second description indicates he is not honest. Not Consistent Not Honest indicates the initial 
description of the financial controller indicates he is not honest and the second description indicates he is honest. Not Consistent Competent indicates the initial 
description of the financial controller indicates he is competent and the second description indicates he is not competent. Not Consistent Not Competent indicates the 
initial description of the financial controller indicates he is not competent and the second description indicates he is competent. 
Table 6.14 shows the descriptive statistics for the auditors' second assessments also 
based on the additional information that either confirms or disconfirms the initial 
honesty and competency of the financial controller. 
Hla predicts that auditors' assessments on the truth of an audit assertion are higher 
when the financial controller is honest than when they are not honest. For the 
conditions where the financial controller is initially described as competent and 
subsequently described as not competent, the assessments are higher when they are 
described as consistently honest (the means are 2.706 for the completeness assertion, 
2.059 for the cut-off assertion, 2.882 for the accuracy assertion, 2.647 for the overall 
cash transaction assertion, and 2.529 for the overall cash and cash equivalent balance 
assertion) than when they are described as consistently not honest (the means are 
2.278 for the completeness assertion, 1.722 for the cut-off assertion, 2.167 for the 
accuracy assertion, 2.000 for the overall cash transaction assertion, and 2.222 for the 
overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertion). 
Table 6.14 
Descriptive Statistics on Auditors' Second Assessments of Audit Assertions 
Based on Consistent or Inconsistent Information about the Honesty and 
Initial Behaviour Consistent Honesty Inconsistent Inconsistent 
and Inconsistent Honesty and Honesty and 
Competency Consistent Inconsistent 
Competency Competency 
Panel A: Completeness Assertion 
Honest and 2.706 2.938 3.000 
Competent (1.160) (1.436) (1.609) 
n = 17 n = 16 n g 18 
Honest and Not 2.933 2.353 2.929 
Competent (1.624) (1.272) (1.685) 
n = 15 n = 17 n = 14 
Not Honest and 2.278 3.211 2.824 
Competent (1.074) (1.686) (1.286) 
n = 18 n = 19 n = 17 
Not Honest and 1.765 2.706 2.929 
Not Competent (1.147) (1.611) (1.385) 
n = 17 n = 17 n = 14 
Panel B: Cut-off Assertion 
Honest and 2.059 2.563 1.889 
Competent (1.144) (1.153) (0.900) 
n = 17 n = 16 n = 18 
Honest and 3.267 2.471 2.357 
Not Competent (1.438) (1.231) (1.008) 
n = 15 n = 17 n = 14 
Not Honest and 1.722 2.790 1.765 
Competent (0.958) (1.134) (0.831) 
n = 18 n = 19 n = 17 
Not Honest and 1.882 2.706 2.786 
Not Competent (1.166) (1.572) (1.477) 
n = 17 n = 17 n i l 14 
Panel C: Accuracy Assertion 
Honest and 2.882 2.688 2.611 
Competent (1.317) (1.815) (1.420) 
n = 17 n = 16 ng! 18 
Honest and 2.733 1.882 2.143 
Not Competent (1.870) (1.054) (1.231) 
n = 15 n = 17 n = 14 
Not Honest and 2.167 2.684 2.882 
Competent (1.043) (1.493) (1.317) 
n = 18 n = 19 n = 17 
Not Honest and 1.882 2.412 2.500 
Not Competent (1.054) (1.583) (1.345) 
n = 17 n = 17 n = 14 
Table 6.14 (continued) 
Initial Consistent Inconsistent Inconsistent 
Behaviour Honest and Honest and Honest and 
Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent 
Competent Competent Competent 
Panel D: Overall Cash Transaction Assertion 
Honest and 2.647 2.750 2.278 
Competent (1.222) (1.653) (1.179) 
n = 17 n = 16 n = 18 
Honest and 2.867 1.882 2.500 
Not Competent (1.506) (0.857) (1.454) 
n = 15 n = 17 n ! 14 
Not Honest and 2.000 3.053 2.588 
Competent (0.9070 (1.580) (0.939) 
n = 18 n = 19 n = 17 
Not Honest and 1.824 2.176 2.857 
Not Competent (1.131) (1.237) (1.956) 
n = 17 n = 17 n = 14 
Panel E : Overall Cash and Cash Equivalent Balance Assertion 
Honest and 2.529 3.063 2.278 
Competent (1.179) (1.982) (1.127) 
n = 17 n = 16 n = 18 
Honest and 2.667 1.765 2.429 
Not Competent (1.345) (0.903) (1.342) 
n = 15 n = 17 n = 14 
Not Honest and 2.222 2.947 2.353 
Competent (1.215) (1.353) (1.057) 
n = 18 n = 19 n = 17 
Not Honest and 1.824 2.235 2.643 
Not Competent (1.334) (1.251) (1.646) 
n = 17 n = 17 n = 14 
Assertion: Subjects' second assessments of the assertions (1 - "Strongly believe that the assertion is 
NOT true", and 7 - "Strongly believe that the assertion is true"). 
Similarly, for the conditions where the financial controller is initially described as 
not competent and subsequently described as competent, the assessments are higher 
when he is described as consistently honest (means = 2.933, 3.267, 2.733, 2.867 and 
2.667 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, 
and overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions) than when he is consistently 
described as not honest (means = 1.765, 1.882, 1.882, 1.824, and 1.824 respectively 
for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and 
cash equivalent balance assertions). 
For the conditions where the financial controller is initially described as not 
competent and subsequently described as competent, the average assessments are 
higher when the financial controller is initially described as not honest and 
subsequently described as honest (means = 2.786, 2.500, 2.857 and 2.643 
respectively for the cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and 
cash equivalent balance assertions) than when the financial controller is initially 
described as honest and subsequently described as not honest (means = 2.357, 2.143, 
2.500 and 2.429 respectively for the cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and 
overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions). However, the means are equal 
for the completeness assertion when the financial controller is initially described as 
not honest and subsequently described as honest; and when he is initially described 
as honest and subsequently described as not honest (mean = 2.929). 
The results are mixed for the conditions where the financial controller is consistently 
described as competent. The assessments are higher when the financial controller is 
initially described as not honest and subsequently described as honest for the 
completeness, cut-off, overall cash transaction assertions (means = 3.211, 2.790 and 
3.053 respectively) than when he is initially described as honest and subsequently 
described as not honest (means = 2.938, 2.563 and 2.750 respectively). However, the 
means are lower when the financial controller is initially described as not honest and 
subsequently described as honest for the accuracy, and overall cash and overall cash 
equivalent balance assertions (means = 2.684 and 2.947 respectively); and when he is 
initially described as honest and subsequently described as not honest (means = 
2.688 and 3.063 respectively). 
The results are also mixed for the conditions where the financial controller is initially 
described as competent and subsequently described as not competent. For the 
accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance 
assertions, the assessments are higher when he is initially described as not honest and 
subsequently described as honest (means = 2.882, 2.588 and 2.353) than when he is 
initially described as honest and subsequently described as not honest (means ** 
2.611, 2.278 and 2.278). For the completeness and cut-off assertions, the assessments 
are lower when the financial controller is initially described as not honest and 
subsequently described as honest (means = 2.824 and 1.765 respectively) than when 
he is initially described as honest and subsequently described as not honest (means = 
3.000 and 1.889 respectively). 
For the conditions where the financial controller is consistently described as not 
competent, the assessments are higher for all the assertions (means = 2.706, 2.706, 
2.412, 2.176 and 2.235 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall 
cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions) when he is 
initially described as not honest and subsequently described as honest than when he 
is initially described as honest and subsequently described as not honest (means = 
2.353, 2.471, 1.882, 1.882, and 1.765 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, 
accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance 
assertions). 
With regard to the competency of the financial controller, for the conditions where 
the financial controller is initially described as honest and subsequently described as 
not honest, consistently being described as competent results in higher assessments 
(means = 2.938, 2.563, 2.688, 2.750 and 3.063 respectively for the completeness, 
cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent 
balance assertions) than when the financial controller is consistently described as not 
competent (means = 2.353, 2.471, 1.882, 1.882 and 1.765 respectively for the 
completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash 
equivalent balance assertions). Similarly, for the conditions where the financial 
controller is initially described as not honest and subsequently described as honest, 
auditors' assessments are higher when he is consistently described as competent 
(means = 3.211, 2.790, 2.684, 3.053 and 2.947 respectively for the completeness, 
cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent 
balance assertions) than when he is consistently described as not competent (means = 
2.706, 2.706, 2.412, 2.176 and 2.235 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, 
accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance 
assertions). 
However, different results are found for the conditions where the financial controller 
is consistently described as not honest. For these conditions, auditors' assessments 
are lower when the financial controller is initially described as not competent and 
subsequently described as competent (means = 1.765, 1.882, 1.882, 1.824 and 1.824 
respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and 
overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions) than when he is initially 
described as competent and subsequently described as not competent (means = 
2.278, 1.772, 2.167, 2.000 and 2.222 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, 
accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance 
assertions). 
The results are mixed for the conditions where the financial controller is consistently 
described as honest. For the completeness, cut-off, overall cash transaction, and 
overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions, the assessments are higher when 
he is initially described as not competent and subsequently described as competent 
(means = 2.933, 3.267, 2.867 and 2.667 respectively) than when he is initially 
described as competent and subsequently described as not competent (means = 
2.706, 2.059, 2.647 and 2.529 respectively). The assessment is lower for the accuracy 
assertion when the financial controller is initially described as not competent and 
subsequently described as competent (mean = 2.733) than when he is initially 
described as competent and subsequently described as not competent (mean = 2.882). 
For the conditions where the financial controller is initially described as honest and 
subsequently described as not honest, the assessment is higher when he is initially 
described as not competent and subsequently described as competent (means = 
2.357, 2.500 and 2.429 respectively for the cut-off, overall cash transaction, and 
overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions) than when he is initially 
described as competent and subsequently described as not competent (means = 
1.889, 2.278 and 2.278 respectively for the cut-off, overall cash transaction, and 
overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions). For the other two assertions, the 
assessments are lower when the financial controller is initially described as not 
competent and subsequently described as competent (means = 2.929 and 2.143 
respectively for the completeness and accuracy assertions) than when he is initially 
described as competent and subsequently described as not competent (means = 3.000 
and 2.611 respectively for the completeness and accuracy assertions). 
Similarly, for the conditions where the financial controller is initially described as 
not honest and subsequently described as honest, the assessments are higher when he 
is initially described as not competent and subsequently described as competent for 
the completeness, cut-off overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash 
equivalent balance assertions (means = 2.929, 2.786, 2.857 and 2.643 respectively) 
than when he is initially described as competent and subsequently described as not 
competent (means = 2.824, 1.765 2.588 and 2.353 respectively). For the accuracy 
assertion, auditors' assessments are lower when the financial controller is initially 
described as not competent and subsequently described as competent (mean = 2.500) 
than when he is initially described as competent and subsequently described as not 
competent (mean = 2.882). 
The MAN OVA and ANOVA results are shown in Tables 6.15 and 6.16. The 
MANOVA results show that the main effect for Initial Honest is not significant (p-
value = 0.318) and the ANOVA results also show that it has no significant main 
effect for all the assertions. The p-values are 0.157 for completeness assertion, 0.101 
for cut-off assertion, 0.240 for accuracy assertion, 0.217 for the overall cash 
transaction assertion and 0.253 for the overall cash and cash equivalent balance 
assertion. Thus, Hypothesis la is not supported for Initial Honest for all the 
assertions. The average second assessments are not necessarily higher when the 
financial controller is initially described as honest compared to when he is initially 
described as not honest. 
Table 6.15 
MANOVA Results for Auditors' Second Assessments of Audit Assertions 
Pillai's 
Trace 
F Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df 
p-value* 
Initial Honest 0.009 0.570 3 185 0.318 
Initial Competent 0.112 7.792 3 185 0.000 
Consistent Honest 0.037 2.379 3 185 0.036 
Consistent Competent 0.055 3.590 3 185 0.008 
Initial Honest x Initial Competent 0.012 0.721 3 185 0.270 
Initial Honest x Consistent Honest 0.038 2.433 3 185 0.033 
Initial Honest x Consistent 
Competent 
0.006 0.395 3 185 0.379 
Initial Competent x Consistent 
Honest 
0.004 0.231 3 185 0.437 
Initial Competent x Consistent 
Competent 
0.027 1.726 3 185 0.082 
Initial Honest x Initial Competent 
x Consistent Honest 
0.025 1.549 3 185 0.102 
Initial Honest x Initial Competent 
x Consistent Competent 
0.007 0.461 3 185 0.355 
Box's test of equality of covariance matrices p=0.000 
*p-values are for one-tail test 
Variables: 
Initial Honest = 1 if the behaviour of the financial controller is initially described as honest; 0 if not 
honest. Initial Competent = 1 if the behaviour of the financial controller is initially described as 
competent; 0 if not competent. Consistent® 1 if the second set of information about the financial 
controller is consistent with the initial behaviour; 0 if the second set of information about financial 
controller is inconsistent with initial behaviour. Assertion f§. Subjects' second assessments of the 
assertions (1 - "Strongly believe that the assertion is NOT true", and 7 - "Strongly believe that the 
assertion is true"). 
Table 6.16 
ANOVA Results for Auditors' Second Assessments of Audit Assertions 
Completeness Assertion" Cut-off Assertion1* Accuracy Assertion' Overall cash Transaction Assertion 
Overall cash and Cash Equivalent 
Balance Assertion' 
SS df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.* SS df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.* SS df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.* SS df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.* SS df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.* 
Initial Honest 2.089 2.089 1.025 0.157 2.280 1 2.280 1.637 0.101 0.983 1 0.983 0.503 0.240 1.075 1 1.075 0.614 0.217 0.787 1 0.787 0.447 0.253 
Initial Competent 3.435 3.435 1.686 0.098 6.988 1 6.988 5.016 0.013 6.982 1 0.982 3.571 0.030 3.943 1 3.943 2.254 0.068 7.834 1 7.834 4.449 0.018 
Consistent Honest 8.038 8.038 3.946 0.024 0.036 1 0.036 0.026 0.437 0.447 1 0.447 0.229 0.317 1.579 1 1.579 0.902 0.177 0.426 1 0.426 0.242 0.317 
Consistent Competent 0.458 0.458 0.225 0.318 6.122 1 6.122 4.394 0.019 0.452 1 0.452 0.231 0.316 0.267 1 0.267 0.153 0.349 0.193 1 0.193 0.110 0.371 
Interactions 
Initial Honest x Initial Competent 0.610 0.610 0.299 0.293 1.084 1 1.084 0.778 0.190 0.361 1 0.361 0.185 0.334 0.271 1 0.271 0.155 0.348 0.027 1 0.127 0.015 0.451 
Initial Honest x Consistent Honest 4.058 4.058 1.992 0.080 8.251 1 8.251 5.923 0.008 9.693 1 9.693 4.957 0.014 11.183 1 11.183 6.391 0.006 4.170 1 4.170 2.368 0.063 
Initial Honest x Consistent 
Competent 1.314 1.314 0.645 0.212 0.051 1 0.051 
0.037 0.425 0.021 1 0.021 0.011 0.459 0.010 1 0.010 0.006 0.470 0.009 1 0.009 0.005 0.472 
Initial Competent x Consistent 
Honest 0.205 0.205 0.101 0.376 0.030 1 0.030 
0.021 0.442 0.350 1 0.350 0.179 0.337 0.404 1 0.404 0.231 0.316 0.992 1 0.992 0.563 0.227 
Initial Competent x Consistent 
Competent 2.573 2.573 1.263 0.132 5.656 1 5.656 
4.060 0.023 0.105 1 0.105 0.054 0.409 10.193 1 10.193 5.826 0.009 12.255 1 12.255 6.960 0.005 
Initial Honest x Initial Competent x 
Consistent Honest 1.692 1.692 0.830 0.182 5.153 1 5.153 
3.699 0.028 0.098 1 0.098 0.050 0.412 0.394 1 0.304 0.225 0.318 0.917 1 0.017 0.521 0.236 
Initial Honest x Initial Competent x 
Consistent Competent 
0.019 0.019 0.009 0.462 0.605 1 0.605 0.434 0.256 0.407 1 0.407 0.208 0.325 0.006 1 0.006 0.004 0.953 0.407 1 0.407 0.231 0.316 
Error 380.968 187 2.037 260.518 187 1.393 365.645 187 1.955 327.212 187 1.750 329.289 187 1.761 
"Levene 's test for equality of variances p =0.538 "Levene 's test for equality of variances p=0.307 cLevene's test for equality of variances p=0.156 Levene's test for equality of variances p=0.082 
'Levene's test for equality of variances p=0.190 *p-values are for one-tail test 
Variables: 
Initial Honest = 1 if the behaviour of the financial controller is initially described as honest; 0 if not honest. Initial Competent = 1 if the behaviour of the financial controller is 
initially described as competent; 0 if not competent. Consistent = 1 if the second set of information about the financial controller is consistent with the initial behaviour; 0 if the 
second set of information about financial controller is inconsistent with initial behaviour. Assertion = Subjects' second assessments of the assertions (1 - "Strongly believe that 
the assertion is NOT true", and 7 - "Strongly believe that the assertion is true"). 
Initial Competent has a significant main effect on the auditors' assessments as shown 
in the MANOVA results (p-value = 0.000) and the ANOVA results are significant 
for all the assertions. The p-values are 0.098, 0.013, 0.030, 0.068 and 0.018 for the 
completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash 
equivalent assertions respectively. Initially describing the financial controller as 
competent results in higher second assessments of the audit assertions compared to 
when he is initially described as not competent. Therefore, Hlb is supported for 
Initial Competent for all the assertions. 
The MANOVA results indicate that Consistent Honest has a significant main effect 
(p-value is 0.036). However, the ANOVA results are mixed, where the p-value is 
significant only for the completeness assertion (p-value = 0.024). It is not significant 
for the cut-off (p-value = 0.437), accuracy (p-value = 0.317), overall cash transaction 
(p-value = 0.177) and overall cash and cash equivalent balance (p-value = 0.317) 
assertions. However, consistently describing the financial controller as honest results 
in lower average second assessments compared to when he is consistently described 
as not honest. In addition, not consistently describing the financial controller as not 
honest results in higher second assessments compared to when he is consistently 
described as honest. Therefore, Hla is not supported for Consistent Honest. 
Consistent Competent has a significant main effect. The MANOVA p-value is 0.008. 
However, the ANOVA results are mixed. Consistent competent has a significant 
main effect only for the cut-off assertion (p-value = 0.019) and is not significant for 
the completeness (p-value = 0.318), accuracy (p-value = 0.316), overall cash 
transaction (p-value = 0.349) and overall cash and cash equivalent balance (p-value = 
0.371) assertions. Consistently describing the financial controller as competent 
results in higher second assessments compared to when he is consistently described 
as not competent. Similarly, not consistently describing him as not competent (i.e., 
he is initially described as not competent and subsequently described as competent) 
may result in higher second assessments compared to not consistently describing him 
as competent (i.e., he is initially described as competent and subsequently described 
as not competent). Therefore, Hlb is supported for Consistent Competent, but only 
for the cut-off assertion. 
The interaction between Initial Honest and Initial Competent is not significant. The 
p-value for MANOVA is 0.270 and the p-values for ANOVA are 0.293 for the 
completeness assertion, 0.190 for the cut-off assertion, 0.334 for the accuracy 
assertion, 0.348 for the overall cash transaction assertion and 0.451 for the overall 
cash and cash equivalent balance assertion. Thus, Hlc is not supported for the 
interaction between Initial Honest and Initial Competent for all the assertions. 
There is a significant interaction effect between Initial Honest and Consistent 
Honest. The MANOVA p-value is 0.033 and the ANOVA p-values are 0.080, 0.008, 
0.014, 0.006 and 0.063 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, overall 
cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions. Figure 6.12 
shows this significant interaction for the completeness assertion. 
Figure 6.12 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Honesty and Competency of the Financial 
Contoller for Auditors' Second Assessments of the Completeness Assertion 
Initial H o n e s t y 
Table 6.17 shows the significant Games-Howell post hoc test results. Note that only 
the significant results are presented in Table 6.17. 
Table 6.17 
Significant Post Hoc Tests for Auditors' Second Assessments of Audit 
Assertions for the Interactions between the Descriptions of the Honesty and 
(I) (J) Mean 
difference 
Std. 
Error 
Sig.* 
Panel A: Completeness Assertion 
Initial NH&NC 
and subsequent 
H&C 
Initial 
NH&NC and 
subsequent 
NH&C 
1.446 0.476 0.073 
Panel B: Cut-off Assertion 
Initial H&C and 
subsequent 
NH&NC 
Initial H&NC 
and subsequent 
H&C 
-1.378 0.428 0.057 
Initial H&NC and 
subsequent H&C 
Initial 
NH&NC and 
subsequent 
NH&C 
1.384 0.467 0.087 
Initial NH&C and 
subsequent 
H&NC 
Initial H&NC 
and subsequent 
H&C 
-1.502 0.422 0.030 
Initial NH&C and 
subsequent 
H&NC 
Initial NH&C 
and subsequent 
H&C 
-1.025 0.329 0.061 
Initial NH&C and 
subsequent 
NH&NC 
Initial H&NC 
and subsequent 
H&C 
-1.544 0.435 0.028 
Initial NH&C and 
subsequent 
NH&NC 
Initial NH&C 
and subsequent 
H&C 
-1.067 0.345 0.062 
Panel B: Overall Cash and Cas i Equivalent Balance Assertion 
Initial H&NC and 
subsequent 
NH&NC 
Initial NH&C 
and subsequent 
H&C 
-1.183 0.380 0.062 
* p-values are for one-tailed tests. 
H&C is where the financial controller is described as honest and competent. H&NC is where the 
financial controller is described as honest and not competent. NH&C is where the financial controller 
is described as not honest and competent. NH&NC is where the financial controller is described as not 
honest and not competent. 
The post hoc tests show that, for the completeness assertion, the auditors' second 
assessments are significantly higher when the financial controller is initially 
described as not honest and subsequently described as honest compared to when he is 
consistently described as not honest (p-value = 0.073). Thus, Hla is supported for the 
interaction between Initial Honest and Consistent Honest for the completeness 
assertion, where the second revisions are higher when the financial controller is 
initially described as honest and is also consistently described as honest compared to 
when he is initially described as not honest and is also consistently described as not 
honest. 
Similar results are found for the cut-off assertion. Figure 6.13 depicts the significant 
interaction between Initial Honest and Consistent Honest for the cut-off assertion. 
The post hoc tests indicate that the auditors' average second assessments are 
significantly higher when the financial controller is consistently described as honest 
compared to when he is consistently described as not honest (p values = 0.087 and 
0.028). When the financial controller is consistently described as not honest, the 
average second assessments are significantly lower than when he is initially 
described as not honest and subsequently as honest (p-value = 0.062). The average 
second assessments are significantly lower when the financial controller is initially 
described as honest and subsequently as not honest compared to when he is 
consistently described as honest (p-value = 0.057). Similarly, the average second 
assessments are significantly lower when the financial controller is initially described 
as not honest and subsequently as honest than when he is consistently described as 
honest (p-value = 0.030). Therefore, Hla is supported for the interaction between 
Initial Honest and Consistent Honest for the cut-off assertion. 
Figure 6.13 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Honesty and Consistency of Honesty of 
the Financial Controller for Auditors' Second Assessments of the Cut-off 
Assertion 
Initial Honesty 
Figure 6.14 shows the significant interaction between initial honesty and consistency 
of honesty of the financial controller for the accuracy assertion. However, the post 
hoc tests do not show any significant results in the comparisons of the conditions. 
Therefore, Hla is not supported for the interaction between Initial Honest and 
Consistent Honest for the accuracy assertion. 
Figure 6.14 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Honesty and Consistency of Honesty of 
the Financial Controller for Auditor's Second Assessments of the Accuracy 
Assertion 
Initial Honesty 
Figure 6.15 depicts the interaction between the initial honesty and consistency of 
honesty of the financial controller for the overall cash transaction assertion. 
However, the Games-Howell post hoc tests do not show any significant results when 
comparing the conditions. Therefore, HI a is not supported for the interaction 
between Initial Honest and Consistent Honest for the overall cash transaction 
assertion. 
Figure 6.15 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Honesty and Consistency of Honesty of 
the Financial Controller for Auditor's Second Assessments of the Overall Cash 
Transaction Assertion 
Figure 6.16 depicts the interaction between initial honesty and consistency of 
honesty of the financial controller for the overall cash and cash equivalent balance 
assertion. The post hoc tests show that the auditors' average second assessments are 
significantly lower when the financial controller is initially described as honest and 
subsequently as not honest compared to when he initially described as not honest and 
subsequently as honest (p-value = 0.062). Therefore, HI a is supported for Initial 
Honest and Consistent Honest for the overall cash and cash equivalent balance 
assertion. 
Figure 6.16 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Honesty and Consistency of Honesty of 
the Financial Controller for Auditors' Second Assessments of the Overall Cash 
and Cash Equivalent Balance Assertion 
Initial Hones ty 
The MANOVA result for the interaction effect between Initial Honest and Consistent 
Competent is not significant (p-value = 0.379) and the ANOVA results are also not 
significant. The p-values are 0.212 for the completeness assertion, 0.425 for the cut-
off assertion, 0.459 for the accuracy assertion, 0.470 for the overall cash transaction 
assertion and 0.472 for the overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertion. 
Therefore, Hlc is not supported for the interaction between Initial Honest and 
Consistent Competent for all the assertions. 
The interaction effect between Initial Competent and Consistent Honest is also not 
significant as the MANOVA p-value is 0.437. The ANOVA results also show that 
the interaction is not significant for all the assertions, where the p-values are 0.376, 
0.442, 0.337, 0.316 and 0.227 respectively for the completeness, cut-off, accuracy, 
overall cash transaction, and overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions. 
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Therefore, Hlc is not supported for the interaction between Initial Competent and 
Consistent Honest. 
There is a significant interaction effect between Initial Competent and Consistent 
Competent. The MANOVA p-value is 0.082. However, the ANOVA results show 
that the interaction is significant for the cut-off assertion (p-value = 0.023), overall 
cash transaction assertion (p-value = 0.009) and overall cash and cash equivalent 
balance assertion (p-value = 0.005). The interaction is not significant for the 
completeness (p-value = 0.132) and accuracy (p-value = 0.409) assertions. 
Figure 6.17 depicts the interaction between initial competency and consistency of 
competency of the financial controller for the cut-off assertion. The Games-Howell 
post hoc tests indicate that the auditors' average second assessments are significantly 
lower when the financial controller is initially described as competent and 
subsequently as not competent compared to when he is initially described as not 
competent and subsequently as competent (p-values = 0.057, 0.030 and 0.028). The 
average second assessments are also significantly lower when the financial controller 
is initially described as competent and subsequently described as not competent than 
when he is consistently described as competent (p = values = 0.061 and 0.062). 
Therefore, Hlb is supported for the interaction between Initial Honest and Initial 
Competent for the cut-off assertion. 
Figure 6.17 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Competency and Consistency of 
Competency of the Financial Controller for Auditors' Second Assessments of 
the Cut-off Assertion 
Initially Not Competent Initially Competent 
Initial Competency 
Consistently Not Competent 
Consistently Competent 
Figure 6.18 shows the interaction between initial competency and consistency of 
competency for the overall cash transaction. However, the post-hoc tests do not show 
any significant results. Therefore, Hlb is not supported for the Initial Competent and 
Consistent Competent for the overall cash transaction assertion. 
Figure 6.18 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Competency and Consistency of 
Competency of the Financial Controller for Auditors' Assessments of the 
Overall Cash Transaction Assertion 
Figure 6.19 depicts the interaction between the initial competency and consistency of 
competency of the financial controller for the overall cash and cash equivalent 
balance assertion. The Games-Howell post hoc tests indicate that the auditors' 
average second assessments are significantly lower when the financial controller is 
consistently described as not competent compared to when he is consistently 
described as competent. Thus, Hlb is supported for the initial Competent and 
Consistent Competent for the overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertion. 
Figure 6.19 
The Interaction Effect between Initial Competency and Consistency of 
Competency of the Financial Controller for Auditors' Second Assessments of 
the Cash and Cash 
Equivalent Balance Assertion 
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The three-way MANOVA result shows an insignificant interaction effect between 
Initial Honest, Initial Competent and Consistent Honest. However, the ANOVA 
results are mixed. The interaction effect is significant only for the cut-off assertion 
(p-value = 0.028) and is not significant for the completeness (p-value = 0.182), 
accuracy (p-value = 0.412), overall cash transaction (p-value = 0.318) and overall 
cash and cash equivalent balance (p-value = 0.236) assertions. 
Figure 6.20 
The Three-way Interaction Effect between Initial Honesty, Consistency of 
Competency and Consistency of Honesty for Auditors' Second Assessments of 
the Cut-off Assertion 
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The three-way MANOVA result shows an insignificant interaction effect between 
Initial Honest, Initial Competent and Consistent Competent. The ANOVA results 
also show insignificant p-values of 0.462 for the completeness assertion, 0.256 for 
the cut-off assertion, 0.325 for the accuracy, 0.953 for the overall cash transaction 
assertion and 0.316 for the overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertion. 
6.6 Summary of the Results 
In determining the effects of honesty and competency on auditors' judgments about 
audit assertions, HI a proposes that honest behaviour will result in higher assessments 
than not honest behaviour, Hlb proposes that competent behaviour will result in 
higher assessments than not competent behaviour. Hlc proposes that the assessments 
will fall in between these two extremes when the financial controller is initially 
described as honest but not competent or not honest but competent. Table 6.18 shows 
the summary of the results for auditors' initial assessments. 
There is evidence that auditors' assessments are the highest when the financial 
controller is described as honest and competent; and their assessments are the lowest 
when the financial controller is described as not honest and not competent. This is 
true for all assertions except for the cut-off assertion. The results for the cut-off 
assertion show that the lowest assessment is found when the financial controller is 
described as not honest but competent. 
Table 6.18 
Summary of the Results for Auditors' Initial Assessments Based on the Initial 
Honesty and Competency of the Financial Controller 
Assertion 
Initial Honest 
(Hla) 
Initial Competent 
(Hlb) 
Initial Honest x 
Initial Competent 
(Hlc) 
Completeness Supported Supported Not Supported 
Cut-off Supported Not Supported Supported 
Accuracy Supported Supported Not Supported 
Overall cash 
transaction 
Not Supported Supported Not Supported 
Overall cash and 
cash equivalent 
balance 
Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
Hla is supported for Initial Honest for the completeness, cut-off and accuracy 
assertions. The financial controller's honesty does not have a significant effect on the 
auditors' assessments of the overall audit assertions. Hlb is supported for Initial 
Competent for the completeness, accuracy and overall cash transaction assertions. A 
significant interaction between Initial Honest and Initial Competent is found only for 
the cut-off assertion. Thus, Hlc is supported, but only for the cut-off assertion. This 
interaction may explain why the lowest initial assessments are found in the 
conditions where the financial controller is initially described as not honest and 
competent and not in the conditions where he is initially described as both honest and 
competent. Auditors might be more sceptical when the financial controller is not 
honest but competent because a financial controller who is not honest may be prone 
to committing fraud and, being competent, is able to conceal the fraud. 
Table 6.19 presents the summary of the results for the auditors' second assessments. 
Initial honesty of the financial controller has no significant effect on auditors' second 
assessments. Auditors do not seem to consider the change in the description of the 
honesty of the financial controller when they revise their initial assessments after 
reading the additional information about the change. However, initial competency of 
the financial controller affects the auditors' second assessments for all the audit 
assertions. These findings indicate that auditors seem to place more weight on the 
competency of the financial controller rather than his honesty. 
Consistency of honesty has no significant effect on auditors' second assessments for 
all the assertions. When management is being consistently described as honest does 
not necessarily result in higher second assessments than them being described as 
consistently not honest. This is consistent with the results for initial description on 
management's honesty. These findings indicate that auditors do not seem to consider 
honesty in their assessments of audit assertions. However, consistency of honesty has 
significant effect on auditors' assessments, but only for the cut-off assertion. 
The interaction between Initial Honest and Initial Competent does not have a 
significant effect on auditors' second assessments. However, describing the financial 
controller as initially and consistently honest, or describing him as initially and 
consistently not honest significantly affects the auditors' second assessments for 
three of the assertions, namely the completeness, cut-off and overall cash and cash 
equivalent balance assertions. Initial description of the financial controller's honesty 
does not affect auditors' second assessments; however, the additional information 
about his honesty affects auditors' second assessments. These findings indicate that 
auditors revise their initial assessments downward when the additional information 
indicates that the financial controller is not honest. In other words, auditors place 
more reliance on consistently honest management and are more likely to assess these 
audit assertions to be true when the management is consistently honest. On the other 
hand, less reliance may be placed on management who are consistently not honest or 
who may seem to be initially honest and later is found to be not honest. 
Initial Honest and Consistent Competent do not have significant interaction effect on 
auditors' second assessments for all the audit assertions. Similarly, the interaction 
between Initial Competent and Consistent Honest also do not significantly affect the 
auditors' second assessments. 
Table 6.19 
Summary of the Results for Auditors' Second Assessments Based on the Revised Information about the Honesty and Competency 
of the Financial controller 
Assertion 
Initial 
Honest 
(HI a) 
Initial 
Competent 
(Hlb) 
Consistent 
Honest 
(HI a) 
Consistent 
Competent 
(Hb) 
Initial 
Honest x 
Initial 
Competent 
(Hlc) 
Initial 
Honest x 
Consistent 
Honest 
(HI a) 
Initial 
Honest x 
Consistent 
Competent 
(Hlc) 
Initial 
Competent 
X 
Consistent 
Honest 
(Hlc) 
Initial 
Competent 
X 
Consistent 
Competent 
(Hlb) 
Initial 
Honest x 
Initial 
Competent 
X 
Consistent 
Honest 
(Hlc) 
Initial 
Honest x 
Initial 
Competent 
X 
Consistent 
Competent 
(Hlc) 
Completeness Not Supp Supported Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Supported Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
Cut-off Not Supp Supported Not Supp Supported Not Supp Supported Not Supp Not Supp Supported Not Supp Not Supp 
Accuracy Not Supp Supported Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
Overall Cash 
Transaction 
Not Supp Supported Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
Overall Cash 
and Cash 
Equivalent 
Balance 
Not Supp Supported Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Supported Not Supp Not Supp Supported Not Supp Not Supp 
Initial Competent and Consistent Competent have a significant interaction effect on 
the auditors' second assessments for the cut-off and overall cash and cash equivalent 
balance assertions. Auditors in this study may have identified, for example, that the 
determination of cut-off dates for business transactions for the purpose of recording 
in the books of accounts, relate to the competency of management. Failing to 
appropriately identify cut-off in expenditure and income recognition may result in 
unreliable financial information. 
Table 6.20 shows the summary of the results of the auditors' assessment revisions 
after reading the additional information. Most of the hypotheses are not supported 
particularly for the interaction effects. This indicates that auditors may consider 
honesty and competency separately in making judgments about the truth of audit 
assertions. 
Studies have found that people compare behaviour to an "anchor". The experiment 
sets the initial honest and competent behaviour of financial controller as the "anchor" 
and subsequent information was given either confirming or disconfirming the initial 
behaviour. Theories on impression formation, particularly category-diagnosticity 
theory, suggest that auditors are more sensitive to negative cues than positive cues. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that auditors' revisions to their assessments on whether 
an audit assertion is true will be negative or negative and larger when management is 
portrayed as consistently not honest or not competent compared to when 
management is consistently portrayed as honest or competent as proposed by H2a. 
H2b proposes that auditors' revisions of their assessments of an audit assertion are 
negative or negative and larger when the financial controller is initially described as 
honest (or competent) and subsequently described as not honest (or not competent) 
than their revisions when the financial controller is initially described as not honest 
(or not competent). 
H2c posits that auditors' assessment revisions on an audit assertion are negative or 
negative and larger when the financial controller is initially described as honest (or 
competent) and subsequently described as not honest (or not competent) than their 
revisions when the financial controller is consistently honest or consistently 
competent. 
H2d posits that auditors' assessment revisions on an audit assertion are negative or 
negative and larger when the financial controller is consistently described as not 
honest or consistently described as not competent than their revisions when the 
financial controller is initially described as not honest (or not competent) and 
subsequently described as honest (or competent). 
Table 6.20 
Summary of the Results for the Differences between Initial and Second Assessments 
Initial Initial Consistent Consistent Initial Initial Initial Initial Initial Initial Initial 
Honest Competent Honest Competent Honest x Honest x Honest x Competent Competent Honest x Honest x 
Initial Consistent Consistent x Consistent x Initial Initial 
Competent Honest Competent Honest Consistent Competent Competent 
Competent x Consistent x Consistent 
Assertion Honest Competent 
Completeness 
H2a Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp - - - - - -
H2b Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H2c - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H2d - - - BsP - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp H3a - - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H3b - - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
Cut-off 
H2a Not Supp Supported Not Supp Supported S-Vjl - - - - ." if . 
H2b Not Supp Supported - - Supported Supported Not Supp Supported Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H2c - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H2d - - - - Supported Not Supp Not Supp Supported Not Supp Not Supp 
H3a - - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H3b - - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
Accuracy 
H2a Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp - - - - - -
H2b Not Supp Not Supp - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H2c - - - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H2d - - - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H3a - - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H3b - - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
Table 6.20 (continued) 
Initial Initial Consistent Consistent Initial Initial Initial Initial Initial Initial Initial 
Honest Competent Honest Competent Honest x Honest x Honest x Competent x Competent Honest x Honest x 
Initial Consistent Consistent Consistent x Consistent Initial Initial 
Competent Honest Competent Honest Competent Competent x Competent x 
Consistent Consistent 
Assertion Honest Competent 
Overall Cash 
Transaction 
H2a Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp _ - - - - -
H2b Not Supp Not Supp - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H2c - - - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H2d Pc-':" - r - " J - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H3a - - - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H3b - KB* - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
Overall cash 
and cash 
equivalent 
balance 
H2a Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp - - - - - -
H2b Not Supp Not Supp - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H2c - - - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H2d - - - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H3a - - - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H3b - - - - - Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp Not Supp 
H2a is not supported except for the cut-off assertion. Auditors revise their initial 
assessments upward when the financial controller is initially described as competent 
and subsequently described as competent, and will revise downward when he is 
initially described as not competent and subsequently described as not competent, 
particularly for the cut-off assertion. However, for the second assessments, initial 
competency of the financial controller is significant for all the assertions. This 
indicates that auditors' revisions to their initial assessments after they read the 
information about the change in the competency of the financial controller are not 
significant, except for their assessments of the cut-off assertion. 
H2b is not supported except for initial competency and the interactions between the 
financial controller's initial honesty and initial competency, initial honesty and 
consistency of honesty, and initial competency and consistency of honesty for the 
cut-off assertion. Auditors' revisions to their initial assessments are significantly 
larger when the financial controller is initially described as honest or competent and 
is not consistently described as honest or competent compared to when the financial 
controller is initially described as not honest or not competent and is subsequently 
described as honest or competent. 
H2c is not supported for all of the assertions. Auditors' revisions to their initial 
assessments are not significantly larger when the financial controller is initially 
described as honest or competent and is not consistently described as honest or 
competent compared to when he is consistently described as honest or competent. 
H2d is not supported except for the interaction between the financial controller's 
initial honesty and consistency of honesty for the cut-off assertion. 
Category-diagnosticity theory proposes that perceptions of honesty are subject to a 
negativity bias and perceptions of competency to a positivity bias. Therefore, it is 
hypothesised in H3a that auditors' revisions to their assessments will be positive or 
positive and larger when the financial controller is consistently described as 
competent and when the financial controller is initially described as not competent 
and subsequently described as competent. H3b proposes that the assessment 
revisions will be negative or negative and larger when the financial controller is 
consistently described as not honest and when the financial controller is initially 
described as honest and subsequently described as not honest than when the financial 
controller is consistently described as competent and the financial controller is 
initially described as competent and subsequently described as not competent. No 
significant effect is found for the interaction between Consistent Honest and 
Consistent Competent. Therefore, auditors do not appear to be negatively biased in 
perceiving honesty and positively biased in perceiving competency. 
The results from the present study are not consistent with previous findings that 
examine the schematic model of attribution (Reeder 1985) and category-diagnosticity 
model (Skowronski and Carlston 1987) of impression formation. There is evidence 
that auditors are influenced by the positive or negative descriptions of the financial 
controller's behaviour, but only in some conditions as discussed above. Auditors may 
be more focused and may rely on harder evidence rather than speculating about the 
implications of honest or not honest behaviour; or competent or not competent 
behaviour of financial controller. Even though there are studies that have shown 
auditors are more sensitive to client's integrity, these studies have been based mostly 
on survey method. Further, this study examines both honesty and competency, 
whereby the auditors consider both the honesty and competency of the client 
management in making their assessments of the audit assertions. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter reiterates the motivation of this thesis and summarises the research 
findings of the survey and the behavioural experiment in Section 7.2. This is 
followed by Section 7.3, which discusses the implications of the findings of these 
studies. Section 7.4 reflects on some limitations of these studies. Section 7.5 
concludes the chapter by highlighting some future research directions. 
7.2 Motivation and Research Findings 
Separately identifying fraud and error risk factors is crucial for the effective 
identification of fraud and error. This is because fraud detection procedures are 
different than error detection procedures. For the purpose of this thesis, error risk 
factors relate to the competency of an audit client's management, and fraud risk 
factors relate to their honesty. Client management is part of an entity's internal 
control environment and they have a direct impact on the truth and fairness of the 
entity's financial reporting. If the honesty and/or competency of client management 
are questionable, the company's financial report may not be reliable. 
This thesis consists of two studies. The first study is based on a survey and the 
second study is a behavioural experiment. The survey is an exploratory study to 
investigate whether auditors appropriately identify management behaviours as being 
related to the honesty and competency of client management. The variables are 
extracted from actual fraud cases, guidelines from the auditing standards, and journal 
articles written on fraud and error risks. The findings from the survey confirm the 
findings from previous studies, i.e., that auditors do identify and classify the 
behaviours of client management into honesty and competency (Abdel-khalik et al. 
1983; Brown 1983; Joyce and Biddle 1981a; Peecher 1996; Schneider 1984, 1985) 
and are able to assess fraud risk and error risk accordingly. However, the findings 
also show that auditors classify some honesty (fraud) risk factors as competency 
(error) risk factors. This should be a serious concern to the auditing profession 
because the implication is that fraud and error may not be discovered since 
incorrectly diagnosing a factor may lead to inappropriate audit procedures being 
performed. Therefore, it is suggested that auditors should be trained to correctly 
recognise client behaviours that signal dishonesty and incompetency. 
To investigate the impact of honesty and competency factors on auditors' judgments, 
the second study uses a behavioural experiment. The purpose of this experiment is to 
examine the existence of biases in auditors' perceptions of the honesty and 
competency of client management, particularly the existence of a negativity bias in 
auditors' perceptions of honesty and a positivity bias in auditors' perceptions of 
competency. Theories on impression formation propose that negative information 
has more influence in the perceptions of behaviours than positive information. 
Further, category-diagnosticity theory posits that people are negatively biased in 
perceiving honesty and positively biased in perceiving competency. The experiment 
is a case study consisting of a summary of two years' annual report for an actual 
company, whose name is disguised. The experiment is a 2 (initial honesty) x 2 
(initial competency) x 2 (consistency of honesty) x 2 (consistency of competency) 
partial factorial between-subjects design. The participants are accountants and 
auditors attending a professional training course in the capital cities in Australia. 
They were given case materials that include background information of a client 
company and descriptions of its financial controller's honesty and competency. After 
reading this information, they were instructed to assess the truth of various audit 
assertions. After making their first set of assessments, they read additional 
information related to the financial controller's honesty and competency. After 
reading the additional information, they made a second assessment of the truth of the 
same assertions in the first judgment. 
Theories on impression formation propose that negative cues have greater influence 
than positive cues in people's belief revision. For auditors' initial assessments, I find 
that initial honesty has a significant main effect for the completeness, cut-off and 
accuracy assertions. Thus, Hla is supported for these assertions. Initial competency 
has a significant main effect on auditors' initial assessments on the completeness, 
accuracy and overall cash transaction assertions and Hlb is supported for these 
assertions. Further, the interaction of initial honesty and initial competency is 
significant only for the cut-off assertions, and therefore, Hlc is supported for only 
the cut-off assertion. 
With regard to the auditors' second assessments, I find that financial controller's 
initial honesty and consistency of honesty do not significantly affect auditors' 
assessments of the truth of all the assertions. The interaction between initial honesty 
and consistency of honesty significantly affects auditors' assessments for the 
completeness, cut-off and overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertions. Thus, 
HI a is not supported for the main effects of initial honesty and consistency of 
honesty, but is supported for the interaction between them for three assertions only. 
The initial competency of the financial controller has a significant effect on auditors' 
assessments for all the assertions. However, his consistency of honesty has a 
significant main effect only for the auditors' second assessments for the cut-off 
assertion. The interaction between these variables has a significant effect on the 
auditors' assessments for the overall cash and cash equivalent balance assertion. Hlb 
is supported for the cut-off assertion. 
Hlc is not supported for the interactions between initial honesty and initial 
competency, initial honesty and consistency of honesty and initial competency and 
consistency of competency. This indicates that auditors' assessments of honesty or 
dishonesty do not depend on whether the financial controller is competent or not 
competent. Similarly, auditors' assessments of the financial controller's competency 
or incompetency do not depend on whether he is honest or not honest. 
For the differences in assessments, the financial controllers' initial honesty and 
consistency of honesty do not significantly affect auditors' assessments of the truth 
of the assertions for all the assertions. Initial competency of the financial controller 
also does not have a significant effect on auditors' revisions of assessments, except 
for the cut-off assertion. Similar results are found for consistent competency, where 
it has a significant effect for the cut-off assertion only. Thus, H2a is not supported. 
Consistently not honest or consistently not competent descriptions do not necessarily 
result in negative or negative and larger revisions than consistently honest or 
consistently competent descriptions. 
H2b posits that when the financial controller is initially described as honest and is 
subsequently described as not honest, this results in negative or negative and larger 
revisions than when he is initially described as not honest and he is subsequently 
described as honest. However, this only occurs for the cut-off assertion. For the cut-
off assertion, initial competency has a main significant effect but not initial honesty. 
The interactions between initial honesty and initial competency, initial honesty and 
consistency of honesty, and initial competency and consistency of honesty are 
significant for the auditors' assessment revisions. Initially describing the financial 
controller as honest or competent and he is not described to be consistently honest or 
competent does not necessarily result in larger revisions than initially describing him 
as not honest or not competent and subsequently describing him as honest or 
competent (i.e., he is not consistently described as not honest or not competent). 
Therefore, H2b is not supported. 
Descriptions of the financial controller that initially portray him as honest and 
subsequently as not honest are hypothesised to result in larger revisions than when he 
is consistently described as honest (H2c). However this is not supported for all the 
assertions, where the interactions between initial honesty and consistency of honesty, 
initial honesty and consistency of competency, initial competency and consistency of 
honesty, and initial competency and consistency of competency are not significant. 
A negative change to honesty or competency (i.e., not consistently describing the 
financial controller as honest or competent) does not necessarily result in negative or 
negative and larger revisions than when he is consistently described as honest or 
competent. 
H2d posits that consistently describing the financial controller as not honest and not 
competent will result in negative or negative and larger revisions to the assessments 
than when he is not consistently described as not honest or not competent. This is not 
supported for all the assertions, except for the cut-off assertion, where the 
interactions between initial honesty and consistency of honesty, and initial 
competency and consistency of competency significantly affect auditors' assessment 
revisions. These interactions are not significant for all the other assertions. Thus, H2d 
is not supported. 
Category-diagnosticity theory proposes that people are negatively biased in 
perceiving honesty and positively biased in perceiving competency. These biases 
could impact auditors' judgments, which may then lead to auditors making 
inappropriate audit decisions. It is hypothesised in Hypothesis 3a that auditor's 
assessment revisions are negative or negative and larger when there is a positive 
change to the description of the financial controller's competency compared to when 
there is a positive change to the descriptions of his honesty, i.e., auditors are 
positively biased in perceiving competency. Hypothesis 3b posits that the 
assessments are negative or negative and larger when there is a negative change in 
the descriptions of the financial controller's honesty compared to a positive change 
in the descriptions of competency. The auditors display a negativity bias in 
perceiving the honesty of the financial controller, however, the results are not 
statistically significant. Therefore, the results do not support category-diagnosticity 
theory. 
7.3 Implications of Study 
The survey provides evidence that auditors do consider both the honesty and 
competency of an audit client's management in their judgments. This confirms the 
findings from previous studies that auditors are sensitive to the honesty and 
competency of an audit client's management. There are several differences between 
the current study and prior studies. The first difference is the variables used in the 
survey. The variables are focused on those factors relating to error risk and fraud 
risk, for example, "There have been regular instructions from the chief accountant to 
transfer inventory to the equipment account" to portray not honest behaviour by the 
client's management. Previous studies use variables that are not related to audit work 
(Anderson and Marchant 1989), for example, "returned a lost wallet intact" to 
portray an honest behaviour. In addition, the variables in the present survey consist 
of carefully selected behaviours of management that auditors would come across in 
their audit engagements. This study is also different from previous studies as it 
examines both honesty and competency simultaneously in a behavioural experiment, 
where both the honesty and competency of client management are built into each 
case. When honesty and competency are being evaluated at the same time, an 
evaluation of one could have an impact on the other. 
The behavioural experiment tests cue-diagnosticity theory by examining the 
diagnosticity of information of an audit client's financial controller's honesty and 
competency. Consistent and inconsistent information of the financial controller's 
honesty and competency is manipulated in the experiment, where auditors make 
assessments of the truth of various audit assertions. The results from the behavioural 
experiment do not provide consistent evidence supporting the cue-diagnosticity 
model of impression formation. Auditors are not particularly more sensitive to 
negative cues than positive cues in their judgments. In other words, they are not 
negatively biased in perceiving honesty and not positively biased in perceiving 
competency. 
However, it is noted that previous studies have not examined both honesty and 
competency in the same experiment when positivity and negativity biases are found. 
The present study presents both types of behaviours and for each audit assertion, the 
auditors were required to base their assessments on the descriptions about both the 
honesty and competency of the financial controller. Nevertheless, the lack of 
interactions between initial honesty and initial competency, initial honesty and 
consistency, and initial competency and consistency of honesty may indicate that 
auditors' perceptions of honesty do not depend on their perceptions of competency. 
7.4 Limitations of Study 
Like any other study performed in a controlled setting, this study has limitations. The 
results may not be representative of all external auditors. Many of the participants are 
junior auditors with limited audit experience. More experienced auditors may make 
different judgments than junior auditors. Previous studies suggest that more 
experienced auditors recall more errors and fewer incorrect items (Tubbs 1992); and 
more experienced auditors produce higher quality ethical judgments (Pflugrath et al. 
2007). 
The experiment is a partial factorial design, where subsequently similar behaviour is 
not tested. The excluded cells include the conditions where: (1) the financial 
controller is consistently described as both honest and competent; (2) the financial 
controller is consistently described as both not honest and not competent; (3) the 
financial controller is initially described as honest and not competent and the 
subsequent description also describes him as honest and not competent; and (4) the 
financial controller is initially described as not honest and competent and the second 
description also portrays him as not honest and competent. If a full factorial design, 
where all possible conditions are tested, had been used, different results might be 
obtained. 
The behavioural experiment describes the honesty and competency of client 
management in written materials. As such, the behaviours were not witnessed 
directly by the participants. Even though written descriptions are an accepted 
method, auditors may respond differently to actual observations of client behaviour. 
In addition, experiments are useful in identifying potential influences and developing 
basic theory. Nevertheless, they are limited in their ability to determine the relative 
importance of the treatment variable in more complex field-based settings. The 
experiment only examines a company with a good internal control. The strength of 
internal control system may impact on auditors' judgments of client management 
behaviour. Different results could be obtained when clients have different levels of 
control risk. 
7.5 Future Research 
This study investigates the effects of the honesty and competency of client 
management on auditors' judgments for the cash cycle. Future research could 
investigate the impact of the honesty and competency of audit client management on 
other account balances and also on the overall financial statement level. Further, this 
study presents a case with a company's background that has a good internal control. 
Future research could investigate the effects of auditors' perceptions of client 
management honesty and competency with varying levels of control risk or could 
introduce other risk factors than those related to the honesty and competency of 
client management. 
Experiments could also examine the impact of client honesty and competency on 
auditor's planning judgments. Audit techniques that are "forensic" in nature are 
required when auditor is suspicious of fraud in an audit of financial statements. Thus, 
it would be beneficial if research could investigate the effects of client honesty and 
competency on the nature and scope of audit evidence that auditors would plan to 
collect. 
The results from the behavioural experiment are not consistent with the findings 
from previous research. However, previous research did not consider honesty and 
competency simultaneously, which is what the present study does. This could be the 
explanation for the differences in the findings. The present study can be extended to 
include more variations of the honesty and competency variables so that a more 
complete framework on client behaviours can be developed, which can assist 
auditors in their judgments. 
Appendix 1 
A list of honest and competent behaviours compiled from various sources. This 
list was then short-listed and only the most suitable behaviours were selected 
Source: Comptronix (Boockholdt 2000) 
1. Valid accounts payable have been deleted two months before the year end and reinstated around 
middle of the financial year. 
2. There have been adjustments showing reduction in operating expenses and increase in inventory 
on monthly basis but no documentations exist to support these adjustments. 
3. Regular transfers from inventory to equipment accounts. 
4. No adjustments are made to start-up costs which have been capitalised. 
5. Termination of officer or director whom you know to have reasonable ethical conduct by the 
CEO. 
6. Related individuals (to the directors) sell their stocks in a subsidiary before the subsidiary was 
sold. 
7. Director is being investigated by the tax authority for allegedly reporting significantly less 
income tax. 
Source: Helecom Communications (Ballou and Mueller 2005) 
8. Directors draw modest salary from company but compensate from salaries from other 
companies that they privately owned 
9. Engaging companies that the Directors (and family) owned to do work at the company, for 
example, interior decoration service. 
Source: MicroStrategy, Inc. (Williams and Koch 2004) 
10. Directors have no accounting or finance background 
11. Directors employ aggressive accounting techniques 
Source: Bell Manufacturing Inc. (Keim and Grant 2003) 
12. You found that the chief financial officer had entered the country as illegal immigrant and asked 
you to keep this in confidence. 
Source: WorldCom (Zekany et al. 2004) 
13. The CEO has pledged his share holding in the company as collateral for loans to finance the 
purchase of his personal outside business interests. 
14. The corporate culture is which the leaders and managers are not to be questioned. 
15. Internal audit department are assigned projects which left the staff little time to perform audit 
functions. 
16. Adjustments made at the corporate level, which are not derived from operating activities, have 
not been made available to all managers. 
17. Managers have never received full monthly review from the directors. 
18. CEO/CFO regularly presses managers to reduce costs. 
19. The CFO was awarded Excellence Award and enjoyed a reputation of impeccable integrity 
Source: Waste Disposal Inc. (Ragothaman et al. 2003) 
20. The press reports that acquisitions by your client have been overpaid. 
21. Management implements cost-cutting plans to reduce operating expenses. 
22. Controller does not comply with GAAP. 
Source: Tallahassee BeanCounter (Durtschi 2003) 
23. Manager has been married several times to different women. 
24. Purchasing manager changed supplier to the one who seemed to be a good friend of his. 
Source: A city council case (Strand et al. 2002) 
25. Chief accountant never takes vacation and when employees are urged to take reasonable length 
of vacation each year, he took one day at a time. 
26. Invoices payable to supplier have not been processed in the usual manner. 
27. The senior accountant was unable to provide list of all fixed assets, plus the inventory 
identification number, date of purchase, cost, and current location of each item on the list. The 
excuse given was she had always been busy. 
28. Senior accountant always very busy and often arrives very early for work and leave the office 
rather late at night 
29. The current year's cash collections have declined. The staff accountant explained that there was 
a computer glitch in the individual accounts receivable software that created the need to reduce 
originally recorded amounts to their lower, correct totals. 
30. Customers complained about overdue notices. They said they have paid and had receipt to prove 
it. The staff accountant was unable to locate record of the accounts receivable. 
31. The senior accountant has filed for personal bankruptcy before because he had overextended his 
credit cards by taking too many cash advances. 
Source: HIH Insurance (Owen 2003) 
32. Directors are committed to attend the board of directors meetings and you observe that decision-
making in these meetings is always thorough. 
Source: The AICPA 
(http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/ForensicAndValuation/Resources/Pages/default.aspx) 
33. Suppliers are added to the vendors' list without proper verification 
34. Entering a purchase invoice into the accounting system without checking the authorisation of 
the invoice. 
35. Accounts manager is unable to answer auditor's questions as to why revenue has dropped. 
36. Accounts manager is unable to answer auditor's questions as to why there was a dramatic 
increase in miscellaneous income over the past year. 
37. Operation manager always approves immediately payments to some accounts but some other 
accounts payable are overdue for more than sixty days. 
38. The accounts manager recorded a purchase of fixed asset as expenditure. 
39. The chief accountant is having an affair with a staff. 
40. Approving non-related expenses (e.g. travelling expenses) as company's expenses. 
41. Having unrelated employee (e.g. secretary) to conferences for financial executives. 
42. Giving an expensive gift to an official in the process of negotiating a contract. 
43. Accounts payable and accounts receivable were not clean and reconciled. 
44. Sales orders received are recognised as sales. 
45. Expired inventory are still included in the valuation of inventory at its full costs. 
46. In inventory counting in a pharmaceutical company, more than half-full bottles of medicine are 
counted to the nearest 10% but less than half-full bottles are counted as half-full even though 
the content is very little. 
Source: ASA 240 (AuASB 2009a) 
47. Goods in transit to customers have been included in this year's income from sales. 
48. No authorisation to the adjustments of credit limits of customers. 
49. You vouched a sample of the recorded sales in the sales journal and find that there are a 
significant number of recorded sales which have no sales orders. When you asked the sales 
manager, he answered that these orders have been made electronically and provided you with a 
sample of the electronic order printouts. 
50. The provision for doubtful debt was reduced because the company has received, just before the 
year-end, a settlement from a substantial customer, whose account has been overdue for months. 
51. The sales clerk who made adjustments to the credit limit of a few customers. 
52. The carbon copies of sales vouchers contain original writings adjusting the amounts of credit 
sales being made on some of them. 
53. Some of the purchase orders have no original copies of except for photocopies. 
54. Manager unable to explain to discrepancies from the reconciliation of shipping and billing 
documents. 
55. There are discrepancies between accounts receivable balances and debtors' confirmations. 
56. Significant amount of inventory or physical assets are missing 
57. Auditors are not provided with complete vendors' addresses even after a few requests. 
58. Management complains that auditors ask too many questions. 
59. Management is very slow in providing the information requested by auditors. 
60. It is very difficult for auditors are unable access electronic files to carry out computerised audit. 
61. There are frequent changes to the accounting estimates which are not accompanied by changes 
in circumstances. 
62. Auditors are not invited and informed about directors' meeting. 
63. Management has not rectified weaknesses in internal control which have been reported in the 
previous audit. 
64. Unwillingness to address identified deficiencies in internal control on a timely basis 
Source: Monroe et al. (1993) 
65. Management has a reputation for taking unusual business risks. 
66. Management has been reluctant to accept auditor's adjustments. 
67. There are errors made in the recording of account receivable. 
68. There have been errors in inventory pricing. 
69. Estimates for the provision of doubtful debts have not been accurate. 
70. Management is not experienced or trained in accounting. 
71. Management is inexperienced and lack knowledge. 
72. Management is in dispute with top management over inventory policies. 
73. Auditors disagreed with management's estimate of obsolete inventory in past audits. 
74. A complicated formula is used in the calculation of overheads for inventory. 
75. The company supplies significant portion of its inventory to its subsidiaries. 
76. The collection pattern for accounts receivable has changed significantly over the past year. 
Appendix 2 
Details of Survey Questionnaire 
School of Accounting and Business Information 
College of Business and Economics 
Copland Building 024 
The Australian National University 
ACT 0200 
Telephone: 02 6125 4791 / 02 6125 3807 
Facsimile: 02 6125 0744 
Dear Sir/Madam 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF 
FACTORS AFFECTING AUDITOR'S ASSESSMENT OF CLIENT 
MANAGEMENT HONESTY AND COMPETENCY 
I am a PhD candidate at the Australian National University, Canberra. This survey is 
a part of my PhD thesis examining factors that affect the assessment of honesty and 
competency of client management. The objective of this survey is to gain a general 
consensus on what can be constituted as honesty and competency from an auditor's 
perspective. I would like you to participate in this survey. 
The findings from this survey will be used in the second phase of my research. Your 
response to this survey and any other information you provide will be kept 
confidential. I will take the necessary steps to ensure this. If you agree to participate, 
please read the information sheet and sign the consent letter. Please retain the 
information sheet. 
I would appreciate it very much if you could complete and return the survey together 
with the consent form. I thank you for your cooperation and look forward to your 
reply soon. 
Yours sincerely, 
ROSZANA TAPSIR 
PhD Candidate 
School of Accounting and Business Information 
College of Business and Economics 
Copland Building 024 
The Australian National University 
ACT 0200 
Telephone: 02 6125 4791 / 02 6125 3807 
Facsimile: 02 6125 0744 
E-mail: Roszana.Tapsir@anu.edu.au 
Information Sheet 
A Survey on Factors Affecting Auditors' Assessments of Honesty and 
Competency of Audit Client Management 
Research by Roszana Tapsir 
(a PhD candidate at the Australian National University) 
Please read this sheet carefully and keep it throughout the study. 
This is a preliminary survey examining factors that affect auditors' assessment of 
honesty and competency of client management. The objective of this survey is to 
gain a general consensus on what can be constituted as honesty and competency 
from an auditor's perspective. This survey should not take more than 30 minutes 
to complete. The findings from this survey will be used in the second phase of 
the research. Please complete the survey as per the instructions. Your responses 
to the questions in this survey will be treated with the strictest confidentiality. 
Please note the following: 
• Your participation is on a voluntary basis therefore, you are free to 
withdraw from the study without any prejudice in any way. In such case, 
the record of your participation will be destroyed, unless you agree 
otherwise. 
• All the information you provide will be treated with the strictest 
confidentiality, where individual responses will not be identifiable. 
• The responses will be preserved and kept confidential to the extent 
permissible by law. 
• The result of this study will be part of a research thesis and part of a 
journal article. However, no information on any individual will be 
reported in a way that will allow identification of individual participants. 
• The researcher will answer any questions you may have with regard to the 
study. Any complaint or other issues of concern can be directed to the 
researcher or to Ms Yolanda Shave, Human Research Ethic Officer, 
Research Services Office, Australian National University, (telephone 
number 6125 7945) or email Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au. Please 
keep this Information Sheet for your personal records. 
School of Accounting and Business Information 
College of Business and Economics 
Copland Building 024 
The Australian National University 
ACT 0200 
Telephone: 02 6125 4791 / 02 6125 3807 
Facsimile: 02 6125 0744 
E-mail: Roszana.Tapsir@anu.edu.au 
Consent Form 
A Survey on Factors Affecting Auditors' Assessments of Honesty and Competency 
of Audit Client Management 
Research by Roszana Tapsir 
(a PhD candidate at the Australian National University) 
I have read and understand the information 
provided. I hereby consent to take part in the survey and understand that I 
may withdraw without any reason unspecified and without prejudice. 
I understand that the information provided by me will be kept confidential so 
far as the law allows and only the researcher will have access to the data 
entered into a computer with no link to my personal details. 
I understand that the information gained during the experiment will be 
reported as a thesis result and may be published in a journal article. Every 
reasonable effort will be made to ensure that no information that identifies 
my personal details will be published or disclosed to any report and any of 
those publications without my prior permission. 
Participant Date 
Any complaint or other issues of concern can be directed to the researcher or 
to Ms Yolanda Shave, Human Research Ethic Officer, Research Services 
Office, Australian National University, (telephone number 6125 7945) or 
email Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au. 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
SURVEY OF AUDITORS' PERCEPTIONS OF HONESTY AND 
COMPETENCY OF CLIENT MANAGEMENT 
Roszana Tapsir 
PhD Candidate 
School of Accounting and Business Information Systems 
College of Business and Economics 
Copland Building 024 
The Australian National University 
ACT 0200 
Telephone: 02 61254791 
Email: Roszana.Tapsir@anu.edu.au 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Thank you for participating in this survey. 
As you are aware, auditing standards require auditors to assess the honesty and 
competency of client management (ASA240 and ASA315). Despite their importance, 
there is little knowledge of what factors affect auditors' assessments of the client 
management honesty and competency. As indicated in the attached letter, this is a 
preliminary survey for my PhD thesis. Its objective is to gain a general consensus on 
what can be constituted as honesty and competency when assessing the audit client's 
management. The findings from this survey will be used in the second phase of my 
research. 
This survey should not take more than 30 minutes. It consists of Parts 1 and 2. Please 
complete both parts. 
For Part 1, you are required to: 
1. Read the circumstance in the first column; and 
2. Assess whether the circumstance is more likely to indicate honesty or 
competency of the auditee [Question (a)] by circling either H (if you think the 
circumstance is more likely to indicate honesty) or C (if you think the 
circumstance is more likely to indicate competency); or N (if you think it 
indicates neither honesty nor competency); and 
3. Assess whether the circumstance contributes to low or high risk of fraud or 
error in the financial statements [Question (b)] and circle the appropriate 
number to indicate the level of risk that you think the circumstance 
represents. 
The circumstances are independent. Please treat them separately. These 
circumstances may not be representative of what you normally encounter. However, 
based on your experience, please assess whether each one is more likely to indicate 
honesty or competency of your audit client. 
Part 2 asks you to provide information on your background. 
I would be most grateful if you will complete the survey and return it to me by 
Monday, 21 May 2007. 
Your responses to the questions and other information you provide will remain 
confidential to me and will be used only for the purpose of my research. 
Please now proceed with the survey. Thank you again for your participation. 
Roszana Tapsir 
PhD Candidate 
Australian National University 
PARTI 
Circumstances involving management or 
those charged with governance of the audit 
client 
Question (a) 
Does the circumstance indicate honesty or 
competency of the auditee? (Circle either H 
or C or N) 
Honesty Competency Neither 
Question (b) 
Does the circumstance contribute to low or 
high risk of fraud or error in the financial 
statements? (Circle the appropriate 
number). 
Low Risk High Risk 
1. The accounts manager is unable to 
answer your questions as to why there 
has been a dramatic increase in 
miscellaneous income over the past year. 
2. There have been adjustments showing a 
reduction in operating expenses and an 
increase in inventory on a monthly basis 
but no documentation exists to support 
these adjustments. 
3. There have been regular instructions from 
the chief accountant to transfer inventory 
to the equipment account. 
4. Individuals related to the directors sell 
their shares in a subsidiary before the 
subsidiary was sold. 
H C N 
H C N 
H C N 
H C N 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Circumstances involving management or 
those charged with governance of the audit 
client 
Question (a) 
Does the circumstance indicate honesty or 
competency of the auditee? (Circle either H 
or C or N) 
Honesty Competency Neither 
Question (b) 
Does the circumstance contribute to low or 
high risk of fraud or error in the financial 
statements? (Circle the appropriate 
number). 
Low Risk High Risk 
5. The CEO terminated the vice president 
and a director who questioned the CEO's 
action to capitalise start-up costs with the 
intention to maintain or increase the stock 
price and earnings. 
6. The directors engage companies that they 
(and their families) own to do work for 
the company, for example, interior 
decoration service. 
7. A director is being investigated by the 
Australian Tax Office for allegedly 
reporting significantly less personal 
income. 
8. The purchasing manager added suppliers 
to the vendors' list without proper 
verification. 
H C N 
H C N 
H C N 
H C N 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Circumstances involving management or 
those charged with governance of the audit 
client 
Question (a) 
Does the circumstance indicate honesty or 
competency of the auditee? (Circle either H 
or C or N) 
Honesty Competency Neither 
Question (b) 
Does the circumstance contribute to low or 
high risk of fraud or error in the financial 
statements? (Circle the appropriate 
number). 
Low Risk High Risk 
9. The manager is unable to explain 
discrepancies arising from the 
reconciliation of shipping and billing 
documents. 
10. The CEO and CFO have not made 
available to all managers reports on 
adjustments made at the corporate level, 
which are not derived from operating 
activities. 
11. A significant amount of physical 
inventory is missing. 
12. Management has not rectified 
weaknesses in internal control that have 
been reported in the previous audit. 
13. The credit manager has not been 
observing the policy to authorise the 
adjustments of customers' credit limits. 
H C N 
H C N 
H C N 
H C N 
H C N 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Circumstances involving management or 
those charged with governance of the audit 
client 
Question (a) 
Does the circumstance indicate honesty or 
competency of the auditee? (Circle either H 
or C or N) 
Honesty Competency Neither 
Question (b) 
Does the circumstance contribute to low or 
high risk of fraud or error in the financial 
statements? (Circle the appropriate 
number). 
Low Risk High Risk 
14. Directors are committed to attend the 
board of directors meetings and you 
observe that decision-making in these 
meetings is always thorough. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. Management is very slow in providing 
the information that you request. H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. The purchasing manager changed 
suppliers to the one who appeared to be a 
good friend of his. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. The chief accountant never takes 
vacation and when employees are urged 
to take reasonable length of vacation 
each year, he took one day at a time. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. Invoices payable to a particular supplier 
have not been processed in the usual 
manner. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Circumstances involving management or 
those charged with governance of the audit 
client 
Question (a) 
Does the circumstance indicate honesty or 
competency of the auditee? (Circle either H 
or C or N) 
Honesty Competency Neither 
Question (b) 
Does the circumstance contribute to low or 
high risk of fraud or error in the financial 
statements? (Circle the appropriate 
number). 
Low Risk High Risk 
19. The CFO confided to you that he entered 
the country as an illegal immigrant and 
asked you to keep this in confidence. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20 The CFO has more than 10 years of 
experience in the industry. H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. The CEO has pledged his shares in the 
company as collateral for loans to finance 
the purchase of his personal outside 
business interests. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. The senior accountant has been unable to 
provide a list of all fixed assets, asset 
identification numbers, cost, date of 
purchase, and current location of each 
item on the list. The excuse given is she 
has always been busy. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Circumstances involving management or 
those charged with governance of the audit 
client 
Question (a) 
Does the circumstance indicate honesty or 
competency of the auditee? (Circle either H 
or C or N) 
Honesty Competency Neither 
Question (b) 
Does the circumstance contribute to low or 
high risk of fraud or error in the financial 
statements? (Circle the appropriate 
number). 
Low Risk High Risk 
23. The sales manager sometimes made 
adjustments to the amounts of credit sales 
in writing on some of the carbon copies 
of sales vouchers. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24. You have not been provided with a 
complete list of vendors' addresses even 
after a few requests. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25. The Financial Controller does not comply 
with GAAP on some material matters H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26. Customers complain about overdue 
notices. They say they have paid and 
have receipts to prove it. The staff 
accountant is unable to locate records of 
the related accounts receivable. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Circumstances involving management or 
those charged with governance of the audit 
client 
Question (a) 
Does the circumstance indicate honesty or 
competency of the auditee? (Circle either H 
or C or N) 
Honesty Competency Neither 
Question (b) 
Does the circumstance contribute to low or 
high risk of fraud or error in the financial 
statements? (Circle the appropriate 
number). 
Low Risk High Risk 
27. The accounts manager is always ready 
with satisfactory answers when asked 
about fluctuations in revenue. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28. The financial director gives an instruction 
to delete valid accounts payable two 
months before the year end and reinstate 
them around middle of the financial year. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
39. The accounts manager processes 
vouchers for payments without checking 
for authorisation. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30. Top management has been in dispute 
with you, the auditor, over inventory 
policies. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
31. The credit manager is unable to explain 
discrepancies between accounts 
receivable balances and debtors' 
confirmations. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Circumstances involving management or 
those charged with governance of the audit 
client 
Question (a) 
Does the circumstance indicate honesty or 
competency of the auditee? (Circle either H 
or C or N) 
Honesty Competency Neither 
Question (b) 
Does the circumstance contribute to low or 
high risk of fraud or error in the financial 
statements? (Circle the appropriate 
number). 
Low Risk High Risk 
32. The chief accountant is having an affair 
with an employee. H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
33. The CEO and CFO purposely assign the 
internal audit department projects that 
leave the staff little time to perform audit 
functions. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
34. Some purchase orders have no original 
copies, just photocopies. H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
35. A director gives an expensive gift to a 
third party in the process of negotiating a 
contract. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
36. Accounts payable and accounts 
receivable are not reconciled. H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
37. Expired inventory are still included in the 
valuation of inventory at full cost. H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Circumstances involving management or 
those charged with governance of the audit 
client 
Question (a) 
Does the circumstance indicate honesty or 
competency of the auditee? (Circle either H 
or C or N) 
Honesty Competency Neither 
Question (b) 
Does the circumstance contribute to low or 
high risk of fraud or error in the financial 
statements? (Circle the appropriate 
number). 
Low Risk High Risk 
38. The financial controller tells the auditor 
his concern about a weakness in the 
control system. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
39. Management approves non-related 
expenses (e.g., personal travelling 
expenses) as a company expenses. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
40. The accounts manager returns vouchers 
for payment, without proper authorisation 
to the purchasing department. 
H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
41. The CFO is inexperienced and lacks 
knowledge of the industry. H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
42. Sales orders received are recognised as 
sales immediately. H C N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Circumstances involving management or 
those charged with governance of the audit 
client 
Question (a) 
Does the circumstance indicate honesty or 
competency of the auditee? (Circle either H 
or C or N) 
Honesty Competency Neither 
Question (b) 
Does the circumstance contribute to low or 
high risk of fraud or error in the financial 
statements? (Circle the appropriate 
number). 
Low Risk High Risk 
43. The chief accountant reduced the 
provision for doubtful debts because the 
company received, just before the year-
end, a settlement from a substantial 
customer, whose account had been 
overdue for months. 
44. The accounts manager recorded the 
purchase of a fixed asset as an expense. 
45 The CFO has a reputation of impeccable 
integrity and has won a CFO Excellence 
Award. 
46. Four years ago, the senior accountant 
filed for personal bankruptcy because he 
had overextended his credit cards by 
taking too many cash advances. 
H C N 
H C N 
H C N 
H C N 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Circumstances involving management or 
those charged with governance of the audit 
client 
Question (a) 
Does the circumstance indicate honesty or 
competency of the auditee? (Circle either H 
or C or N) 
Honesty Competency Neither 
Question (b) 
Does the circumstance contribute to low or 
high risk of fraud or error in the financial 
statements? (Circle the appropriate 
number). 
Low Risk High Risk 
47. Management does not assist you in 
accessing electronic files to carry out 
computerised audit procedures. 
48. Half of the directors have been absent 
from board meetings, and, when they are 
there, they do not contribute significantly 
in the discussions. 
H C N 
H C N 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
PLEASE TURN OVER 
PART 2 
Please indicate your gender. 
(Tick the appropriate box) 
Male 
Female 
2. How many years of audit-related experience do 
years 
you have? 
3. Have you held any of these positions? 
(Tick all those that are applicable)_ 
Audit staff 
Senior auditor 
Audit partner 
Audit manager 
Internal auditor 
Audit committee member 
Other 
(Please specify): 
Your current position 
(Tick only ONE box) 
Audit staff 
Senior auditor 
Audit partner 
Audit manager 
Internal auditor 
Audit committee member 
Other 
(Please specify): 
Have you worked (or are you working) with any of the following 
firm type? 
(Tick all those that appropriate) 
Big-4 r z z 
Medium size firm 
Small firm 
Other 
(Please specify) 
APPENDIX 3 
Details of Behavioural Experiment 
School of Accounting and Business Information 
College of Business and Economics 
Copland Building 024 
The Australian National University 
ACT 0200 
Telephone: 02 6125 4791 / 02 6125 3807 
Facsimile: 02 6125 0744 
1 August 2008 
Dear Sir/Madam 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A CASE STUDY ON ASSESSMENTS OF 
AUDIT ASSERTIONS 
I am a PhD candidate at the Australian National University, Canberra. This case study is 
the second phase of my PhD thesis examining auditors' judgments in the assessments of 
audit assertions. This case study is supervised by Professor Gary Monroe from the 
School of Accounting and Business Information Systems, College of Business and 
Economics, the Australian National University. He may be contacted at 02 6125 5906 or 
through email: gary.monroe@anu.edu.au 
Your response to the questions in this case study is essential in the study of audit 
judgments and thus will contribute to the audit profession in general. Your response in 
this case study and any other information you provide will be kept confidential. I will 
take the necessary steps to ensure this. If you agree to participate, please read the 
information sheet. 
Please indicate your acknowledgment of the receipt of $20 shopping voucher after 
completing the case study. I thank you for your cooperation and look forward to your 
reply soon. 
Yours sincerely, 
ROSZANA TAPSIR 
PhD Candidate 
School of Accounting and Business Information 
College of Business and Economics 
Copland Building 024 
The Australian National University 
ACT 0200 
Telephone: 02 6125 4791 / 02 6125 3807 
Facsimile: 02 6125 0744 
Information Sheet 
A Case Study on Assessments of Audit Assertions. 
Research by Roszana Tapsir 
PhD candidate 
Supervised by Prof. Gary Monroe 
School of Accounting and Business Information Systems 
College of Business and Economics 
The Australian National University 
Telephone: 02 6125 5906 
Email: gary.monroe@anu.edu.au 
Please read this sheet carefully and keep it throughout the study. 
This behavioural experiment is the second phase of my research work. The first phase was a survey 
questionnaire. The results from the survey are used in this experiment. The objective of this case study is 
to examine auditors' judgments in the assessments of audit assertions. The findings are expected to impact 
on the process which judgments are made. The findings are also expected to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of these judgments. Even though the extant literature on auditors' judgments is extensive, little 
is known about this important aspect. 
This case study should take not more than 20 minutes to complete. Please complete the case study as per 
the instructions. Your responses in this case study will be treated with the strictest confidentiality. 
Please note the following: 
• Your participation is on a voluntary basis therefore, you are free to withdraw from the study 
without any prejudice in any way. In such case, the record of your participation will be destroyed, 
unless you agree otherwise. 
• All the information you provide will be treated with the strictest confidentiality, where individual 
responses will not be identifiable. 
• The responses will be preserved and kept confidential to the extent permissible by law. 
• The result of this study will be part of a research thesis and part of a journal article. However, no 
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participants. 
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A CASE STUDY ON THE ASSESSMENTS OF AUDIT ASSERTIONS 
Thank you for participating in this research. 
As indicated in the attached letter, this is the second phase of my PhD research. The 
objective is to examine the assessments of audit assertions. 
Your responses to the questions and other information you provide will remain 
confidential to me and will be used only for the purpose of my research. 
Please now proceed with the case study. Thank you again for your participation. 
Roszana Tapsir 
PhD Candidate 
The Australian National University 
A summary of the outcome of this research can be provided to you if you wish. Please 
provide your contact address (email or postal address) below. Please tear off this portion 
and submit it separately. 
General Instructions 
Please read carefully the following instructions before you actually complete the case 
study which is presented from pages 4 to 15. 
• This case study will take approximately 20 minutes to complete. 
• The responses you give should represent your individual judgment. Please do not 
discuss the case materials with anyone else. 
• This case study consists of three parts as follows: 
o Part 1: Information for an audit client. 
o Part 2: Additional information and audit evidence relating to specific 
audit assertions, 
o Part 3: Debriefing questions. 
This study examines auditors' judgments in the assessments of audit assertions. In this 
case, you are asked to assess whether particular audit assertions are true or false given 
audit evidence. The evidence will include the background information of an audit client 
company and audit evidence obtained during the audit. Your judgment will be in the 
form of circling a number on a seven-point rating scale that indicates how strongly you 
believe that the assertion is true or not true. The scales are anchored by "Strongly 
believe that the assertion is NOT true" and "Strongly believe that the assertion is true". 
Please proceed with the case study. 
Part 1: Audit of Telcom Ltd 
Telcom Ltd is a mobile communication retail company. Telcom has been the audit client 
of your firm since it became a publicly listed company in 2005. Under the audit 
agreement between your firm and Telcom, you must provide assurance as to whether the 
financial statements present fairly the financial position and the results of operations. 
You are currently working on the audit of Telcom and you want to verify if the cash and 
cash equivalent balance on the 2008 balance sheet is fairly presented. 
As part of your audit of the Cash at Bank Account and the underlying related cash 
transactions, you obtained evidence about the following three assertions. 
Assertion 1: All cash transactions have been recorded (Completeness). 
Assertion 2: Cash transactions have been recorded in the proper period (Cut-off). 
Assertion 3: Cash transactions have been recorded using the proper amounts. (Accuracy). 
The following pages contain information about Telcom Ltd. 
Background Information 
Telcom Ltd 
Telcom's first store was opened in 1995. Telcom has grown rapidly from a single Gold 
Coast store in 1995 to almost 150 retail locations around the country. It maintains its 
head office in the Gold Coast. Telcom Ltd is now the largest specialist mobile 
communications retailer and is the largest independent Telstra mobile dealer. It 
successfully listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) on 2 November 2005. So 
far, Telcom has 127 stores, and 23 nominated dealers, including some licensed shops 
with Telstra. The latest acquisition from Telstra is one of Telstra biggest mobile dealers, 
OZ One, which was agreed on 2 Julyt 2008. OZ One is a mobile phone retailer and has 
15 stores in Western Australia, making this acquisition Telcom's biggest project 
involving the standardisation and improvements of the operation of the nominated dealer 
channels. 
Telcom has achieved double digit compounded growth over the last 10 years. The year 
2008 has been another successful year for Telcom with: 
• total operating revenue of $181.8 million, an increase of almost 20% from the 
previous financial year; 
• net profit after tax (NPAT) of $10.7 million, an increase of 26% from the 
previous year; 
• earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) of $17.4 million, an increase of 
almost 30% from the previous year. 
The following are figures for earnings per share and other financial measures of the 
return to shareholders: 
2008 2007 
Basic earnings per share (cents) 8.59 6.90 
Return on equity 68.6% 50.0% 
Debt/equity ratio 42.5% 84.7% 
In his report, the Chairman states that Telcom is in position to grow and expects to 
improve profit performance in the 2009 financial year. There are plans to open 8 to 10 
more stores in addition to OZ One. The results for the first half of 2009 are expected to 
be similar to the 2008 first half due to costs associated with the integration of OZ One 
and an anticipated drop in Telstra transition payments. The company aims to maintain 
gearing below 50% and the Board considers that the current level of gearing of 42.5% is 
well within acceptable limits. 
Revenue and profit figures for the recent three years are as follows: 
2008 2007 2006 
Net profit after tax 
Revenue from operating activities 
EBIT 
$m 
181.8 
17.4 
10.7 
$m 
151.9 
13.4 
8.6 
$m 
144.9 
16.0 
9.6 
On 2 July 2008, the company agreed to purchase OZ One for $6 million, to be funded 
from cash reserves. 
On 5 July 2008, the company declared a fully franked dividend of 4 cents per share. This 
amounted to $5,005,912. This dividend has not been provided for in the 30 June 2008 
financial statements. 
The financial year ended 30 June 2008 was one of the most competitive and changing 
environments for the mobile communications industry, with the launches of various 
arrays of products by other major service providers. These market conditions resulted in 
Telcom implementing significant product shifts throughout the year. 
The company has in place a statement of corporate governance. This statement is in 
accordance with the Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council's 
(ASXCGC) Principles of Good Corporate Governance Practice and Best Practice 
Recommendations (Guidelines). This statement consists of among other things: the 
requirement to disclose any director's interests; independence of directors are assessed 
regularly; employees and directors to make ethical and responsible decisions; and the 
CEO and CFO are required to state in writing that the financial reports are produced 
with integrity. 
Executive Directors receive fixed remuneration. Under the Executive Service 
Agreement, they are also entitled to an annual salary review and bonus based on the 
performance of their duties and obligations. Bonus payments to key managers are at the 
discretion of the Executive Directors who take into account the Company and individual 
performance against key performance indicators. In compliance with the ASXCGC 
recommendations, Telcom established a Remuneration and Nomination Committee. The 
majority of the members are independent directors. 
Your firm has been auditing Telcom since it became a publicly listed company and has 
issued an unqualified audit opinion on the financial statements of Telcom. Based on the 
prior year's financial statements and the review of results of 2007 audit, materiality has 
been set at $2,000,000 for balance sheet items and $1,000,000 for income statement 
items this year. 
In performing your audit of Telcom, you work very closely with Mr Adam Stewart, the 
Financial Controller. Mr Stewart always expresses his concerns whenever he feels that 
some aspects of internal control are not observed. Telcom's internal control is assessed 
as moderate. However, in most cases where breakdowns have been observed in 
Telcom's internal control procedures in past audits, and with Mr Stewart's help, you 
were able to perform related substantive audit procedures to identify any material 
misstatements that might exist in the accounts. 
Your current year's audit also revealed that there were a number of sales invoices 
included in the current year's results for product sales that were actually delivered on the 
first two days of the next financial year despite the fact that title to the goods did not 
transfer until the goods were delivered to the customer. The items had not been included 
in inventory, but the profit on these sales had effectively been "anticipated". The effect 
was a material increase in profit. Mr Stewart refused to reverse the sales as he argued 
there was no question about whether the profits were real or not, it was just a matter of 
one or two day's timing. Subsequent discussions with Mr Stewart indicated to you that 
he was not aware that title to the goods did not transfer until the goods were delivered to 
the customer. 
The following pages contain Telcom's summary of financial statements that consist of 
the income statements for the years ended 30 June 2007 and 2008, balance sheets as at 
those dates and cash flow statements for those years. 
Summary of Financial Statements 
Income Statement for the year ended 30 June 
2008 2007 
(Unaudited) (Audited) 
$'000 $'000 
Sale of goods 129,376 110,242 
Fee revenue 30,819 17,473 
Commission revenue 20,874 23,110 
Other Revenue 734 1,070 
181,803 151,895 
Cost of sales (92,971) (79,962) 
Gross profit 88,832 71,933 
Other income 3,890 3,633 
Employee benefit expense (47,304) (36,485) 
Marketing expenses (4,108) (4,737) 
Operating lease rental expense (10,942) (8,551) 
Depreciation and amortisation expense (4,511) (3,538) 
Other expenses (8,491) (8,880) 
Finance costs (852) (559) 
Profit before income tax 16,514 12,816 
Income tax expense (5,773) (4,265) 
Net profit for the year 10,741 8,551 
Earnings per share (cents per share) 
- basic profit for the year 8.59 6.90 
Dividends paid per share (cents per share) 8 
Balance Sheet 
As at 30 June 
2008 2007 
(Unaudited) (Audited) 
$'000 S'OOO 
Assets 
Current Assets 
Cash and cash equivalent 12,038 3,657 
Trade and other receivables 13,040 10,745 
Inventories 7,050 6,368 
Prepayments 1,009 794 
Total Current Assets 33,137~ 21,564 
Non-current Assets 
Other financial assets 576 546 
Available for sale investments 0 2 
Deferred tax asset 2,514 2,136 
Plant and equipment 11,614 9,399 
Intangible assets and goodwill 16,184 17,014 
Total Non-current Assets 30,888~ 29,097 
Total Assets 64,025 50,661 
Liabilities 
Current Liabilities 
Trade and other payables 17,765 15,106 
Interest bearing loans and borrowings 2,601 2,683 
Deferred tax liabilities 1,807 454 
Provisions 2,716 2,559 
Total Current Liabilities 24,889 20,802 
Non-current Liabilities 
Trade and other payables 565 672 
Interest bearing loans and borrowings 8,807 10,571 
Deferred tax liabilities 1,170 1,546 
Provisions 1,750 1,416 
Total Non-current Liabilities 12,292 14,205 
Total Liabilities 37,181 35,007 
Net Assets 26,844 15,654 
Equity 
Contributed equity 4,128 4,128 
Retained earnings 22,267 11,526 
Reserve 449 0 
Total Equity 26,844 15,654 
Cash Flow Statement 
For the year ended 30 June 
Cash flows from operating activities 
Receipts from customers 
Payments to suppliers and employees 
Interest received 
Finance costs 
Income tax paid 
Net GST remitted 
Net cash flow from/(used in) operating activities 
Cash flows from investing activities 
Proceeds from the sale of plant and equipment 
Proceeds from the disposal of investment 
Repayments of advances to shareholders 
Purchase of plant and equipment 
Purchase of intangibles 
Acquisition of subsidiary, net of cash required 
Purchase of interest bearing deposits 
Net cash flow from/(used in) financing activities 
Cash flows from financing activities 
Proceeds from borrowings 
Repayments of borrowings 
Repayment of finance lease principal 
Equity dividends paid 
Net cash flow from/(used in) financing activities 
Net increase/(decrease) in cash and cash equivalents 
Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of period 
Cash and cash equivalents at end of period 
2008 2007 
(Unaudited) (Audited) 
$'000 $'000 
179,508 169,566 
(151,332) (154,289) 
734 1,070 
(852) (559) 
(4,553) (9,737) 
(5,440) (5,405) 
18,065 646 
92 135 
6 0 
292 (292) 
(4,907) (922) 
(359) (179) 
79 (16,928) 
(30) 1,124 
(4,827) (17,062) 
345 18,450 
(3,469) (10,701) 
(1,733) (1,602) 
0 (10,000) 
(4,857) (3,853) 
8,381 (20,269) 
3,657 23,926 
12,038 3,657 
Part 2: Assessments of Audit Assertions 
For this part, please provide your assessments on the audit assertions. Your judgment 
will be in the form of circling a number on a seven-point rating scale that indicates how 
strongly you believe that the assertion is true or not true. The scales are anchored by 
"Strongly believe that the assertion is NOT true" and "Strongly believe that the assertion 
is true". The following pages describe some of the audit procedures and the audit 
evidence you have obtained relating to the determination of the three assertions. In 
stating your assessment on one audit assertion, you should take into consideration only 
(1) audit evidence regarding that particular audit assertion and (2) the background 
information. 
To verify Assertion 1 (Completeness): 
You were examining inter-company transfers made by Telcom to its subsidiaries. You 
paid particular attention to transfers made during the month of June 2008. Inter-company 
transfers that took place during that month totalled $3,150,000. You came across two 
transfers of $48,450 made to a subsidiary that appeared in the bank statements for June 
2008 but were not recorded anywhere in Telcom's books of accounts. You made an 
inquiry to that subsidiary. However, the accountant from the subsidiary could not verify 
that they had received the transfer. You discussed this with the Financial Controller, Mr 
Stewart, who assures you that this is simply a bank error and the two "transfers" will be 
corrected by the bank next month. 
Your assessment about Assertion 1: All cash transactions have been recorded. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly believe that the 
assertion is NOT true 
Strongly believe that 
the assertion is true 
To verify Assertion 2 (Cut-off): 
In addition to examining unpresented cheques that appeared in the bank reconciliation 
for the month of June 2008, you also examined the cheques that had been drawn but 
were not mailed during the same month. You were surprised to find that some of the 
cheques listed as unpresented in the bank reconciliation for the month of June 2008 had 
not been mailed to suppliers. The total of these cheques was $1,055,200 and the 
unpresented cheques listed in the bank reconciliation for the last month of the financial 
year totalled $3,450,000. You discussed this with Mr Stewart because you understood 
that one of the debt covenants attached to Telcom's long term borrowing involved the 
company's current ratio. Mr Stewart assured you that the reclassification of these 
unpresented cheques back to trade payables was not warranted since the company's 
current ratio was well within the covenant limits. 
Your assessment about Assertion 2: Cash transactions have been recorded in 
the proper period. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly believe that the Strongly believe that 
assertion is NOT true the assertion is true 
To verify Assertion 3 (Accuracy): 
You were comparing paid cheques recorded in the cash payments journal with cheques 
cleared by the bank as listed in the bank statement. There was one cheque which was 
cleared by the bank for the value $2,222,222.00. The same cheque was recorded as 
$222,222.00 in the cash payments journal. You discussed this with Mr Stewart, the 
Financial Controller, who assured you that this must be another bank error and he would 
request that the bank correct their mistake immediately. 
Your assessment about Assertion 
using the proper amounts. 
3: Cash transactions have been recorded 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly believe that the 
assertion is NOT true 
Strongly believe that 
the assertion is true 
To verify Overall Assertion 
Your assessments about this overall assertion: The cash transactions have 
been recorded fairly. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly believe that the 
assertion is NOT true 
Strongly believe that 
the assertion is true 
To verify Overall Assertion 
Your assessments about this overall assertion: The cash and cash equivalent 
balance on the 2008 balance sheet is fairly presented. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly believe that the 
assertion is NOT true 
Strongly believe that 
the assertion is true 
PLEASE DO NOT CHANGE YOUR ANSWER ONCE YOU PROCEED TO THE 
NEXT SECTION. 
New Additional Information 
You audited a sample of non-inventory transactions in the cash payments journal. You 
discovered that one of the travel expenditures paid by Telcom was for airfares to Hawaii 
for Mr Stewart and his family. The expenditure had been approved only by Mr Stewart. 
You pointed this out to Mr. Stewart. Nevertheless, there was no adjustment made with 
respect to this personal payment. 
Mr Stewart was recently honoured with the prestigious CFO of the Year Award. This 
award is presented annually to an outstanding CFO who has demonstrated, to an 
independent panel, outstanding levels of achievements across six professional attributes 
including a high technical competence in corporate accounting and financial reporting. 
Please state your assessment on whether the assertions are true or false based on the 
background information, audit evidence, and the new additional information provided 
above. Please make the assessments of the audit assertions independently. Again, you 
should take into consideration only audit evidence regarding that particular audit 
assertion and the background information. 
To verify Assertion 1 (Completeness): 
Your revised assessment about Assertion 1: All cash transactions have been 
recorded. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly believe that the 
assertion is NOT true 
Strongly believe that 
the assertion is true 
To verify Assertion 2 (Cut-off): 
Your revised assessment about Assertion 2: Cash transactions have been 
recorded in the proper period. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly believe that the 
assertion is NOT true 
Strongly believe that 
the assertion is true 
To verify Assertion 3 (Accuracy): 
Your revised assessment about Assertion 3: Cash transactions have been 
recorded using the proper amounts. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly believe that the 
assertion is NOT true 
Strongly believe that 
the assertion is true 
To verify Overall Assertion 
Your revised assessments about this overall assertion: The cash transactions 
have been recorded fairly. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly believe that the 
assertion is NOT true 
Strongly believe that 
the assertion is true 
To verify Overall Assertion 
Your revised assessments about this overall assertion: The cash 
equivalent balance on the 2008 balance sheet is fairly presented. 
and cash 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 
Strongly believe that the 
assertion is NOT true 
Strongly believe that 
the assertion is true 
Part 3: Debriefing Questions 
Question Set 1: Additional Questions. 
1. Please assess the level of honesty of the Financial Controller 
1 2 3 4 5 
Dishonest Moderately Honest 
2. Please assess the level of competency of the Financial Controller. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Incompetent Moderately Competent 
7 
Honest 
Competent 
Question Set 2: Information on yourself. 
1. What is your gender? Please tick 
Male Female 
2. How old are you? 
years 
3. How many years of audit-related experience do you have? 
years 
4. What is your current position? Please tick ONE box only 
Audit Staff 
Senior Auditor 
Audit Manager 
Audit Partner 
Internal Auditor 
Audit Committee Member 
Other 
Please specify 
5. Which type of firm are you working for? Please tick ONE box only 
Big-4 Firm 
Medium Size Firm 
Small Firm 
Other 
Please specify 
6. Have you ever worked for any of the following firms? Please tick the relevant box(es). 
Big-4 Firm 
Medium Size Firm 
Small Firm 
Other 
Please specify 
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